Big blow to AAP as Chadha, 6 more Rajya Sabha MPs quit, join BJP

Seven Rajya Sabha members announced their departure from their original party and declared their intention to merge with another party, constituting one of t...

What Happened

Seven Rajya Sabha members announced their departure from their original party and declared their intention to merge with another party, constituting one of the largest single-episode parliamentary defections in the Rajya Sabha.
The seven members — Raghav Chadha, Ashok Mittal, Sandeep Pathak, Harbhajan Singh, Rajinder Gupta, Vikramjit Sahney, and Swati Maliwal — represented a majority of their original party's Rajya Sabha strength.
Their move raised immediate questions about whether they had incurred disqualification under the Tenth Schedule's anti-defection provisions, or whether the merger exception protected their membership.
This event provides an occasion to examine the precise mechanics of anti-defection law: what triggers disqualification, how "voluntary giving up" is defined, and when the merger exception applies.

Static Topic Bridges

Grounds for Disqualification Under the Tenth Schedule

The Tenth Schedule sets out specific grounds under Paragraph 2 on which a member of Parliament or a State Legislature can be disqualified on account of defection.

A member is liable to disqualification if they:

(a) Voluntarily give up membership of the political party on whose ticket they were elected (or, in the case of independently elected members, if they subsequently join a political party); or

(b) Vote or abstain from voting in the House contrary to any direction issued by the political party, or by any person or authority authorised by such party to give such direction, without the prior permission of the party and without such vote or abstention having been condoned by the party within 15 days.

"Voluntarily giving up membership" is broader than formal resignation from a party. The Supreme Court has held in cases including Ravi Naik v. Union of India (1994) that "voluntary giving up" can be inferred from conduct — publicly joining another party, making statements against the original party, or acting consistently with membership in another party can all constitute voluntary giving up even without formal resignation.
In the case of Rajya Sabha members, the relevant party is the party on whose ticket they contested the Rajya Sabha election (since RS members are elected by State Legislative Assemblies via proportional representation, not by direct public vote).
The disqualification operates prospectively — the member loses the seat for the remainder of the term.

Connection to this news: The moment the seven MPs announced their departure and intention to join another party, they arguably met the test of "voluntarily giving up membership" unless their act could be sheltered under the merger exception. This is why the merger petition was filed simultaneously.

Voluntary Giving Up of Membership — Judicial Interpretation

Courts have developed a nuanced body of doctrine on what constitutes "voluntarily giving up membership."

Formal resignation from the party: Clearly constitutes voluntary giving up.
Joining another party: Equally clear — formally becoming a member of another party satisfies the test.
Public statements against the party: In G. Viswanathan v. Speaker, Tamil Nadu Legislative Assembly (1996), the Supreme Court held that publicly denouncing the party and attending the other party's meetings could amount to voluntary giving up, even without formal resignation.
Abstaining from attending party meetings: May not alone constitute voluntary giving up, but combined with other conduct, can be relevant.
Key principle: The test is whether, from the totality of the member's conduct, they have unequivocally demonstrated that they no longer regard themselves as a member of the original party.
There is an important distinction: a member can resign from the party but not give up their seat (the seat belongs to the electorate, not the party), but the Tenth Schedule converts the act of giving up party membership into a ground for disqualification from the seat.

Connection to this news: The seven MPs' public announcement of leaving and joining another party — even before any formal merger petition was filed — triggered the "voluntary giving up" question. Their argument that they are protected by the merger exception (not by immunity from voluntary giving up) is an implicit concession that a ground for disqualification arose.

The Merger Exception — When Defection Is Constitutionally Protected

As detailed above, Paragraph 4 of the Tenth Schedule exempts members from disqualification when their action results from a merger of their original political party with another, provided at least two-thirds of the legislature party's members consent to the merger.

The merger exception was designed to allow genuine, principled ideological realignment at the party level — where a party as a whole decides to merge — rather than individual opportunism.
In the Rajya Sabha: The "legislature party" is the group of all Rajya Sabha members belonging to a given political party. Two-thirds of that group must consent.
Seven MPs out of approximately 10 Rajya Sabha members of the original party — this exceeds the two-thirds threshold at the legislature party level.
The dispute is not about the numerical threshold being met, but about whether the legislature party's act alone can constitute a "merger" or whether the political party as an organisation must itself merge.
Critical distinction: If courts later hold that the merger exception requires an organisational (national-level) party merger, then the seven MPs' protection falls away, and the original disqualification ground (voluntary giving up) would apply — potentially making them liable for disqualification.

Connection to this news: The legal outcome turns on this interpretive question, which ultimately may have to be resolved by the Supreme Court after Kihoto Hollohan's limited judicial review standard is applied.

Rajya Sabha — Special Character and Anti-Defection

The Rajya Sabha, as the upper house of Parliament, has some distinct features relevant to anti-defection law.

Rajya Sabha members are not directly elected by the public — they are elected by State Legislative Assemblies (MLAs voting) using single transferable vote. This means the "party mandate" is delivered through state legislators, not directly through citizen votes.
RS members serve six-year terms with one-third retiring every two years. They cannot be dissolved (unlike the Lok Sabha).
The Chairman of the Rajya Sabha (who is the Vice President of India) is the designated authority under the Tenth Schedule for RS disqualification proceedings.
Unlike the Lok Sabha Speaker, the RS Chairman is not a member of the House and is considered more institutionally distant from day-to-day partisan politics — though the Chairman is still elected to the Vice-Presidency by an electoral college in which political parties participate.
In practice, the RS Chairman's decisions on disqualification petitions are also subject to judicial review under Kihoto Hollohan standards.

Connection to this news: The RS Chairman's dual role — receiving both the merger petition and the competing disqualification petition — places the Chairman at the centre of a constitutional adjudication that will significantly shape the Tenth Schedule's jurisprudence.

Key Facts & Data

Seventh Schedule defectors (all Rajya Sabha): Raghav Chadha, Ashok Mittal, Sandeep Pathak, Harbhajan Singh, Rajinder Gupta, Vikramjit Sahney, Swati Maliwal.
7 members = majority of the original party's Rajya Sabha group (exceeds the 2/3 merger threshold).
Anti-defection grounds (Para 2): (a) Voluntary giving up of party membership, or (b) voting/abstaining against party whip without permission.
Merger exception (Para 4): Requires not less than 2/3 of legislature party members to consent — split exception (1/3 rule) was deleted by 91st Amendment, 2003.
Ravi Naik v. Union of India (1994): "Voluntary giving up" can be inferred from conduct, not only from formal resignation.
G. Viswanathan v. Speaker, TN (1996): Public anti-party conduct can amount to voluntary giving up.
Disqualification authority in Rajya Sabha: The Chairman (who is also the Vice President of India).
Judicial review standard post-Kihoto Hollohan (1992): Limited to constitutional mandate violations, mala fides, natural justice, and perversity.
Para 7 (absolute finality of Speaker's decision): Struck down in Kihoto Hollohan — courts retain jurisdiction under Articles 136, 226, and 227.
No time limit for the Chairman to decide disqualification petitions — a structural gap in the Tenth Schedule.