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Polity & Governance April 27, 2026 5 min read Daily brief · #12 of 32

Seven AAP MPs including Raghav Chadha, Ashok Mittal officially part of BJP as Rajya Sabha chair accepts merger

The Rajya Sabha Chairman formally accepted a merger petition filed by seven Members of Parliament who had recently left one political party and declared thei...


What Happened

  • The Rajya Sabha Chairman formally accepted a merger petition filed by seven Members of Parliament who had recently left one political party and declared their merger with another.
  • Upon acceptance, these seven MPs were officially recognised as part of the new parliamentary party in the Upper House, raising its total strength in Rajya Sabha to 113.
  • The original party submitted a counter-petition seeking disqualification of the same seven MPs, arguing the merger violated the Tenth Schedule because no merger had occurred at the national party level — only legislators acted.
  • Constitutional experts and former parliamentary officials were divided: one school held that the law requires the political party itself to merge first; another argued the two-thirds legislative consent alone triggers the merger exception.
  • With the Chairman having accepted the merger, the original party announced it would approach the courts.

Static Topic Bridges

The Tenth Schedule — Origins and Purpose

The Tenth Schedule was inserted into the Constitution by the 52nd Constitutional Amendment Act, 1985. It operates through Articles 102(2) and 191(2), which respectively empower Parliament and State Legislatures to disqualify members on grounds of defection.

The Schedule was enacted to address the widespread phenomenon of "aaya ram, gaya ram" — a phrase coined after a Haryana legislator who switched parties multiple times in a single day in 1967 — which had destabilised governments and eroded the legitimacy of electoral mandates.

  • Applies to both Houses of Parliament and all State Legislative Assemblies and Councils.
  • A member incurs disqualification if they: (a) voluntarily give up membership of the political party on whose ticket they were elected, or (b) vote or abstain contrary to a direction issued by their party without prior permission.
  • The deciding authority is the Speaker (Lok Sabha / State Assemblies) or the Chairman (Rajya Sabha / State Councils).

Connection to this news: The seven MPs' departure from their original party triggered the question of whether this constituted voluntary giving up of membership (attracting disqualification) or a valid merger (exempting them).


The Merger Exception — The Two-Thirds Rule

The Tenth Schedule provides two exceptions to the disqualification rule. The split exception (one-third of members) was deleted by the 91st Constitutional Amendment Act, 2003, leaving only the merger exception.

Under Paragraph 4 of the Tenth Schedule, a member is not disqualified if their act of defection results from a merger of the original political party with another party. A merger is deemed to have occurred when not less than two-thirds of the members of the legislature party agree to the merger.

  • The two-thirds threshold applies to the legislature party (the MPs/MLAs of that party), not to the total membership of the political party as a whole.
  • Critically, the text refers to a merger "of the original political party" — this raises the interpretive question of whether a merger must also occur at the national/organisational level of the party, or whether legislative consent alone suffices.
  • The conjunctive interpretation: both a national-level party merger AND two-thirds legislative consent are required.
  • The disjunctive interpretation: two-thirds legislative consent alone creates a "deemed merger," independent of any organisational merger.

Connection to this news: All seven of the departing MPs constituted 7 out of the party's then-10 Rajya Sabha members, exceeding the two-thirds threshold for the legislature party. The legal dispute turns precisely on whether this legislative act alone is sufficient or whether an organisational merger of the party was also needed.


Role of the Speaker/Chairman Under the Tenth Schedule

The Tenth Schedule designates the Speaker (Lok Sabha) or the Chairman (Rajya Sabha) as the sole authority for deciding disqualification petitions. This was a deliberate constitutional choice to keep such decisions within the House rather than in courts.

  • The Speaker/Chairman is required to act in a quasi-judicial capacity, following principles of natural justice.
  • Paragraph 6 of the Tenth Schedule originally provided that the Speaker/Chairman's decision shall be final and not be questioned in any court. However, this finality clause was struck down in Kihoto Hollohan (see below).
  • The deciding authority can: accept the merger petition (validating the defection), refer the disqualification petition for hearing, or reject petitions at the threshold.
  • There is no statutory time limit within which the Speaker/Chairman must decide — a significant procedural gap often criticised by constitutional scholars.

Connection to this news: The Rajya Sabha Chairman exercised this exact authority in accepting the merger petition before ruling on the competing disqualification petition — a sequencing that the original party described as prejudging the outcome.


Kihoto Hollohan v. Zachillhu (1992) — Judicial Review of Anti-Defection Decisions

The Supreme Court's landmark five-judge Constitution Bench judgment in Kihoto Hollohan v. Zachillhu and Others (1992 Supp (2) SCC 651) is the foundational authority on the Tenth Schedule's constitutionality.

  • The Court upheld the general constitutional validity of the Tenth Schedule, ruling that vesting disqualification powers in the Speaker/Chairman does not violate the basic structure.
  • The Court (by a 3:2 majority) struck down Paragraph 7 of the Schedule, which had entirely excluded judicial review of the Speaker/Chairman's decisions. The Court held that absolute exclusion of judicial review violates the basic structure of the Constitution — and that since Paragraph 7 required ratification by State Legislatures under Article 368(2) (which was not done), it was void.
  • Scope of review: Courts can review decisions of the Speaker/Chairman, but only on limited grounds — constitutional mandate violations, mala fides, violation of natural justice, and perversity. Courts do not conduct a merits review of factual findings.
  • Judicial review is available under Articles 136, 226, and 227 of the Constitution.

Connection to this news: The original party's announced intention to approach courts is grounded directly in Kihoto Hollohan: courts can review the Chairman's acceptance of the merger petition if it is challenged as violating the constitutional requirements of the Tenth Schedule or natural justice.


Key Facts & Data

  • Seven MPs named in the merger petition: Raghav Chadha, Ashok Mittal, Harbhajan Singh, Sandeep Pathak, Vikramjit Sahney, Swati Maliwal, and Rajinder Gupta.
  • Rajya Sabha Chairman: C.P. Radhakrishnan.
  • After acceptance of merger, the receiving party's Rajya Sabha strength rose to 113.
  • The two-thirds merger threshold under Para 4 of the Tenth Schedule requires consent of at least 2/3 of the legislature party members.
  • The split exception (one-third rule) was deleted by the 91st Amendment Act, 2003 — only the merger exception survives.
  • The 52nd Amendment (1985) inserted the Tenth Schedule; it applies via Articles 102(2) and 191(2).
  • Kihoto Hollohan (1992): struck down Para 7 (finality clause); upheld Para 6 subject to limited judicial review.
  • Constitutional expert Kapil Sibal and former Lok Sabha Secretary-General PDT Achary publicly stated that a legislature-only merger without an organisational party merger may not satisfy the Tenth Schedule's requirements.
On this page
  1. What Happened
  2. Static Topic Bridges
  3. The Tenth Schedule — Origins and Purpose
  4. The Merger Exception — The Two-Thirds Rule
  5. Role of the Speaker/Chairman Under the Tenth Schedule
  6. Kihoto Hollohan v. Zachillhu (1992) — Judicial Review of Anti-Defection Decisions
  7. Key Facts & Data
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