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International Relations May 08, 2026 5 min read Daily brief · #9 of 33

China confirms its support to Pakistan during last year’s war with India

A year after the May 2025 four-day India-Pakistan conflict, Chinese media reported that an AVIC aviation engineer provided active technical support to Pakist...


What Happened

  • A year after the May 2025 four-day India-Pakistan conflict, Chinese media reported that an AVIC aviation engineer provided active technical support to Pakistan's air force during the war — the first public confirmation of Chinese personnel involvement in live combat operations against India.
  • The engineer, Zhang Heng, was deployed at a Pakistani airbase to maintain and support J-10CE fighter jet systems under combat conditions, describing operating under temperatures close to 50°C while air-raid sirens sounded.
  • The confirmation came via Chinese state television (CCTV), making it an officially sanctioned disclosure rather than a leak — indicating China chose to publicise this information, likely to demonstrate the combat validation of its aerospace exports.
  • The combat debut of the J-10CE and PL-15E missiles during Operation Sindoor drew global attention to the capabilities of Chinese-origin aerospace systems and the implications for regional air-power balance.
  • The disclosure raised significant strategic questions about the nature of China's future military involvement in South Asian conflicts, particularly given India's "two-front" threat doctrine.

Static Topic Bridges

India's Two-Front Threat Doctrine and Strategic Calculus

India's "two-front" challenge refers to the strategic concern of simultaneously managing military pressure from both Pakistan (western front) and China (northern/northeastern front). This concern has shaped India's force structure, procurement strategy, and strategic planning for decades. Operation Sindoor highlighted this calculus acutely: Chinese engineers embedded with Pakistani forces during a conflict with India demonstrated operational coordination between the two adversaries. India's Long-Term Integrated Perspective Plan (LTIPP) and its Defence Acquisition Procedure (DAP-2020) are both calibrated for a two-front scenario.

  • India shares approximately 3,488 km of disputed boundary with China (Line of Actual Control/LAC) and 776 km of Line of Control (LoC) with Pakistan.
  • The 1962 Sino-Indian War and 1965/1971 India-Pakistan wars are the historical precedents for multi-front pressure.
  • The 2020 Galwan Valley clash (Eastern Ladakh) and the 2025 Operation Sindoor are the most recent stress-tests of India's two-front strategic thinking.
  • India's Chief of Defence Staff (CDS) post, created in January 2020, was specifically designed to improve jointness for multi-domain and multi-front scenarios.
  • Theaterization — consolidating army, navy, and air force commands under joint theatre commands — is India's ongoing structural response to the two-front challenge.

Connection to this news: Chinese engineers' physical presence at Pakistani bases during India-Pakistan fighting is the first confirmed instance of active Chinese operational involvement in a conflict on India's western front, validating the "two-front" concern beyond theory.


Arms Transfer and Defence Cooperation Frameworks

Arms transfers between states are governed by a combination of domestic export control laws, international regimes, and bilateral agreements. Key regimes include the Missile Technology Control Regime (MTCR), the Wassenaar Arrangement (conventional arms and dual-use technologies), and the Arms Trade Treaty (ATT). China is not a member of the Wassenaar Arrangement and has ratified the ATT but with reservations. China is a member of the MTCR. The China-Pakistan defence relationship bypasses several of these multilateral constraints through bilateral agreements that classify transfers as strategic cooperation rather than commercial arms sales.

  • Wassenaar Arrangement: Founded 1996; 42 members; governs conventional arms and dual-use goods; China is NOT a member.
  • MTCR: Founded 1987; 35 members; limits missile technology transfers; China joined 2004 (though compliance has been questioned).
  • Arms Trade Treaty (ATT): Adopted 2013; regulates international trade in conventional arms; China ratified 2020.
  • SIPRI data: China accounts for >80% of Pakistan's arms imports; India is the world's largest arms importer by value, though that share has been declining as indigenous procurement rises.
  • The JF-17 Thunder (jointly produced by Pakistan and China) and the J-10CE represent two tiers of China's arms transfer strategy: co-production and direct export.

Connection to this news: The deployment of AVIC engineers to an active combat zone illustrates how the China-Pakistan relationship has evolved from arms supply to active operational support — a distinction with significant implications for future conflict scenarios.


China's People's Liberation Army Air Force (PLAAF) and Export Strategy

China's aerospace export strategy, channelled through AVIC, serves the dual purpose of commercial revenue generation and strategic influence projection. Combat validation — the demonstrated use of Chinese equipment in actual warfare — is the most powerful marketing tool for the global arms market. The J-10CE's performance during the May 2025 conflict was broadcast by Chinese state media and cited at air shows across Asia, positioning China as a peer-tier aerospace supplier to Western manufacturers.

  • AVIC (Aviation Industry Corporation of China): Chinese state-owned conglomerate; among the world's 10 largest defence manufacturers by revenue.
  • The J-10CE's combat debut in May 2025 was the first combat use of an advanced Chinese-manufactured 4.5-generation fighter.
  • After the conflict, AVIC's parent company and associated stocks surged significantly in Chinese markets.
  • The J-10CE was displayed at the Malaysia LIMA 2025 airshow immediately after the conflict as "combat-proven."
  • China's defence exports grew significantly over the 2015–2025 decade, with Pakistan, Bangladesh, and several African and Middle Eastern states as major customers.

Connection to this news: CCTV's broadcast of Zhang Heng's account is part of China's deliberate combat-validation narrative for global arms marketing; the disclosure is strategically timed one year after the conflict to consolidate the J-10CE's reputation.


Key Facts & Data

  • China's share of Pakistan arms imports: >80% (SIPRI data)
  • J-10CE first inducted by Pakistan: March 2022
  • Pakistan J-10CE fleet: 36 aircraft
  • PL-15E range (export): ~145 km; domestic PL-15: 200–300 km at Mach 5
  • India-China LAC length (disputed): ~3,488 km
  • India-Pakistan LoC length: ~776 km
  • India's CDS post created: January 2020 (General Bipin Rawat, first CDS)
  • Wassenaar Arrangement members: 42 (China excluded)
  • MTCR members: 35 (China joined 2004)
  • ATT adopted by UN: 2013; China ratified: 2020
  • Operation Sindoor conflict: May 7–10, 2025 (4 days)
On this page
  1. What Happened
  2. Static Topic Bridges
  3. India's Two-Front Threat Doctrine and Strategic Calculus
  4. Arms Transfer and Defence Cooperation Frameworks
  5. China's People's Liberation Army Air Force (PLAAF) and Export Strategy
  6. Key Facts & Data
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