'No vacuum in law to deal with the offence' — What Supreme Court said on hate speeches

The Supreme Court on April 29, 2026 dismissed petitions seeking fresh judicial directions or a dedicated legal framework to curb hate speech, ruling that no ...

What Happened

The Supreme Court on April 29, 2026 dismissed petitions seeking fresh judicial directions or a dedicated legal framework to curb hate speech, ruling that no legislative vacuum exists in Indian law.
A Bench of Justices Vikram Nath and Sandeep Mehta held that the existing substantive criminal law — including the Bharatiya Nyaya Sanhita (BNS) and allied legislation — already adequately addresses acts that promote enmity, disturb public tranquillity, or outrage religious sentiments.
The Court stated that the constitutional scheme founded on the doctrine of separation of powers does not permit the judiciary to create new offences or expand criminal liability through judicial directions.
The bench observed that the grievance of petitioners arises not from the absence of law, but from lack of enforcement — placing responsibility on State authorities and police.
The Court encouraged the Union and State governments to consider, in their wisdom, whether any further legislative measures are warranted given evolving societal and technological challenges.
The Court refrained from passing any specific directions to Parliament or State legislatures, distinguishing the present case from situations where courts have issued guidelines pending legislation.

Static Topic Bridges

Legislative Domain and Judicial Limits on Criminal Law

Under the Indian Constitution, criminal law is a subject in the Concurrent List (Entry 1, List III — Seventh Schedule), meaning both Parliament and State legislatures can legislate on it. However, the Supreme Court has consistently held that the power to define new criminal offences — particularly those that restrict speech — belongs exclusively to the legislature. Courts may interpret, read down, or strike down existing provisions, but cannot create new offences through judicial directions.

Entry 1, List III (Concurrent List): Criminal law — including offences against the human body, definition of offences, and punishment.
Entry 2, List III: Criminal procedure.
Article 246: Distribution of legislative powers among Parliament and State legislatures via the three Lists of the Seventh Schedule.
Strict construction of penal statutes: Courts interpret criminal provisions narrowly, not expansively.

Connection to this news: The Court invoked this principle to decline petitioners' request to judicially create or mandate a dedicated hate speech law, holding that any such measure must come through legislative action under the Concurrent List.

Vishaka Distinction — When Courts Issue Guidelines Pending Legislation

In Vishaka v. State of Rajasthan (1997), the Supreme Court issued a set of binding guidelines on sexual harassment at the workplace in the absence of specific legislation, treating them as having the force of law until Parliament acted. This became a landmark precedent for judicial gap-filling in the absence of law. The Protection of Women from Sexual Harassment Act, 2013, was eventually enacted to replace the Vishaka guidelines.

Vishaka v. State of Rajasthan (1997): SC issued workplace sexual harassment guidelines under Article 32 — operative until legislation was passed.
POSH Act (2013): Legislatively codified the Vishaka principles.
Key distinction: In Vishaka, there was an absolute legislative vacuum on the specific subject; in the hate speech case, substantial legislation already exists (BNS/IPC provisions, Representation of the People Act, IT Act, etc.).

Connection to this news: The Court differentiated the current situation from Vishaka — since multiple existing provisions already address hate speech, the precondition for court-issued guidelines (complete legislative vacuum) is not met.

Information Technology Act, 2000 — Section 66A (Struck Down) and Remaining Provisions

The Information Technology Act, 2000 (IT Act) also contains provisions relevant to hate speech in the digital space. Section 66A, which punished "offensive" online communication, was struck down entirely by the Supreme Court in Shreya Singhal v. Union of India (2015) as an unconstitutional restriction on free speech under Article 19(1)(a). However, Section 69A (power to block websites for public order/security) and Section 79 (intermediary liability) remain operative.

Section 66A IT Act: Struck down in Shreya Singhal v. Union of India (2015) — held to be unconstitutionally vague and overbroad.
Shreya Singhal (2015): Landmark case on online free speech; distinguished between "discussion/advocacy" (protected) and "incitement" (not protected).
Section 69A IT Act: Government can issue orders to block online content in the interest of sovereignty, security, or public order — this remains valid.
IT (Intermediary Guidelines and Digital Media Ethics Code) Rules, 2021: Impose due diligence obligations on social media platforms.

Connection to this news: Petitioners had sought directions against online hate speech; the Court's ruling that existing law is adequate implicitly covers the IT Act framework as part of the legal arsenal.

Freedom of Speech and Reasonable Restrictions (Article 19)

Article 19(1)(a) of the Constitution guarantees all citizens the right to freedom of speech and expression. Article 19(2) permits the State to impose reasonable restrictions on this right in the interests of sovereignty and integrity of India, security of the State, friendly relations with foreign States, public order, decency or morality, contempt of court, defamation, or incitement to an offence. The Supreme Court has held in multiple cases that any restriction must be proportionate, narrowly tailored, and backed by law.

Article 19(1)(a): Freedom of speech and expression — only for citizens (not companies or foreigners).
Article 19(2): Eight grounds for restriction — "public order" and "incitement to an offence" are most relevant to hate speech.
Ramji Lal Modi v. State of UP (1957): Upheld Section 295A IPC as a reasonable restriction under Article 19(2).
S. Rangarajan v. P. Jagjivan Ram (1989): Held that freedom of expression cannot be suppressed on the account of threat of demonstration.
"Us versus them" narrative explicitly identified by the Court as antithetical to constitutional fraternity — falls under "incitement to an offence" as a permissible restriction ground.

Connection to this news: The Court's analysis balances Article 19(1)(a) protections with the Article 19(2) grounds that justify criminal restrictions on hate speech, holding that this balance is already struck in existing law.

Role of Police and State Machinery in Enforcement

Constitutional policing in India is a State subject (Entry 2, List II — State List: Public order; Entry 1, List II: Land; Entry 2, List II: Police). The police are responsible for registering FIRs and investigating offences under the BNS. The Supreme Court has repeatedly directed police to register FIRs promptly (Lalita Kumari v. Government of UP, 2013 — a cognisable offence must result in mandatory FIR registration).

Lalita Kumari v. Government of UP (2013): FIR registration is mandatory for cognisable offences — police cannot conduct a preliminary inquiry before registering.
Offences under Section 196 BNS (promoting enmity) are cognisable and non-bailable.
CrPC (now BNSS 2023): Section 173 BNSS allows magistrates to order police to register FIRs if police refuse.
Promotion of enmity under Section 196 BNS requires prior government sanction for prosecution — a condition that has often delayed action.

Connection to this news: The Court identified enforcement failure — not legislative gaps — as the core problem, implicitly critiquing State governments and police for not using existing provisions against hate speech.

Key Facts & Data

Bench: Justices Vikram Nath and Sandeep Mehta; judgment dated April 29, 2026.
Key petitions arose from: "Corona Jihad" (2020), Sudarshan TV "UPSC Jihad" (2020), Dharam Sansad speeches.
Shreya Singhal v. Union of India (2015): Section 66A IT Act struck down — landmark free speech ruling.
Lalita Kumari v. Government of UP (2013): Mandatory FIR registration for cognisable offences.
Vishaka v. State of Rajasthan (1997): Guidelines pending legislation — distinguished in this case.
Entry 1, List III (Concurrent List): Criminal law — both Parliament and States can legislate.
Article 19(1)(a): Free speech; Article 19(2): Eight grounds for reasonable restriction.
Section 196 BNS (ex-153A IPC): Requires prior government sanction for prosecution.
BNS in force: July 1, 2024 (replaced IPC 1860); BNSS replaced CrPC on the same date.
Ramji Lal Modi v. State of UP (1957): Upheld 295A IPC as reasonable restriction — still good law.