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Iran announces alternative routes for ships travelling through Strait of Hormuz


What Happened

  • Iran announced alternative shipping routes for vessels transiting the Strait of Hormuz, establishing a new channel north of Larak Island rather than the main channel south of the island.
  • Tehran had effectively blocked the Strait since late February 2026, following the start of a US-Israeli air campaign against Iran, causing global energy prices to spiral — Brent crude surpassed $114 per barrel at its peak.
  • Daily transits through the Strait plummeted from a pre-conflict average of approximately 130 vessels to just 6–7 per day — a roughly 95% drop.
  • Iran introduced a selective passage system, allowing "friendly" nations (including China, India, and Russia) to transit — sometimes for a fee — while restricting US-aligned nations; one vessel reportedly paid $2 million for passage.
  • On April 4–6, 2026, Iran introduced draft legislation that would formally impose tolls on Hormuz-transiting vessels, while permitting humanitarian passage and limited movement in Omani waters.

Static Topic Bridges

The Strait of Hormuz: Strategic Significance and International Law

The Strait of Hormuz is a narrow waterway between Iran and Oman, connecting the Persian Gulf to the Gulf of Oman and the Arabian Sea. It is the world's most strategically critical maritime chokepoint — approximately 20–21 million barrels of oil per day, representing nearly 20–21% of global oil trade, transit through it. Under the United Nations Convention on the Law of the Sea (UNCLOS, 1982), ships of all nations have the right of "transit passage" through international straits used for international navigation — a right that cannot be suspended even during peacetime.

  • Width: approximately 33 km (21 miles) at its narrowest; shipping lanes are only about 3 km wide.
  • UNCLOS Article 38 guarantees the right of transit passage through international straits — this right is non-suspendable.
  • Iran and the US are not UNCLOS signatories, though both generally abide by its navigation provisions.
  • Approximately 20–21 million barrels of oil per day pass through the Strait, along with significant LNG (primarily from Qatar — about 30% of global LNG trade).
  • A complete closure of Hormuz would affect Saudi Arabia, UAE, Kuwait, Iraq, Qatar, and Iran's own oil exports.

Connection to this news: Iran's blockade directly violates the UNCLOS right of transit passage, setting a precedent for state actors weaponizing maritime chokepoints; its "alternative route" announcement is partly a response to international pressure and ongoing US negotiations rather than a genuine restoration of freedom of navigation.

Alternative Oil Pipelines and Bypass Infrastructure

Anticipating potential Hormuz disruptions, Gulf states have invested in pipeline infrastructure to route oil exports overland and bypass the Strait. Saudi Arabia's East-West Pipeline (Petroline), operated by Saudi Aramco, was the most immediately activated bypass during the current crisis.

  • Saudi East-West Pipeline (Petroline): 1,200 km long; runs from Abqaiq (Eastern Province) to Yanbu port on the Red Sea; capacity of 7 million barrels per day (bpd) — maxed out during the crisis.
  • UAE's Abu Dhabi Crude Oil Pipeline (ADCOP): 380 km; capacity approximately 1.5 million bpd; runs from Habshan to Fujairah on the Gulf of Oman, bypassing Hormuz entirely.
  • Iraq-Turkey Pipeline: capacity approximately 1.5 million bpd; exports through Ceyhan port on Turkey's Mediterranean coast.
  • Combined bypass capacity (all pipelines): approximately 10–11 million bpd — still well below the 20+ million bpd normally transiting Hormuz.

Connection to this news: Despite maximum utilization of bypass pipelines, the supply gap from the Hormuz blockade cannot be fully compensated by existing infrastructure, explaining why Brent crude surpassed $114/barrel — and why Iran's controlled "alternative routes" carry enormous geopolitical leverage.

Energy Security and India's Import Dependence

India imports approximately 85% of its crude oil requirements. West Asia (the Persian Gulf region) supplies roughly 60% of India's crude imports, making the Strait of Hormuz — through which much of this oil transits — critical to India's energy security. Disruptions in Hormuz directly translate to higher crude import bills, inflationary pressure, and current account deficit widening for India.

  • India's crude oil import dependence: ~85% of total consumption.
  • West Asia share of India's crude imports: approximately 55–65% (Iraq, Saudi Arabia, UAE, Kuwait are top suppliers).
  • India's strategic petroleum reserves (SPR): three underground facilities at Visakhapatnam, Mangaluru, and Padur — combined capacity approximately 5.33 million tonnes (~39 million barrels), covering roughly 9–10 days of import cover.
  • India Petroleum Planning & Analysis Cell (PPAC) monitors import trends; Ministry of Petroleum and Natural Gas oversees energy security policy.
  • India Strategic Petroleum Reserves Limited (ISPRL) manages the SPR infrastructure under government of India.

Connection to this news: Iran selectively allowing India's vessels to transit (as a "friendly" nation) temporarily shields India from the worst supply disruptions, but India's structural dependence on Hormuz-routed crude makes any prolonged closure an existential energy security challenge — and underscores why the Indian Navy is monitoring the situation around the clock.

Iran's IRGC and the "Axis of Resistance" Strategy

Iran's Islamic Revolutionary Guard Corps (IRGC) has a dedicated naval wing — the IRGC Navy — that operates in the Persian Gulf and Strait of Hormuz. The IRGC Navy is distinct from Iran's conventional Artesh (military) and has been designated a terrorist organization by the United States (since 2019). The IRGC has historically used asymmetric tactics — fast attack boats, naval mines, and seizure of tankers — to threaten Hormuz shipping as a deterrence mechanism.

  • IRGC designated as a Foreign Terrorist Organization by the US in April 2019.
  • IRGC Navy doctrine: "swarming" with fast patrol boats, sea mines, coastal anti-ship missiles, and submarine operations.
  • Iran has seized multiple tankers since 2019 under the pretext of sanctions violations or environmental disputes.
  • The "tanker war" precedent: during the Iran-Iraq War (1980–1988), both sides attacked oil tankers — ultimately prompting US naval escort operations (Operation Earnest Will, 1987).

Connection to this news: Iran's selective passage system and formal toll legislation are an evolution of IRGC naval doctrine — using Hormuz as a coercive instrument not just militarily but economically and diplomatically, extracting geopolitical concessions from both adversaries and nominally neutral nations.

Key Facts & Data

  • Strait of Hormuz blockade began: late February 2026, following US-Israeli air campaign
  • Daily transits fell from ~130 vessels pre-conflict to 6–7 during the blockade (95% drop)
  • Brent crude peak: over $114 per barrel during the disruption
  • Saudi East-West Pipeline (Petroline) capacity: 7 million bpd — reached maximum capacity during the crisis
  • UAE Abu Dhabi Crude Oil Pipeline: ~1.5 million bpd bypass capacity to Fujairah (Gulf of Oman)
  • Iran's new channel: north of Larak Island; one vessel paid $2 million to use it
  • Iran's proposed toll legislation introduced: April 4–6, 2026
  • Friendly nations given passage: China, India, Russia (selectively)
  • 40+ nations met in London to discuss diplomatic reopening of the Strait
  • India's crude import dependence on West Asia: ~60% of total crude imports