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Internal Security April 27, 2026 5 min read Daily brief · #36 of 55

Ukraine, West Asia conflicts put attack drones at the centre of modern warfare

Conflicts in Ukraine and West Asia have decisively established attack drones — particularly First Person View (FPV) drones and loitering munitions — as the d...


What Happened

  • Conflicts in Ukraine and West Asia have decisively established attack drones — particularly First Person View (FPV) drones and loitering munitions — as the defining weapon system of contemporary warfare.
  • FPV drones costing as little as $500 per unit have destroyed armoured vehicles, artillery systems, and supply convoys worth millions of dollars, creating a severe cost asymmetry that disadvantages defenders relying on conventional, expensive weapon systems.
  • Russia has escalated its Shahed-136/131 loitering munition campaign against Ukraine, ramping from approximately 200 launches per week to over 1,000 per week by March 2025, while Iran has supplied these systems to Russia — representing a strategic technology partnership between the two states.
  • Ukraine, in turn, has shared air defence strategy and counter-drone expertise with Gulf Cooperation Council (GCC) countries facing Iranian drone threats, creating a novel triangular knowledge-transfer dynamic.
  • Even major military powers — including members of NATO — have found themselves lagging in drone production capacity and counter-drone doctrine, exposing structural gaps in conventional military planning.
  • By 2025, Ukraine was producing approximately 200,000 FPV drones per month, targeting a production figure of 7 million drones in 2026.

Static Topic Bridges

FPV Drones and Loitering Munitions: Technology and Tactical Role

First Person View (FPV) drones are small, commercially derived unmanned aerial systems flown via video goggles by a remote operator. In warfare, they are fitted with anti-tank rocket-propelled grenade (RPG) warheads or shaped charge munitions. Loitering munitions (also called kamikaze drones or suicide drones) are purpose-built systems that loiter over a target area until a target is identified, then dive and detonate — combining the persistent surveillance of a UAV with the terminal precision of a guided missile.

  • FPV drone unit cost: $300–$1,000 (commercially sourced components)
  • Shahed-136 (Iranian) unit cost: $80,000–$150,000; used in mass saturation attacks
  • Switchblade-300 (US): costs more than 100× a standard FPV drone
  • FPV drone can destroy a main battle tank (value: $3–10 million) in a single strike
  • Loitering munitions have ranges from a few km to 2,500 km (e.g., Harop)

Connection to this news: The cost asymmetry documented in Ukraine and West Asia confirms that cheap offensive drone mass can systematically overwhelm expensive defensive systems — a lesson directly applicable to India's security planning and the indigenous drone industry under Atmanirbhar Bharat.

The Drone Warfare Cost Curve and Asymmetric Conflict

The central strategic insight from drone warfare is that attackers operate on a favourable cost curve while defenders face an unfavourable one. A single Patriot interceptor missile costs $3–6 million; destroying a $50,000 Shahed drone with it is economically unsustainable. Counter-drone (C-UAS) solutions — including low-cost interceptor FPVs at $1,000–$5,000, electronic jamming, and laser-based directed energy weapons — are being rapidly developed to restore cost parity.

  • Tomahawk cruise missile: up to $2.4 million per unit
  • Hellfire missile: up to $170,000 per unit
  • FPV interceptor drone: $1,000–$5,000 (inclusive of warhead and AI module)
  • By end-2025, FPV interceptors accounted for ~one-third of Russian aerial threats neutralised in Ukraine
  • 500+ drone manufacturers operating in Ukraine alone by 2025

Connection to this news: The shift from expensive air defence missiles to cost-effective interceptor drones and electronic countermeasures is a global trend, reshaping procurement priorities and force structure planning across militaries including India's.

Russia-Iran Defence Technology Cooperation

Russia's deployment of Iranian-origin Shahed-136 loitering munitions in Ukraine, and subsequent Iranian upgrades (replacing the original "motorbike" engine with a compact turbojet tripling speed), illustrates how adversarial coalitions share and evolve battlefield technology in near-real-time. This technology transfer dynamic has drawn sanctions from the EU and the US under export control frameworks, and has altered the security calculus for countries in the Middle East and Europe.

  • Russia began receiving Shahed-136 from Iran after 2022; subsequently, Russia began co-producing them
  • Iran provided drones and technical expertise in exchange for Russian air defence technology and fighter aircraft
  • Upgraded Shahed with turbojet: 3× faster, harder to intercept, reduced radar cross-section
  • US and EU imposed sanctions on Iranian drone manufacturers and suppliers
  • Russia launched over 19,000 attack drones against Ukraine in the winter of 2025–26

Connection to this news: Russia-Iran drone cooperation has created a new precedent for state-to-state technology sharing of asymmetric weapons, with implications for India's strategic assessments of threats in the northern and western approaches.

India's Drone Ecosystem and Atmanirbhar Bharat in Defence

India has recognised the lessons of drone warfare and is building a domestic drone industrial base. The Drone Rules 2021, the Production Linked Incentive (PLI) Scheme for drones, and the ban on import of foreign drones for government use (except for defence) are key policy measures. DRDO has developed the Rustom and Tapas series of UAVs, while the private sector (ideaForge, Garuda Aerospace, Alpha Design Technologies) is producing ISR and tactical drones. The Indian Army's acquisition of indigenous UAS under Emergency Procurement and DAC fast-track categories reflects the urgency.

  • PLI Scheme for drones: ₹120 crore outlay; 23 companies approved
  • iDEX (Innovations for Defence Excellence): funds startup-developed drone solutions
  • Drone Federation of India: industry body coordinating with MoD
  • India aims to become a global drone hub (exports + domestic use) by 2030
  • Defence Drone Cell in MoD oversees procurement and indigenisation

Connection to this news: The Ukraine and West Asia experience serves as a real-world stress test for the global drone industry and is directly informing India's doctrine, procurement preferences, and the push for indigenous drone production under Atmanirbhar Bharat.

Key Facts & Data

  • FPV drone cost: $300–$1,000; can destroy multi-million-dollar armoured vehicles
  • Shahed-136 cost: $80,000–$150,000; Russia launched 19,000+ in winter 2025–26
  • Ukraine FPV production: ~200,000 per month in 2025; target 7 million in 2026
  • Interceptor FPV cost: $1,000–$5,000; accounts for ~one-third of aerial threats neutralised
  • NATO exercise (2025): 10 drone operators rendered two battalions combat ineffective using dummy drones
  • Russia-Iran drone cooperation: technology sharing plus turbojet upgrade increasing Shahed speed 3×
  • Ukraine is providing air defence strategy assistance to GCC countries facing Iranian drone threats
On this page
  1. What Happened
  2. Static Topic Bridges
  3. FPV Drones and Loitering Munitions: Technology and Tactical Role
  4. The Drone Warfare Cost Curve and Asymmetric Conflict
  5. Russia-Iran Defence Technology Cooperation
  6. India's Drone Ecosystem and Atmanirbhar Bharat in Defence
  7. Key Facts & Data
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