What Happened
- With a full-scale war underway in West Asia involving Israel, the US, and Iran, India's diplomatic positioning has come under scrutiny.
- Prime Minister Modi visited Israel immediately before the US-Israeli attack on Iran (February 28, 2026) — the timing raising questions about prior knowledge and India's alignment.
- India has not formally condemned the killing of Iran's Supreme Leader Ayatollah Ali Khamenei in the conflict.
- The war has produced immediate consequences for India: rising energy prices, disrupted maritime traffic through the Strait of Hormuz, and risk to over a million Indian nationals working in the Gulf region.
- Former diplomat Talmiz Ahmad and strategic affairs analyst Kabir Taneja of Observer Research Foundation (ORF) presented divergent views on whether India is abandoning its traditional West Asian autonomy.
Static Topic Bridges
India's Traditional West Asia Policy — Balanced Engagement
India's West Asia policy has historically been characterised by balanced engagement with all regional actors regardless of their rivalries. India maintained friendly ties with both Israel and Arab states (despite most Arab states not recognising Israel for decades), with both Iran and Saudi Arabia (despite their bitter rivalry), and with Palestine (supporting a two-state solution). This balancing act was rooted in India's energy import dependence, large diaspora in the Gulf, and non-alignment traditions.
- India upgraded ties with Israel after establishing full diplomatic relations in 1992 (despite recognising Israel in 1950)
- India imports ~60% of its crude oil from the Gulf region (Saudi Arabia, Iraq, UAE, Kuwait)
- Indian diaspora in the Gulf: ~8–9 million (largest in UAE ~3.5 million, Saudi Arabia ~2.5 million, Kuwait, Qatar, Bahrain, Oman)
- Remittances from the Gulf: ~$40 billion/year (largest single regional source for India)
- India has voted for Palestinian statehood at the UN while simultaneously expanding defence ties with Israel
- India maintains the Chabahar port project with Iran despite US sanctions pressure
Connection to this news: India's simultaneous dependence on Gulf Arab states (oil, diaspora remittances), Iran (Chabahar gateway to Central Asia), and Israel (defence technology) makes a clear alignment with any one camp extremely costly — explaining why the absence of a formal condemnation of Iran strikes is strategically significant.
Strategic Autonomy — India's Foreign Policy Doctrine
Strategic autonomy refers to India's ability to pursue its national interest independently without being locked into the strategic framework of any great power. It is the modern evolution of the Non-Aligned Movement (NAM) principles India championed during the Cold War. Under this doctrine, India has reserved the right to buy weapons from multiple suppliers, maintain ties with adversarial states, and abstain on UN resolutions where alignment would compromise national interests.
- Non-Aligned Movement founded 1961 (Belgrade Summit): India a founding member alongside Egypt, Yugoslavia, Indonesia, Ghana
- India's first PM Jawaharlal Nehru articulated Panchsheel (Five Principles of Peaceful Coexistence) in 1954 as the philosophical basis
- Strategic autonomy operationalised post-Cold War: India signed US-India Civil Nuclear Deal (2008) while retaining ties with Russia and Iran
- India abstained on UN resolutions on Ukraine (2022) and Israel-Gaza (2023–24) — asserting independent judgment
- Critics argue India's abstentions have tilted increasingly toward Western positions compared to earlier genuine non-alignment
- India-Israel defence trade: ~$2.5–3 billion/year (Israel is among India's top defence suppliers)
Connection to this news: Modi's visit to Israel just before the war, and India's muted response to the killing of Iran's Supreme Leader, suggests a tilt toward the US-Israel axis that diverges from India's stated strategic autonomy — particularly problematic given India's deep economic ties with Iran and Gulf Arab states that Iran can threaten.
India-Iran Relations — The Chabahar Dimension
India's relationship with Iran is not merely diplomatic but strategically functional. The Chabahar port in Iran's Sistan-Baluchestan province is India's gateway to Afghanistan and Central Asian markets, bypassing Pakistan. India has invested in developing Shahid Beheshti terminal at Chabahar and uses it to supply wheat to Afghanistan and build connectivity to the International North-South Transport Corridor (INSTC).
- Chabahar Port: Located on Iran's southeastern coast (Gulf of Oman, outside the Persian Gulf)
- India-Iran Chabahar Agreement: signed 2016; India has invested ~$85 million in port development
- India signed a 10-year lease agreement for Shahid Beheshti terminal in May 2024
- INSTC: 7,200 km multi-modal route from India via Iran and Russia to Europe — an alternative to Suez
- In 2024, the US granted India a specific waiver from Iran sanctions for Chabahar operations
- ~9,000 Indians in Iran; ~8–9 million more in neighbouring Gulf states (at risk if conflict widens)
Connection to this news: India's reluctance to condemn the US-Israeli strikes reflects the pull of its strategic partnership with the US, but this risks the Chabahar investment, trade relations with Iran, and the safety of thousands of Indians in the region — illustrating the real costs of perceived alignment.
India-Gulf Arab States — Energy and Diaspora Ties
The six Gulf Cooperation Council (GCC) states — Saudi Arabia, UAE, Qatar, Bahrain, Kuwait, Oman — collectively represent India's most economically consequential regional relationship. The GCC is India's largest trading partner bloc, and Gulf remittances form the backbone of household incomes in Kerala, Uttar Pradesh, Bihar, and Rajasthan.
- India-GCC trade: ~$160–180 billion/year
- Indian diaspora in GCC: ~8–9 million workers
- Remittances from GCC: ~$40 billion/year (India is world's top remittance recipient at ~$125 billion total)
- Saudi Arabia: India's second-largest crude oil supplier (~16% of imports); also source of significant private investments
- UAE: India's top export destination within the GCC; free trade agreement (CEPA) signed in February 2022
- The Gulf Arab states are predominantly Sunni-led; Iran is the principal Shia power and their strategic rival
Connection to this news: A West Asia war between Iran and the US-Israel-Gulf Arab axis places India's massive diaspora and trade interests directly in harm's way. India's failure to independently call for a ceasefire — instead echoing US framing — risks alienating Gulf Arab states that expect India to use its influence on all sides.
Key Facts & Data
- PM Modi visited Israel: February 26, 2026 (two days before the conflict erupted February 28)
- India's Gulf diaspora: ~8–9 million; remittances ~$40 billion/year
- India-Israel defence trade: ~$2.5–3 billion/year
- Chabahar port investment by India: ~$85 million; 10-year terminal lease signed May 2024
- India's crude oil from Gulf: ~60% of total imports
- Indians in Iran: ~9,000 (some evacuated to Armenia and Azerbaijan)
- India's position on Palestinian statehood: supports two-state solution; has voted for it at UNGA
- EAM Jaishankar had spoken with his Iranian counterpart three times since hostilities began