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Internal Security April 28, 2026 5 min read Daily brief · #14 of 48

Terrorism epicentres no longer immune to 'justifiable punishment': Rajnath Singh at SCO Defence Ministers' meeting

At the SCO Defence Ministers' Meeting in Bishkek (April 28, 2026), India's Defence Minister articulated a new doctrinal posture: "terrorism epicentres are no...

GS Paper 2 (International Relations India's Security Doctrine) GS Paper 3 (Internal Security Counter-Terrorism)

What Happened

  • At the SCO Defence Ministers' Meeting in Bishkek (April 28, 2026), India's Defence Minister articulated a new doctrinal posture: "terrorism epicentres are no longer immune to justifiable punishment," explicitly citing Operation Sindoor as its proof of concept.
  • India framed Operation Sindoor — launched on May 7, 2025, striking nine terrorist infrastructure sites in Pakistan and Pakistan-occupied Kashmir — as a demonstration of India's "firm resolve" to hold states responsible for sheltering terror groups.
  • The statement went beyond India's traditional "no double standards" line (see companion article on Article 78951) to assert an affirmative right of retaliation, putting the international community on notice that India would act unilaterally when multilateral mechanisms fail.
  • The minister simultaneously invoked Gandhian philosophy, emphasising that every action must be evaluated by its impact on "the life of a poor and needy person" — framing India's counter-terrorism doctrine as proportionate and deliberate, not punitive.

Static Topic Bridges

India's Evolving Counter-Terrorism Doctrine — From Strategic Restraint to Calibrated Response

India's counter-terrorism posture has historically been characterised as "strategic restraint" — absorbing cross-border attacks without crossing the Line of Control militarily. This doctrine was tested and revised after the 2016 Uri surgical strikes and again after the 2019 Balakot airstrikes (following the Pulwama attack), which marked the first time India used air power across the international boundary with Pakistan since 1971. Operation Sindoor (2025) represented a further evolution: a multi-site, precision-strike operation against terrorist infrastructure, explicitly not targeting Pakistani military assets — framed as a non-escalatory, non-military counter-terrorism action.

  • Uri surgical strikes (September 2016): India publicly acknowledged cross-LoC special forces operations for the first time.
  • Balakot airstrikes (February 26, 2019): Indian Air Force struck what it described as a JeM training camp in Khyber Pakhtunkhwa, crossing the international boundary — first such strike since 1971.
  • Operation Sindoor (May 7, 2025): Precision strikes on nine sites; India distinguished "terrorist infrastructure" from Pakistani state/military targets to limit escalation.
  • The doctrine of "justifiable punishment" explicitly links state inaction (harbouring terrorists) to state liability for consequences.

Connection to this news: The Bishkek statement is the diplomatic codification of what Operation Sindoor operationalised — India now considers itself entitled to pre-emptive or retaliatory strikes against terrorist infrastructure abroad when a state shelters those groups.

Right of Self-Defence Under International Law (UN Charter Article 51)

Article 51 of the United Nations Charter preserves the inherent right of individual or collective self-defence "if an armed attack occurs against a Member of the United Nations." The key interpretive questions are: (a) whether attacks by non-state actors (terrorist groups) trigger Article 51; and (b) whether the "unwilling or unable" doctrine — under which a state may act against non-state actors on foreign soil if the host state is unable or unwilling to suppress them — is accepted as customary international law. India's post-Balakot and post-Sindoor posture implicitly invokes the "unwilling or unable" doctrine, arguing that Pakistan's persistent support for terrorist groups precludes reliance on Pakistani sovereignty as a shield.

  • The ICJ's advisory opinion on the Separation Wall (2004) and the Nicaragua case (1986) are frequently cited as limiting Article 51 to attacks by states, not non-state actors.
  • The US, UK, and Israel have consistently argued that Article 51 applies to attacks by non-state actors where the host state is complicit or incapable of acting.
  • The "unwilling or unable" standard has been invoked by the US in its drone strike campaigns in Pakistan, Yemen, and Somalia.
  • India's Bishkek formulation — "terrorism epicentres no longer immune to justifiable punishment" — is a direct assertion that this doctrine applies to India's security environment.

Connection to this news: India is building a legal-diplomatic record that frames Operation Sindoor (and future similar actions) within the accepted international law exception of self-defence against state-sponsored terrorism.

SCO's Regional Anti-Terrorist Structure (RATS) and Collective Security Gaps

The SCO's Regional Anti-Terrorist Structure (RATS), headquartered in Tashkent, is the organisation's dedicated counter-terrorism body. It maintains a database of suspected terrorists, facilitates intelligence sharing, and coordinates joint exercises among member states. However, RATS has a structural limitation: it requires consensus, meaning Pakistan — as an SCO member — participates in the same anti-terrorism bodies that India uses to push back against Pakistani-sponsored terrorism. This creates a paradox where the organisation's counter-terrorism machinery is simultaneously undermined by one of its own members. India's Bishkek statement is implicitly a criticism of this structural gap.

  • RATS was established in 2002 and became operational in 2004 from Tashkent.
  • RATS coordinates with Interpol and the UN Counter-Terrorism Committee Executive Directorate (CTED).
  • SCO joint counter-terrorism exercises (e.g., "Pabbi-Antiterror," "Peace Mission" series) are held regularly, but India and Pakistan rarely exercise together directly.
  • India's 2025 refusal to sign the SCO joint communiqué in Beijing was a direct signal that RATS-level coordination is ineffective when Pakistan is a party.

Connection to this news: India's assertion of a right to "justifiable punishment" is a response to the failure of multilateral mechanisms like RATS to hold state sponsors of terrorism accountable.

Key Facts & Data

  • Operation Sindoor: launched May 7, 2025; nine terrorist infrastructure targets struck in Pakistan and PoK.
  • SCO Defence Ministers' Meeting: April 28, 2026, Bishkek, Kyrgyzstan — attended by ministers from all 10 SCO member states.
  • India's Defence Minister held bilateral meetings with Chinese and Russian counterparts on the sidelines of Bishkek.
  • The Pahalgam attack (April 22, 2025) marked the first anniversary just days before the Bishkek meeting — India used the timing deliberately.
  • UN Security Council Resolution 1373 (2001): requires all states to deny safe havens to terrorists — a legal hook India frequently uses in multilateral forums.
  • India is one of the largest contributors to UN peacekeeping operations, reinforcing its self-presentation as a rules-based order stakeholder.
On this page
  1. What Happened
  2. Static Topic Bridges
  3. India's Evolving Counter-Terrorism Doctrine — From Strategic Restraint to Calibrated Response
  4. Right of Self-Defence Under International Law (UN Charter Article 51)
  5. SCO's Regional Anti-Terrorist Structure (RATS) and Collective Security Gaps
  6. Key Facts & Data
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