‘Will boost speedy justice’: Amit Shah on bill to increase SC strength

Following the Union Cabinet's clearance of the Supreme Court (Number of Judges) Amendment Bill, 2026, the government articulated three policy rationales for ...

What Happened

Following the Union Cabinet's clearance of the Supreme Court (Number of Judges) Amendment Bill, 2026, the government articulated three policy rationales for the four-judge expansion: faster justice delivery, better access for poor and remote petitioners, and expedited resolution of constitutional matters.
The bill proposes to increase the sanctioned strength of the Supreme Court from 34 to 38 judges (technically amending the Supreme Court (Number of Judges) Act, 1956 to raise the number of judges other than the Chief Justice from 33 to 37).
The articulation of "relief to poor and remote petitioners" as a goal connects the bench expansion to India's access-to-justice challenges — particularly the prohibitive costs and distances involved in approaching the highest court.
The emphasis on "expediting constitutional matters" signals recognition that the Supreme Court's constitutional and original jurisdiction caseload has grown substantially, and that dedicated benches for constitutional questions require more judges.

Static Topic Bridges

Access to Justice as a Constitutional Right

Access to justice — the ability of every citizen to approach a court and receive a fair, timely decision — is embedded in multiple constitutional provisions. Article 39A (Directive Principle of State Policy) explicitly directs the state to ensure that the legal system promotes justice on the basis of equal opportunity, and to provide free legal aid so that economic or other disabilities do not prevent any citizen from securing justice.

Article 39A (inserted by 42nd Constitutional Amendment, 1976): free legal aid and equal access to justice as a DPSP
Article 21 (Right to Life): the Supreme Court in Hussainara Khatoon v. State of Bihar (1979) held that speedy trial is a component of Article 21
Article 32: Right to approach the Supreme Court directly for enforcement of fundamental rights — "heart and soul of the Constitution" per Dr. B.R. Ambedkar
Article 136: Special Leave Petition (SLP) — the Supreme Court's discretionary power to hear appeals from any court or tribunal; the primary channel through which most cases reach the SC
Supreme Court Legal Services Committee under the Legal Services Authorities Act, 1987: provides free legal aid for cases before the SC

Connection to this news: The four-judge expansion directly serves Article 39A's directive by increasing the court's capacity to hear cases from poor and remote petitioners, including those filed under Article 32 and Article 136, reducing wait times that disproportionately affect economically disadvantaged litigants.

The Supreme Court's Original, Appellate, and Constitutional Jurisdictions

The Supreme Court wears multiple hats — original court, final court of appeal, and constitutional court. Each jurisdiction generates distinct categories of cases; growth in each strains the court's capacity differently and benefits from a larger bench.

Original jurisdiction (Article 131): disputes between the Centre and States, or between States inter se; heard by a Constitution Bench (minimum 5 judges)
Appellate jurisdiction (Articles 132-134): appeals from High Courts in constitutional, civil, and criminal matters
Special Leave Petition jurisdiction (Article 136): discretionary power to hear any appeal; accounts for the bulk of SC filings
Writ jurisdiction (Article 32): enforcement of fundamental rights; any citizen can approach the SC directly
Advisory jurisdiction (Article 143): President can refer questions of law or fact to SC for opinion
Constitution Benches (Article 145(3)): minimum 5 judges required for cases involving substantial questions of constitutional interpretation
Pendency of constitutional matters and SLPs is the primary driver of the 92,800+ backlog

Connection to this news: More judges allow more simultaneous Constitution Benches and regular benches, directly expanding capacity to hear constitutional references, SLPs, and writ petitions — the three largest categories of pending matters.

The Supreme Court (Number of Judges) Act, 1956 and the Logic of Incremental Expansion

Every prior expansion of the Supreme Court's strength has been motivated by a specific pattern of judicial bottleneck. The 2026 expansion follows this historical logic: as case complexity and volumes outpace disposal, Parliament responds by amending the 1956 Act. The mechanism is deliberately flexible — ordinary legislation, not constitutional amendment — because the Constituent Assembly anticipated that judicial needs would evolve.

Original SC strength (1950): CJI + 7 judges = 8 total
Growth trajectory: 8 → 11 (1956) → 14 (1960) → 18 (1978) → 26 (1986) → 31 (2009) → 34 (2019) → 38 (proposed 2026)
All amendments done by simple majority in both Houses — ordinary legislation under Article 124(1)
The 1978 increase (from 14 to 18) was specifically driven by the need for more Constitution Benches post-Emergency
The 2019 increase (from 31 to 34) followed then-CJI Ranjan Gogoi's recommendation citing mounting pendency
The 2026 increase is the seventh amendment to the Act; each responds to pendency data

Connection to this news: The three stated objectives — speedy justice, access for the disadvantaged, and constitutional case resolution — map directly onto the three core jurisdictions (appellate, writ/SLP, and original/constitutional) that will benefit from an expanded bench.

Judicial Vacancies vs. Sanctioned Strength: A Structural Problem

Even before the 2026 amendment, the Supreme Court operated below its sanctioned strength due to the time lag between sanctioning, collegium recommendations, and Presidential appointments. This structural vacancy problem means the effective capacity of the court is typically lower than its notional cap.

As of the time of the 2026 announcement, the Supreme Court had two vacancies against the then-current sanctioned strength of 34
The collegium recommends; the government processes the recommendation; the President formally appoints — the full cycle often takes months
The 99th Constitutional Amendment (2014), which sought to replace the collegium with the National Judicial Appointments Commission (NJAC), was struck down by the Supreme Court in 2015 (Fourth Judges Case)
Post-NJAC, appointments are still made on collegium recommendation — judicial independence in selection is preserved
High Court vacancy rates are even more severe: across 25 High Courts, vacancy rates frequently exceed 30%

Connection to this news: The four additional sanctioned posts created by the 2026 Amendment Bill will only translate into actual expansion after the collegium nominates, the government processes, and the President appoints four new judges — making the collegium's efficiency as important as the legislative step in the chain.

Key Facts & Data

Bill: The Supreme Court (Number of Judges) Amendment Bill, 2026
Parent Act: The Supreme Court (Number of Judges) Act, 1956
Constitutional basis: Article 124(1) — Parliament's power to prescribe judge strength by ordinary law
Current strength: 34 (CJI + 33); proposed: 38 (CJI + 37)
Key access-to-justice provision: Article 39A (DPSP, inserted by 42nd Amendment, 1976)
Right to speedy trial: Hussainara Khatoon v. State of Bihar (1979), held part of Article 21
Constitution Bench quorum: minimum 5 judges (Article 145(3))
SC pending cases (January 2026): 92,828 — all-time high
SLP (Article 136): main channel for most cases reaching the SC
NJAC struck down: Fourth Judges Case, 2015 (99th Constitutional Amendment held unconstitutional)
Collegium composition: CJI + 4 senior-most SC judges (Third Judges Case, 1998)
Judges' retirement age: 65 years (Article 124(2))
Removal of SC judge: special majority — 2/3 of members present and voting AND majority of total membership of each House (Article 124(4))