Jaishankar speaks to Israeli counterpart Gideon Sa'ar over ‘different aspects’ of West Asia crisis

What Happened

External Affairs Minister S. Jaishankar held a telephonic conversation with Israeli Foreign Minister Gideon Sa'ar on April 14, 2026, covering "different aspects of the West Asia situation" — including the Strait of Hormuz, Iran's nuclear programme, and Lebanon — as India intensified diplomatic outreach to all key parties in the escalating crisis.
The call followed Jaishankar's official visit to the UAE and separate calls with Australian counterpart Penny Wong, reflecting India's multi-directional engagement strategy: maintaining dialogue with Israel, Gulf Arab states, Iran, and Western partners simultaneously.
Sa'ar urged that firm conditions preventing Iran from obtaining nuclear weapons — including no enrichment on Iranian soil and removal of enriched material — are "critical for the entire international community," while also specifically noting that Iran's disruption of freedom of navigation through the Strait of Hormuz "requires action that will ensure the freedom of navigation for all countries, including India."

Static Topic Bridges

India-Israel Relations: A Strategic Partnership Built Gradually

India and Israel established full diplomatic relations only in January 1992, despite Israel's recognition of India's independence in 1950. The delay reflected India's historic support for Palestinian self-determination (India was among the first countries to recognise the PLO as the legitimate representative of Palestinians in 1974) and dependence on Arab goodwill for oil and diaspora remittances. The relationship has transformed dramatically since 1992, particularly in defence cooperation: Israel is among India's top three defence suppliers, providing advanced systems including the Barak missile systems, Phalcon AWACS, Heron and Harop drones, Spike ATGM, and Spice bombs.

India's 2014 abstention at UN Human Rights Council on a resolution establishing a Commission of Inquiry on Gaza marked a pivot from India's previous practice of voting against Israel
India abstained on multiple UN General Assembly resolutions on Gaza (2023–24) rather than voting against Israel — reflecting the evolved relationship
India's official position consistently calls for a "two-state solution" (independent Palestinian state coexisting with Israel) within the framework of UN Security Council resolutions
India imported approximately $2.3 billion in defence equipment from Israel in 2022–23; Israel is also a major source of agricultural technology, cybersecurity, and water management expertise for India

Connection to this news: Jaishankar's call with Sa'ar reflects India's calibrated balancing — India maintains warm ties with Israel (its strategic and defence partner) while simultaneously maintaining communication channels with Iran (whose Chabahar port India has invested in) and Arab Gulf states (from whom India receives oil and remittances).

India's Doctrine of "Strategic Autonomy" in West Asia

India's foreign policy doctrine of "strategic autonomy" (also described as "multi-alignment" in the current era) means India refuses to anchor itself within any single power's camp and instead maintains independent relations across competing blocs. In West Asia, this translates to simultaneous relationships with: Israel (defence partner), Arab Gulf states (energy and diaspora), Iran (Chabahar/INSTC), and the US (overall strategic partner). India typically abstains on UN resolutions that require choosing between these actors.

India's "Link West" policy formally articulated India's intent to expand engagement across the entire West Asia region — not just the Gulf — as a priority under the 2014 onwards foreign policy framework
India has simultaneously maintained embassies and active diplomatic relations with Israel, Iran, Saudi Arabia, UAE, Qatar, and all GCC states — a balancing act most major powers cannot replicate
In the current crisis, India's EAM has spoken with Israeli, UAE, and Australian counterparts; India has also maintained its Chabahar investment in Iran — demonstrating multi-directional engagement
India's official position on the US-Iran conflict has been for "de-escalation" and "dialogue" — neutral phrasing that avoids endorsing either the US blockade or Iran's nuclear programme

Connection to this news: The Jaishankar-Sa'ar call is a deliberate signal to Israel (and by extension the US) that India is engaged and monitoring the crisis, while India's simultaneous engagement with all parties maintains the strategic autonomy doctrine.

Freedom of navigation (FON) is a principle of international law codified under UNCLOS (United Nations Convention on the Law of the Sea, 1982) — specifically Articles 17 (innocent passage through territorial seas), 58 (freedom of navigation in EEZs), and 87 (freedom of navigation on the high seas). For India, which is the world's largest democracy with coastlines on the Arabian Sea and Bay of Bengal and whose trade is 95% seaborne, FON is an existential economic interest. India imports energy and exports merchandise through sea lanes that traverse the Persian Gulf, Red Sea, and Indian Ocean — all of which are disrupted by the 2026 West Asia conflict.

India has consistently advocated for "rules-based order in the maritime domain" and freedom of navigation in all disputes — including in the South China Sea
The Strait of Hormuz is an international strait under UNCLOS Part III (Articles 34–45), through which all states enjoy the right of "transit passage" — a stronger right than innocent passage, which cannot be suspended by the coastal state
India's 95%+ seaborne trade dependence makes any sustained maritime chokepoint closure an economic emergency requiring diplomatic intervention
Sa'ar's specific mention of freedom of navigation "for all countries, including India" was a diplomatic signal inviting India to align its interests with the US-Israel position on the blockade

Connection to this news: India faces a dilemma: the US-Israel blockade disrupts India's FON and energy security, yet India cannot publicly oppose its strategic partners. The EAM's "different aspects" formulation is deliberately ambiguous, preserving India's room to manoeuvre.

Key Facts & Data

India-Israel full diplomatic relations established: January 1992
Israel is among India's top 3 defence suppliers
India's official position: two-state solution, de-escalation, and dialogue
India has CEPA with UAE (signed February 2022); Strategic Partnership Council with Saudi Arabia (2019); 10-year Chabahar agreement with Iran (2024)
India imports approximately 50–55% of crude oil from West Asia; receives approximately 38% of total remittances from Gulf diaspora (~9 million Indians in West Asia)
Sa'ar specifically invoked India's interest in freedom of navigation through the Strait of Hormuz
India's position on UN resolutions related to Gaza (2023–24): abstentions, not negative votes