Women entry in Sabarimala: Supreme Court says it won’t rely on ‘WhatsApp University’ in religious freedom cases

A nine-judge constitutional bench of the Supreme Court is hearing a reference arising from the Sabarimala review petitions, examining the broader scope of re...

What Happened

A nine-judge constitutional bench of the Supreme Court is hearing a reference arising from the Sabarimala review petitions, examining the broader scope of religious freedom under the Constitution.
During proceedings, the bench emphasised that it would not rely on unverified or informal sources — referenced colloquially as "WhatsApp University" — while adjudicating questions of religious practice and tradition.
The bench has made clear that while scholarly and academic works by eminent authors carry weight, personal or anonymous opinions do not constitute admissible judicial evidence.
The nine-judge bench is examining questions across 66 tagged matters including women's entry to mosques, the rights of Parsi women who marry outside the community, and practices of the Dawoodi Bohra community.
Arguments concluded in phases between April 7 and April 22, 2026, with parties supporting review, parties opposing review, rejoinder arguments, and the amicus all having presented.

Static Topic Bridges

The Sabarimala Litigation — Background and 2018 Verdict

The original Sabarimala case (Indian Young Lawyers Association v. State of Kerala, 2018) concerned the exclusion of women aged 10–50 years from the Sabarimala temple in Kerala, based on a customary belief in the deity's celibate (Naishtika Brahmacharya) nature.

In September 2018, a five-judge bench delivered a 4:1 majority verdict holding the exclusionary practice unconstitutional, striking down Rule 3(b) of the Kerala Hindu Places of Public Worship (Authorisation of Entry) Rules, 1965.
The majority held the practice violated Article 25(1) — freedom of religion for female worshippers — and could not be justified under Article 26(b) as the sect did not constitute a distinct religious denomination.
Justice Indu Malhotra delivered a lone dissent, arguing that what constitutes an "essential religious practice" is for the religious community — not courts — to determine, and that the practice was protected under Article 26(b).
Following a review petition, a five-judge bench in 2019 referred the broader constitutional questions to a larger nine-judge bench.

Connection to this news: The nine-judge bench is now settled into full arguments, making this among the most consequential constitutional hearings on religious freedom and gender rights in recent years.

Articles 25 and 26 — Freedom of Religion

Articles 25 and 26 of the Indian Constitution together form the framework for religious freedom in India.

Article 25(1): All persons are equally entitled to freedom of conscience and the right to freely profess, practise and propagate religion — subject to public order, morality, and health, and to other Fundamental Rights.
Article 25(2): The State may make laws regulating or restricting any economic, financial, political, or other secular activity associated with religious practice; and may provide for social welfare and reform, or throwing open of Hindu religious institutions to all classes.
Article 26: Subject to public order, morality and health, every religious denomination or section thereof has the right to establish and maintain institutions for religious and charitable purposes, manage its own affairs in matters of religion, and own and administer property.
The "Essential Religious Practices" (ERP) doctrine — developed by the Supreme Court from the 1950s — holds that only practices essential and integral to a religion are protected under Articles 25 and 26; peripheral or superstitious practices are not.

Connection to this news: The nine-judge bench is being asked to re-examine or refine the ERP test, clarify the relationship between Articles 25/26 and equality rights, and determine the limits of State power in reforming religious practices.

Constitutional Morality vs. Popular Morality

A central theme of the nine-judge bench proceedings is the distinction between constitutional morality and popular (or social) morality, first articulated by Dr. B.R. Ambedkar in the Constituent Assembly.

Constitutional morality refers to adherence to the values and norms embedded in the Constitution — equality, dignity, non-discrimination — even when these conflict with prevailing social or religious conventions.
In the Navtej Singh Johar case (2018, decriminalising same-sex relations) and the Sabarimala majority verdict (2018), the Supreme Court invoked constitutional morality over popular morality.
The question before the nine-judge bench includes whether social reform under Article 25(2)(b) can override religious communities' assertion of autonomy under Article 26.
The bench is also examining whether pre-constitutional religious customs receive constitutional protection under Article 25.

Connection to this news: The bench's caution against unverified informal sources reflects its commitment to deciding these profound constitutional questions on sound jurisprudential and scholarly foundations rather than popular sentiment.

Key Facts & Data

2018 Verdict: 4:1 majority in Indian Young Lawyers Association v. State of Kerala; decided September 28, 2018.
Dissent: Justice Indu Malhotra was the sole dissenter in the 2018 bench.
Nine-judge bench composition (2026): Justices Surya Kant (presiding), B V Nagarathna, Ahsanuddin Amanullah, M M Sundresh, Aravind Kumar, Augustine George Masih, Prasanna B Varale, R Mahadevan, Joymalya Bagchi.
66 matters tagged to the Sabarimala reference, including dargah entry, Parsi women's temple rights, and FGM in the Dawoodi Bohra community.
Hearing schedule: Arguments by supporting parties (April 7–9), opposing parties (April 14–16), rejoinder (April 21), amicus (April 22).
Rule 3(b), Kerala Hindu Places of Public Worship (Authorisation of Entry) Rules, 1965 — struck down by the 2018 majority verdict.
Essential Religious Practices doctrine: Originated in Commissioner, Hindu Religious Endowments, Madras v. Sri Lakshmindra Thirtha Swamiar (1954).
Article 25(2)(b) empowers the State to legislate for social reform and throwing open Hindu religious institutions to all classes and sections of Hindus.