On the Yashwant Varma probe’s future

A sitting High Court judge against whom a formal statutory inquiry had been initiated under the Judges (Inquiry) Act, 1968 tendered resignation to the Presid...

What Happened

A sitting High Court judge against whom a formal statutory inquiry had been initiated under the Judges (Inquiry) Act, 1968 tendered resignation to the President of India in April 2026, bringing the parliamentary removal process to an abrupt halt.
Cash had been discovered at the judge's official New Delhi residence during a fire-fighting operation in March 2025, triggering an in-house Supreme Court inquiry, a transfer, and ultimately a formal Lok Sabha-constituted committee.
The in-house inquiry committee had concluded that the cash found was under the covert or active control of the judge and his family members, following which over 100 Members of Parliament supported a removal motion.
The Lok Sabha Speaker constituted a three-member inquiry committee in August 2025 under the Judges (Inquiry) Act, 1968, which was reconstituted in February 2026; it comprised a Supreme Court judge, a High Court Chief Justice, and a distinguished jurist.
Upon resignation, the inquiry stood abated — since the Judges (Inquiry) Act, 1968 contains no provision enabling an inquiry to continue against a former judge, leaving a structural gap in judicial accountability.
The resigning judge also simultaneously withdrew from the ongoing inquiry proceedings, alleging violations of due process.

Static Topic Bridges

Removal of Judges: The Constitutional Framework

The removal of Supreme Court and High Court judges is governed by Article 124(4) of the Constitution (for SC judges) and Article 218 (which extends the same provisions to HC judges). Removal requires "proved misbehaviour or incapacity" and can only be effected through a parliamentary address — a motion passed by a special majority in both Houses — which is then presented to the President. This process is intentionally arduous to preserve judicial independence.

Article 124(4): A Supreme Court judge may be removed by the President upon an address by each House of Parliament, supported by a majority of the total membership of that House and not less than two-thirds of members present and voting.
Article 218: Makes Articles 124(4) and 124(5) applicable to High Court judges without modification.
Article 124(5): Parliament is empowered to regulate, by law, the procedure for investigation of misbehaviour or incapacity — this is the authority under which the Judges (Inquiry) Act, 1968 was enacted.
No judge has been removed from office in India through the parliamentary process since independence; several removal motions have been introduced but none have completed all procedural stages.

Connection to this news: The constitutional design ties removal entirely to a judge's continued incumbency. Once a judge resigns, the parliamentary address mechanism becomes moot — because there is no one in office to be addressed for removal.

Judges (Inquiry) Act, 1968

The Judges (Inquiry) Act, 1968 (Act No. 51 of 1968) prescribes the statutory procedure for investigating allegations of misbehaviour or incapacity against Supreme Court and High Court judges. When a removal motion is admitted by the Speaker/Chairman, a three-member inquiry committee is constituted — comprising one judge of the Supreme Court, one Chief Justice of a High Court, and one distinguished jurist. The committee investigates, records findings, and reports to the Speaker/Chairman, after which Parliament votes.

A motion for removal requires the support of at least 100 members in the Lok Sabha or 50 members in the Rajya Sabha for the Speaker/Chairman to admit it.
The inquiry committee has powers equivalent to a civil court for summoning witnesses and examining evidence.
Crucially, the Act contains no provision enabling the inquiry to survive the resignation of the judge being investigated; inquiry abates automatically on departure from judicial office.
The Act is the only statutory mechanism for investigating judges; no other law provides for post-retirement accountability.

Connection to this news: The inquiry lapsed the moment the judge ceased to hold office, despite the in-house committee having already found prima facie evidence of cash at the premises. This exposes the accountability gap that critics argue must be addressed through legislative amendment.

In-House Procedure of the Supreme Court

The Supreme Court has an administrative "in-house procedure" — a non-statutory mechanism adopted in 1999 — which allows the Chief Justice of India to conduct preliminary inquiries into complaints against judges before the formal parliamentary process is triggered. This procedure was the first layer of accountability invoked in the present case; the in-house committee's adverse finding paved the way for the parliamentary motion.

The in-house procedure is not backed by statute or constitutional provision — it operates through internal resolutions of the Supreme Court.
Its findings are not binding in a legal sense; they serve as a basis for the CJI to recommend further action to the President or for Parliament to take up a motion.
The Supreme Court, in dismissing the judge's challenge to the procedure, held that the CJI is not a "mere post office" between the inquiry committee and the President, affirming the procedure's legitimacy.
The in-house procedure was designed to protect judicial dignity while ensuring accountability; critics argue it lacks transparency and enforceable outcomes.

Connection to this news: The in-house inquiry produced the foundational adverse finding, but the statutory mechanism that followed — the Judges (Inquiry) Act inquiry — lapsed upon resignation, leaving both layers of accountability without a final adjudicated outcome.

Judicial Independence vs. Judicial Accountability

The architecture of judge removal in India deliberately raises the bar for removal to protect the judiciary from executive and legislative interference. Provisions such as security of tenure, fixed salaries charged to the Consolidated Fund, and the supermajority requirement for removal are designed to insulate the judiciary. However, this same protection creates a structural gap: a judge facing imminent adverse findings can resign to forestall removal, exiting with full retirement benefits and pension intact — unlike an officer of a constitutional body removed after due process.

Judges' salaries and allowances are charged to the Consolidated Fund of India (Article 112/202) and cannot be voted upon by Parliament, ensuring financial independence.
A judge who resigns, unlike one removed, is not barred from post-retirement employment or practice.
Several democracies — including Australia and the United Kingdom — have provisions for inquiries to continue or post-retirement disqualification to apply even after a judge leaves office.
The Law Commission and parliamentary standing committees have flagged this gap in prior reports, recommending legislative amendments to the Judges (Inquiry) Act.

Connection to this news: The case has reinvigorated the debate over whether Parliament should amend the Act to allow inquiries to continue post-resignation, or whether the Constitution itself needs to be amended to close this accountability gap.

Key Facts & Data

March 14, 2025: Cash discovered at the official New Delhi residence of the High Court judge during fire-fighting operations.
August 2025: Lok Sabha Speaker constituted the three-member inquiry committee under the Judges (Inquiry) Act, 1968.
February 26, 2026: Inquiry committee reconstituted by the Lok Sabha Speaker.
April 9–10, 2026: The judge withdrew from the inquiry proceedings and submitted resignation to the President of India.
Article 124(4): Governs Supreme Court judge removal; Article 218 extends the same to High Court judges.
Special majority required for removal: Majority of total House membership AND two-thirds of members present and voting.
Judges (Inquiry) Act, 1968 (Act 51 of 1968): Sole statutory mechanism for investigating judges; silent on post-resignation continuance.
In-house procedure (1999): Non-statutory administrative mechanism; adverse finding was the trigger for parliamentary proceedings.
No judge removed since 1950: The constitutional mechanism has never been completed for any sitting judge in independent India.
Inquiry committee composition: One SC judge + one HC Chief Justice + one distinguished jurist (under Section 3 of the Judges Inquiry Act).