Switch by Raghav Chadha, others no surprise as BJP targets new voter blocs in Punjab
Seven members of the Rajya Sabha, constituting two-thirds of their legislative party's strength in the Upper House, announced their departure from their orig...
What Happened
- Seven members of the Rajya Sabha, constituting two-thirds of their legislative party's strength in the Upper House, announced their departure from their original party and merger with another parliamentary party.
- The Rajya Sabha Chairman accepted the merger on April 27, 2026, issuing an official Secretariat notice confirming the move — shielding all seven members from disqualification under the Tenth Schedule (Anti-Defection Law).
- The seven members represented exactly seven out of ten — 70% of their legislative party's Rajya Sabha strength — crossing the two-thirds (66.67%) threshold required for a valid merger under Paragraph 4 of the Tenth Schedule.
- The remaining three members of the original legislative party did not join the merger; they continue as a separate group, also protected from disqualification under the Tenth Schedule's merger exception.
- A counter-petition was filed by a member of the original party to the Rajya Sabha Chairman seeking disqualification of the seven, arguing that the parent political party itself has not merged and the move is therefore a colourable defection.
- A constitutional irony emerged: one of the departing members had in 2022 introduced a private member's bill in the Rajya Sabha proposing to raise the merger threshold from two-thirds to three-fourths — which, had it become law, would have required eight members rather than seven, potentially blocking this very merger.
Static Topic Bridges
Tenth Schedule — Anti-Defection Law: Overview
The Tenth Schedule was inserted into the Constitution by the 52nd Constitutional Amendment Act, 1985, during the Rajiv Gandhi government. It was a response to large-scale political defections in the 1960s–1980s, notably the era of "Aaya Ram Gaya Ram" (a Haryana MLA who switched parties multiple times in a single day in 1967).
Grounds for Disqualification under Paragraph 2: 1. If a member voluntarily gives up membership of the political party on whose ticket they were elected; OR 2. If a member votes or abstains from voting in the House contrary to the direction of their political party (i.e., against the party whip) — unless they have been condoned by the party within 15 days
Deciding Authority: - For Lok Sabha members: Speaker of the Lok Sabha - For Rajya Sabha members: Chairman of the Rajya Sabha (Vice-President of India) - For state legislature members: Speaker/Chairman of the respective House
- Inserted by: 52nd Constitutional Amendment Act, 1985
- Constitutional hooks: Articles 102(2) (Lok Sabha/Rajya Sabha) and 191(2) (state legislatures)
- Applies to: Both Houses of Parliament and all state legislatures
- Modified by: 91st Constitutional Amendment Act, 2003 (removed the split exception; raised merger threshold to two-thirds)
Connection to this news: The seven departing members are not being disqualified because they invoked the merger exception under Paragraph 4 — they crossed the two-thirds threshold of their legislative party's Rajya Sabha strength.
Paragraph 4 — The Merger Exception (Detailed)
Paragraph 4 of the Tenth Schedule provides the principal exception to disqualification — the merger exception.
Text of Paragraph 4 (simplified): A member is not disqualified under Paragraph 2 where their original political party merges with another political party, if and only if: - (a) Not less than two-thirds of the members of the legislature party have agreed to such merger; AND - The merging members have become members of the other party (or a new party formed by the merger)
The protection extends to BOTH groups: - Those who agree to the merger: Protected (they have not defected — they have merged) - Those who do NOT agree to the merger and remain with the original party: Also protected (they have not voluntarily given up membership)
- Threshold: Two-thirds of the legislative party (not the national/organisational political party)
- The legislative party = all members of the House belonging to the original party at the time of the merger
- Before the 91st Amendment (2003): The exception covered "splits" — one-third of the legislature party was sufficient
- After 91st Amendment: The "split" exception (old Paragraph 3) was deleted; only the "merger" exception (Paragraph 4) remains
- The 91st Amendment also inserted Articles 75(1A) and 164(1A): Council of Ministers capped at 15% of the lower house strength
Connection to this news: 7 out of 10 = 70% > 66.67% (two-thirds). The numbers technically satisfy Paragraph 4's threshold. The Chairman of the Rajya Sabha accepted the merger on this basis.
"Legislature Party" vs. "Original Political Party" — The Critical Ambiguity
The most contested legal question in the current episode is whether Paragraph 4 requires only a two-thirds vote of the legislature party OR also a formal merger at the level of the original political party (the national organisation).
Two-tier structure of Paragraph 4: - Legislature party: All elected representatives of a party within a particular House (e.g., a party's 10 Rajya Sabha MPs form its Rajya Sabha legislature party) - Original political party: The national/organisational party to which the member belongs
The ambiguity: Paragraph 4(1) reads: "...where the original political party of a member of a House merges with another political party..." This raises the question: Is it the original political party (national organisation) that must formally merge — or is a two-thirds legislative party agreement itself deemed a "merger" under the Schedule?
- Conjunctive interpretation: BOTH (i) the political party at the national level must formally merge AND (ii) two-thirds of the legislature party must agree. Under this view, a legislative faction's vote cannot substitute for a genuine party-level merger.
- Disjunctive/liberal interpretation: Two-thirds agreement by the legislature party is itself sufficient to constitute a merger for the purposes of the Tenth Schedule. This is the interpretation favoured by those who executed the current merger.
Counter-petition argument: Petitioners argue that since the parent political party has not merged nationally, the exception in Paragraph 4 cannot be invoked — making the departure a straightforward defection subject to disqualification under Paragraph 2.
Connection to this news: The Rajya Sabha Chairman's acceptance of the merger favours the disjunctive interpretation. The counter-petition, if pursued in court, could result in judicial clarification of this long-standing ambiguity.
Judicial Scrutiny: Kihoto Hollohan v. Zachillhu (1992)
The foundational Supreme Court judgment on the Tenth Schedule is Kihoto Hollohan v. Zachillhu (1992).
Key holdings: 1. The Tenth Schedule is constitutionally valid — it does not violate the basic structure of the Constitution, the principle of representative democracy, or freedom of speech under Article 105 2. Paragraph 7 (which barred judicial review of the Speaker's/Chairman's decision) was struck down as unconstitutional — it violated the principles of judicial review (part of the basic structure) 3. The presiding officer's decision is a quasi-judicial function — subject to judicial review by the High Court and Supreme Court, but only after a final order is made (not by way of interim stay mid-proceeding) 4. Courts can review the disqualification decision for errors of jurisdiction, law, or natural justice — but the Speaker/Chairman retains the primary adjudicatory role
- Case: Kihoto Hollohan v. Zachillhu — 5-judge Constitution Bench (1992)
- Outcome: Tenth Schedule upheld; Paragraph 7 (ouster of judicial review) struck down
- Subsequent case: Ravi S. Naik v. Union of India (1994) — expanded the definition of "voluntarily giving up membership" to include conduct-based inferences (formal resignation from party not necessary)
Connection to this news: The counter-petition and any judicial challenge to the Rajya Sabha Chairman's merger acceptance would be governed by the Kihoto Hollohan framework — courts can intervene but only post a final adjudicatory order.
Impact on Rajya Sabha Arithmetic
The merger has immediate arithmetic consequences for the Upper House.
Post-merger changes: - The receiving party's strength in the Rajya Sabha rose to 113 seats, consolidating its position as the largest single party in the Upper House - The original party's Rajya Sabha representation reduced from 10 to 3 members — below the threshold for "recognised party status" in Rajya Sabha (which requires either 10% of House membership or a specific numerical minimum) - The three remaining members retain their seats but may lose entitlements associated with recognised party status (time allocation for debates, committee assignments, etc.)
Why Rajya Sabha mergers matter: - The Rajya Sabha (Council of States) is a permanent House — not subject to dissolution - Members serve 6-year staggered terms; a merger does not affect tenure or require re-election - Government Bills that do not qualify as Money Bills require passage in both Houses; Rajya Sabha arithmetic is therefore directly consequential for legislative agenda
Connection to this news: The merger shifts the Upper House's numerical balance significantly, illustrating why the anti-defection law's merger exception carries high political stakes.
Key Facts & Data
- Tenth Schedule: Inserted by 52nd Constitutional Amendment Act, 1985
- Grounds for disqualification (Paragraph 2): (a) Voluntarily giving up party membership; (b) Voting/abstaining against party whip
- Merger threshold (current): Two-thirds of the legislative party's members in the House
- Merger threshold (pre-2003): One-third (the old "split" exception — deleted by 91st Amendment)
- 91st Constitutional Amendment Act (2003): Deleted split exception; raised merger threshold to two-thirds; capped Council of Ministers at 15% of lower house strength (Articles 75(1A), 164(1A))
- Deciding authority (Rajya Sabha): Chairman of the Rajya Sabha (Vice-President of India)
- Kihoto Hollohan v. Zachillhu (1992): Upheld Tenth Schedule; struck down Paragraph 7 (ouster of judicial review); presiding officer's decision is quasi-judicial and subject to post-order judicial review
- Ravi S. Naik v. Union of India (1994): "Voluntarily giving up membership" includes conduct-based inferences; formal resignation not required
- Constitutional hooks: Article 102(2) (Parliament); Article 191(2) (state legislatures)
- This case (April 2026): 7 of 10 members (70%) of the legislative party invoked Paragraph 4 merger exception; Chairman accepted merger; counter-petition filed
- Post-merger Rajya Sabha strength: Receiving party rises to 113 seats; original party reduced to 3 seats
- Legislature party: Distinct from "original political party" — the legislature party is the subset of elected members in a given House; the political party is the national organisation