What Happened
- Prime Minister Narendra Modi spoke with Iranian President Masoud Pezeshkian on March 12, 2026 — his first conversation with the Iranian President since the West Asia war began 13 days earlier on February 28.
- Modi expressed "deep concern over the escalation of tensions and the loss of civilian lives as well as damage to civilian infrastructure."
- Modi "urged for dialogue and diplomacy" and "reiterated India's commitment to peace and stability."
- He flagged two specific Indian priorities: safety of Indian nationals in Iran (approximately 9,000) and unhindered transit of maritime traffic, particularly fuel ships stuck in the Persian Gulf after Iran's closure of the Strait of Hormuz.
- India "deplored" an attack on an India-bound ship in the strait the previous day.
- Some of the ~9,000 Indians in Iran had already been moved to Armenia and Azerbaijan for safety.
- External Affairs Minister S. Jaishankar had spoken three times with his Iranian counterpart since hostilities began, making this PM-level call the fourth diplomatic touchpoint.
Static Topic Bridges
India-Iran Bilateral Relations
India and Iran share a civilisational connection predating modern nation-states. Post-1979 Islamic Revolution, the relationship has been characterised by balancing acts: India maintained economic ties despite western sanctions, invested in Chabahar port, and continued purchasing Iranian oil until the US CAATSA-era sanctions in 2018 forced India to halt oil imports. The relationship recovered partially when the US granted India a Chabahar waiver in 2024.
- Full diplomatic relations maintained continuously since 1950
- India was one of Iran's top oil customers until 2018 when US secondary sanctions forced a halt
- Chabahar Port Agreement: signed 2016; 10-year terminal lease by India signed May 2024; grants India access to Afghanistan and Central Asia bypassing Pakistan
- India-Iran trade (pre-sanctions): ~$17 billion/year; reduced substantially post-2018
- Iran accounts for about 10% of India's connectivity corridor strategy (International North-South Transport Corridor — INSTC)
- In 2019, India's oil imports from Iran were zero due to US pressure; India resumed minimal imports post-waiver
Connection to this news: The 13-day delay before a PM-level call has been noted as a sign of India's diplomatic tilt. However, the call itself — with its explicit focus on Indian nationals and maritime traffic — signals that India's pragmatic interests ultimately drove engagement with Tehran, regardless of geopolitical alignment pressures.
Indian Nationals Abroad — Evacuation and Consular Obligations
India has approximately 32 million Non-Resident Indians (NRIs) and Persons of Indian Origin (PIOs) worldwide, making it the world's largest diaspora. The Ministry of External Affairs operates a comprehensive consular network and emergency management system. India has conducted several large-scale evacuation operations in conflict zones.
- Total Indian diaspora: ~32 million worldwide (largest national diaspora globally)
- Indians in Iran: ~9,000 (many in Tehran, some in border areas)
- Indians in Gulf region overall: ~8–9 million (UAE ~3.5 million, Saudi Arabia ~2.5 million, Kuwait, Qatar, Oman, Bahrain)
- Major Indian evacuation operations: Operation Raahat (Yemen 2015, ~5,600 evacuated), Operation Devi Shakti (Afghanistan 2021), Operation Ganga (Ukraine 2022, ~22,500 students), Operation Kaveri (Sudan 2023)
- MEA's Emergency Operations Centre: 24/7 helpline for distressed Indian nationals abroad
- India has a "Minister of State for External Affairs" specifically overseeing diaspora affairs
- Evacuation route for Indians in Iran: via Armenia and Azerbaijan (land borders)
Connection to this news: The evacuation of Indian nationals from Iran to Armenia and Azerbaijan follows a well-established Indian playbook of using third-country land/air corridors when direct repatriation is not possible — a pattern seen in Yemen (2015) and Afghanistan (2021).
Energy Security and Gulf Tanker Disruptions
India is the world's third-largest oil consumer, importing ~85% of its needs. The Persian Gulf region (Saudi Arabia, Iraq, UAE, Kuwait) supplies approximately 60% of these imports. Any tanker halting in the Persian Gulf directly threatens India's refinery supply chains and fuel availability. The Strait of Hormuz is the sole exit route for all Persian Gulf crude destined for India.
- India's daily crude oil consumption: ~5.5 million barrels per day
- Domestic production: ~750,000 barrels/day (covers ~14% of needs)
- Gulf crude dependency: ~60% of imports (~3.3 million bpd from Gulf region)
- Tankers that departed before the conflict could still be in transit; those loading after February 28 faced war-risk premium spikes of 1–1.5% of vessel value
- India's Strategic Petroleum Reserve (SPR): ~5.33 million metric tonnes at Visakhapatnam, Mangaluru, Padur — approximately 9–10 days' buffer
- Refineries most exposed: BPCL Mumbai, MRPL Mangaluru, IOCL and HPCL western refineries
Connection to this news: Modi explicitly flagging "unhindered transit of goods and energy" in the call with Pezeshkian illustrates that India's diplomatic engagement with Iran was primarily economically driven — an attempt to secure Iran's cooperation in keeping commercial shipping lanes passable, consistent with Iran's own stated preference to avoid a full Hormuz closure.
India's "Multi-Alignment" Diplomacy in Regional Conflicts
Unlike the Cold War-era Non-Alignment (which meant staying out of great power blocs), modern India practices "multi-alignment" — actively maintaining relations with rival powers simultaneously to maximise strategic leverage. In the Ukraine war, India maintained ties with Russia while deepening the US strategic partnership. In West Asia, India maintains ties with Israel, Arab Gulf states, Iran, and Palestine simultaneously.
- India signed the Abraham Accords sidelines: India-UAE CEPA (2022), India-Israel defence pacts (ongoing)
- India voted for UNGA resolution calling for humanitarian ceasefire in Gaza (December 2023) — a balance between Palestinian solidarity and Israel partnership
- India's EAM Jaishankar visited Tehran, Riyadh, and Tel Aviv in different recent periods
- India has not joined the US-led Maritime Security Coalition in the Red Sea (IMSC) against Houthi attacks — preferring independent naval deployment
- India maintains independent naval patrols in the Gulf of Aden/Arabian Sea under Operation Sankalp
- Three phone calls from EAM Jaishankar to his Iranian counterpart before the PM-level call reflects India's careful escalation management
Connection to this news: Modi's call to Pezeshkian — not Trump or Netanyahu — as his first outreach reflects India's instinct to engage all sides and avoid being seen as exclusively in the US-Israel camp. The call is consistent with India's multi-alignment posture, even if the 13-day delay suggests it was reactive rather than proactive diplomacy.
Key Facts & Data
- West Asia conflict began: February 28, 2026
- Modi-Pezeshkian call: March 12, 2026 (13 days into conflict)
- Indians in Iran: ~9,000; some evacuated to Armenia and Azerbaijan
- EAM Jaishankar: 3 prior calls with Iranian FM before PM-level engagement
- India's crude oil imports from Gulf: ~60% of total
- India's SPR: ~5.33 million metric tonnes (~9–10 days of imports)
- India "deplored" attack on India-bound ship: March 11, 2026
- Operation Raahat (Yemen, 2015): ~5,600 Indians evacuated — India's largest West Asia evacuation