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Can the Strait of Hormuz blockade break the Internet?

March 18, 2026 6 min read Science & Technology International Relations Internal Security GS3 (Infrastructure Critical Technology Internal Security)
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What Happened

  • For the first time in history, both the Strait of Hormuz and the Red Sea are simultaneously effectively closed to commercial maritime traffic, disrupting two of the world's most critical submarine cable corridors.
  • Approximately 17 submarine cables pass through the Red Sea, and additional cables run through the Persian Gulf — together carrying an estimated 30% of global internet traffic.
  • Iran's Islamic Revolutionary Guard Corps (IRGC) declared the Strait of Hormuz shut to vessels from the US, Israel, and their Western allies following the outbreak of the US-Israel war on Iran (February 28, 2026).
  • Major tech companies — Amazon, Microsoft, Google, and Meta — face severe disruption to their Gulf data centre investments; Meta has halted work on its 2Africa Pearls undersea cable project in the Persian Gulf.
  • Six competing overland cable route projects are being fast-tracked by Gulf states as alternatives, including SilkLink (led by Saudi Arabia's STC Group) — a 4,500 km overland route through Jordan and Syria expected to be operational in 18-24 months.
  • India faces a compounded threat: both its oil supply (through Hormuz) and internet connectivity (through undersea cables) are simultaneously at risk.

Static Topic Bridges

Submarine Cable Infrastructure: Architecture and Strategic Significance

Submarine (undersea) fibre-optic cables carry over 95% of international data traffic, including internet communications, financial transactions, and government communications. Unlike satellites, which have high latency and limited bandwidth, fibre-optic cables transmit data at near-light speed with enormous capacity, making them the invisible backbone of the modern global economy.

  • There are approximately 530 active submarine cable systems worldwide, spanning over 1.4 million km of ocean floor (as of 2025).
  • The Persian Gulf and Red Sea together host cables serving Europe-Asia-Africa connectivity; the Red Sea route alone carries the majority of data between Europe and South/Southeast Asia.
  • Cable landing stations — where undersea cables connect to terrestrial networks — are critical national infrastructure. India has cable landing stations at Mumbai, Chennai, Cochin, and Tuticorin.
  • Cables are vulnerable to both accidental damage (ship anchors, earthquakes) and deliberate sabotage; the January 2024 Red Sea cable cuts by Houthi forces disrupted approximately 25% of traffic on that route.
  • Repair of damaged undersea cables requires specialised cable-laying ships, which cannot operate in a conflict zone — meaning damage during war could remain unrepaired for months.

Connection to this news: The simultaneous closure of both the Hormuz and Red Sea corridors creates an unprecedented "double chokepoint" scenario for internet infrastructure, with no quick alternative route available. This is a new dimension of geopolitical risk that was largely theoretical before 2026.

The Strait of Hormuz as a Strategic Chokepoint

The Strait of Hormuz is a narrow waterway between Iran (north) and the Musandam exclave of Oman (south), connecting the Persian Gulf to the Gulf of Oman and the Arabian Sea. It is classified as the world's most important oil transit chokepoint and is now understood also as a critical data chokepoint.

  • Width: approximately 55–95 km; navigable shipping lanes are just 2 miles wide in each direction (inbound and outbound), separated by a 2-mile median zone.
  • Depth: 60–100 metres throughout most of its width.
  • Oil transit: approximately 20 million barrels per day (mb/d) as of 2025 — nearly 20% of global oil supply and 34% of global crude oil trade.
  • LNG transit: approximately 93% of Qatar's and 96% of UAE's LNG exports pass through Hormuz, representing 19% of global LNG trade.
  • Top oil destination countries: China (37.7%), India (14.7%), South Korea (12.0%), Japan (10.9%).
  • India imports approximately 85% of its crude oil; disruption at Hormuz directly affects fuel prices, inflation, and the current account deficit.

Connection to this news: The article makes the novel argument that Hormuz is not merely an oil chokepoint but also an internet chokepoint — a convergence that makes its strategic significance even greater. For India, both energy security and digital connectivity depend on this narrow waterway.

Critical Information Infrastructure (CII) and National Security

Critical Information Infrastructure (CII) refers to computer resources, networks, and communication systems whose incapacitation or destruction would have a debilitating impact on national security, economy, public health, or safety. India has a formal CII protection framework under the Information Technology (Amendment) Act, 2008.

  • Section 70 of the IT Act, 2008 defines CII and empowers the government to declare any computer resource as "protected system."
  • The National Critical Information Infrastructure Protection Centre (NCIIPC) — established under Section 70A of the IT Act — is India's nodal agency for CII protection. It operates under the National Technical Research Organisation (NTRO), which reports to the Prime Minister's Office.
  • Submarine cables are formally recognised as CII in India's National Cyber Security Policy (2013) and the draft National Cyber Security Strategy (2020).
  • The Budapest Convention on Cybercrime (2001) — the primary international treaty on cybercrime — India is not a signatory, preferring a UN-led framework.
  • CERT-In (Computer Emergency Response Team — India) coordinates with cable operators and internet exchange points during disruptions.

Connection to this news: The Hormuz crisis illustrates that CII threats can be physical (cable cuts, conflict zones) as much as cyber. This blurs the line between internal security and external geopolitics — a key Mains GS3 theme on emerging security challenges.

Data Localisation and Alternate Connectivity Strategies

Overland data cable routes are being fast-tracked as strategic alternatives to vulnerable undersea cables. This dovetails with the broader global conversation on data sovereignty, digital infrastructure resilience, and reducing dependence on single points of failure.

  • The SilkLink project (STC Group, Saudi Arabia) proposes a 4,500 km overland cable through Jordan and Syria — expected operational within 18-24 months.
  • India's BharatNet project aims to connect all gram panchayats with fibre-optic connectivity; however, international connectivity remains dependent on undersea cables.
  • The US-led "Clean Network" initiative and India's participation in the Quad's Cable Connectivity and Resilience initiative reflect growing state attention to undersea cable security.
  • India-Japan-Australia undersea cable routes through the Pacific offer partial alternatives but cannot fully substitute Gulf-Red Sea routes for Europe-bound traffic.
  • The 2Africa cable (backed by Meta and partners) — one of the world's longest at 45,000 km — was designed to ring Africa and connect to the Gulf; its suspension due to the current conflict illustrates how private infrastructure investment is also a national security concern.

Connection to this news: The race to build overland alternatives is not just an engineering exercise — it is a geopolitical competition over who controls the future internet backbone. Gulf states investing in overland routes are seeking to hedge against their own vulnerability while gaining leverage over global data flows.

Key Facts & Data

  • 30%: estimated share of global internet traffic passing through Gulf and Red Sea undersea cables
  • 17: number of submarine cables crossing the Red Sea
  • 95%+: share of international internet traffic carried by undersea fibre-optic cables (vs. satellites)
  • 530+: active submarine cable systems worldwide, spanning 1.4 million km
  • 2Africa Pearls: Meta's Gulf extension project — now suspended due to the Hormuz conflict
  • SilkLink: Saudi STC Group's 4,500 km overland cable project through Jordan and Syria
  • India's cable landing stations: Mumbai (primary), Chennai, Cochin, Tuticorin
  • Section 70A, IT Act 2008: establishes NCIIPC as nodal agency for CII protection
  • January 2024: Houthi forces cut Red Sea cables, disrupting ~25% of that route's traffic
  • India imports ~85% of its crude oil; 14.7% of all Hormuz oil flows to India