AAP seeks termination of Raghav Chadha, 6 'defector' MPs in plea to Rajya Sabha chairman

A petition was filed before the Rajya Sabha Chairman seeking disqualification of seven Rajya Sabha MPs under the Tenth Schedule (anti-defection law), after t...

What Happened

A petition was filed before the Rajya Sabha Chairman seeking disqualification of seven Rajya Sabha MPs under the Tenth Schedule (anti-defection law), after the MPs announced their departure from the party on whose ticket they were elected and sought to join another party.
The departing MPs argued their group constitutes exactly two-thirds of the party's ten-member Rajya Sabha legislature party — thereby qualifying for the merger exception under Paragraph 4 of the Tenth Schedule, which protects members from disqualification when two-thirds of the legislature party agrees to merge.
The original party contested the petition's rejection, arguing that the Tenth Schedule's merger provision requires the political party as a whole to merge, not merely a legislature party faction, and that the party organisation continues to function independently in multiple states.
The petition raises a fundamental constitutional question: does the "merger" in Paragraph 4 refer solely to the legislature party (numerical test: two-thirds) or does it also require the original political party at the organisational level to actually merge with the other party?

Static Topic Bridges

Paragraph 4 — Merger Exception: Text and Interpretation

The Tenth Schedule, inserted by the Constitution (Fifty-Second Amendment) Act, 1985, provides in Paragraph 4 that a member is not disqualified if "the original political party of such member merges with another political party" and at least two-thirds of the legislature party members agree to the merger.

Two conditions under Paragraph 4: (i) Two-thirds of legislature party members must agree; AND (ii) the original political party must merge with another political party — both conditions must be jointly satisfied.
Strict reading: The phrase "original political party merges" contemplates an organisational-level union between two parties; a legislature party bloc cannot unilaterally declare a "merger" while the parent party continues to exist.
Post-91st Amendment (2003) landscape: The earlier one-third split exception (old Paragraph 3) was deleted; now, no protection exists for splits — only genuine mergers at two-thirds offer safe harbour.
Protected parties under Paragraph 4: Both those who merge (joining the other party) and those who stay with the original party are protected — neither group is disqualified.
Adjudicating authority: Rajya Sabha Chairman for Rajya Sabha members; acts in a quasi-judicial capacity under Paragraph 5; decisions are subject to judicial review (Kihoto Hollohan v. Zachillhu, 1992).

Connection to this news: The case tests whether "two-thirds of the legislature party" is the sole operative criterion, or whether the organisational merger of the political party itself is a separate, additional requirement. If the latter, the seven MPs' claim fails because the original party as an entity has not merged with any other party.

Disqualification Grounds Under Paragraph 2

For comparison, the grounds for disqualification absent a merger or split exception are:

Voluntary giving up of membership (Paragraph 2(1)(a)): A member who voluntarily surrenders party membership is disqualified. Courts have held that actions short of formal resignation — such as publicly supporting another party — can constitute "voluntarily giving up membership."
Anti-party voting (Paragraph 2(1)(b)): A member who votes (or abstains from voting) against the direction issued by the political party (whip), without prior permission or subsequent condonation within 15 days, is disqualified.
Independent members: An independent member who joins a party after election is disqualified (Paragraph 2(2)).
Nominated members: A nominated member who joins a party after six months of taking seat is disqualified (Paragraph 2(3)).

Connection to this news: If the Rajya Sabha Chairman finds the merger claim invalid, the departing MPs' actions (voluntarily leaving their party and joining another) would squarely fall under Paragraph 2(1)(a) — voluntarily giving up membership — making disqualification mandatory.

Key Facts & Data

Tenth Schedule inserted by: Constitution (Fifty-Second Amendment) Act, 1985.
Merger protection threshold: Two-thirds of the legislature party (Paragraph 4).
91st Amendment Act (2003): Deleted one-third split exception; only merger protection survives.
Two-thirds of 10 MPs: Threshold question — 6.67 rounds to 7; whether exactly 7 of 10 constitutes "not less than two-thirds" is legally disputed.
Kihoto Hollohan v. Zachillhu (1992): Supreme Court upheld Tenth Schedule; Speaker/Chairman's decisions subject to post-decision judicial review.
Key constitutional distinction: "Legislature party" (members of one House belonging to a party) vs. "original political party" (the party as a whole at organisational level) — Paragraph 4 uses both phrases, and both must be satisfied.
Disqualification authority (Rajya Sabha): Chairman of Rajya Sabha (ex-officio: Vice-President of India per Article 64).
Paragraph 5: Presiding officer's decision is final subject to judicial review; no intra-Parliamentary appeal.
Article 102(2): Disqualification under Tenth Schedule is also a ground for disqualification from membership of either House of Parliament.