Sabarimala case: 'Judges experts in law, not religion,' Centre tells SC over 'superstition'

What Happened

In the ongoing hearing before a nine-judge Constitution Bench of the Supreme Court (Sabarimala temple reference), the Centre (through Solicitor General Tushar Mehta) argued that secular courts lack the scholarly competence to determine whether a religious practice constitutes "superstition," and that such determinations are beyond the judicial domain.
The Supreme Court verbally disagreed, asserting its authority to examine religious practices that violate public order, morality, or health — even if the legislature has not acted.
The bench debated the limits of the judicial power under Article 25(2)(b), which gives the State the power to enact laws for social welfare and reform of religious institutions — the Centre argued this power vests exclusively in the legislature, not the judiciary.
The nine-judge bench is examining seven broad constitutional questions, including: whether the Essential Religious Practices (ERP) doctrine is constitutionally valid; whether courts can determine what constitutes "superstition" in a religious context; and the relative roles of the judiciary and legislature in religious reform.
The Centre's arguments, if accepted, would significantly constrain judicial intervention in religious practices — with implications extending well beyond Sabarimala to all cases of faith vs. constitutional rights.

Static Topic Bridges

Articles 25 and 26 — Religious Freedom and Its Limits

Articles 25 and 26 of the Constitution guarantee freedom of religion — but subject to significant qualifications that have been the subject of extensive judicial interpretation.

Article 25(1): All persons are equally entitled to freedom of conscience and the right to freely profess, practise, and propagate religion — subject to public order, morality, and health, AND subject to other provisions of Part III.
Article 25(2)(a): The State may regulate or restrict any economic, financial, political, or other secular activity associated with religious practice.
Article 25(2)(b): The State may make laws providing for social welfare and reform or throwing open Hindu religious institutions to all classes and sections of Hindus — this is the provision the Centre argued gives the legislature (not courts) the power to reform religious practices.
Article 26: Every religious denomination (or section thereof) has the right to: (a) establish and maintain institutions for religious and charitable purposes; (b) manage its own affairs in matters of religion; (c) own and acquire movable and immovable property; (d) administer such property in accordance with law. Subject to public order, morality, and health.
"Denomination" test: The court must determine whether a group qualifies as a "religious denomination" — meaning a collection of persons with a common faith, organisation, and designation.

Connection to this news: The central dispute is whether the Sabarimala customs (barring women of menstruating age) fall within the protected core of Articles 25-26 or within the State's regulatory power under Articles 25(2)(a) and 25(2)(b) — and who decides: the court (via ERP doctrine) or the legislature.

The Essential Religious Practices (ERP) Doctrine — Origins and Critique

The ERP doctrine is the Supreme Court's self-created test for determining which religious practices receive constitutional protection. Under this doctrine, only practices that are "essential" or "integral" to a religion are protected under Articles 25-26; peripheral or non-essential practices may be regulated or prohibited by the State.

Origin: The Commissioner, Hindu Religious Endowments, Madras v. Sri Lakshmindra Thritha Swamiar of Sri Shirur Mutt (1954) — first established the idea that constitutional protection extends to "matters of religion" as essentially religious, not to peripheral or secular activities.
Applied extensively: used to examine Jallikattu, entry restrictions in temples, religious dress codes, triple talaq, etc.
Critique: Critics (including the Centre's current position) argue that the ERP doctrine requires courts to adjudicate on the internal theology of religions — a task for which judges have no training and which violates the principle of judicial restraint.
The Centre proposed replacing ERP with a "sincere devotional belief" test — i.e., the court should ask whether devotees sincerely and genuinely believe the practice is part of their religion, without the court second-guessing the theology.
The Supreme Court itself has been ambivalent about ERP: some judgments have expanded its scope; others (like the 2019 Sabarimala review reference) have questioned its validity.

Connection to this news: The Centre's argument that courts cannot determine "superstition" is essentially an argument against the ERP doctrine — by challenging the court's competence to adjudicate what is or is not an essential religious practice, the Centre is seeking to narrow the ERP framework.

Judicial Review of Religious Practices — Article 13 and Part III Limits

The Constitution grants the Supreme Court the power of judicial review — the power to strike down laws or actions that violate Fundamental Rights. But the scope of this power in the religious domain is contested: can courts directly strike down a religious practice (not just a law), and on what constitutional basis?

Article 32: The right to constitutional remedies (move the Supreme Court for enforcement of Fundamental Rights) is itself a Fundamental Right — meaning courts must hear petitions challenging alleged violations.
The "State action" limitation: Fundamental Rights under Part III generally protect individuals from State action (laws, executive orders). Whether purely private religious practices (by a denomination, not the State) can be directly challenged under Part III is contested.
The Sabarimala case involved the Travancore Devaswom Board, a statutory body administering the temple under Kerala law — making it a quasi-State actor and enabling the constitutional challenge.
Courts can strike down State laws (under Article 13) that enable discriminatory religious practices; whether courts can directly prohibit a non-State religious group's practice without a law is a deeper question.
Durgah Committee, Ajmer v. Syed Hussain Ali (1961): the Court held that practices which are merely accretions or superstitions are not protected under Articles 25-26 — this is the origin of the "superstition" test the Centre now challenges.

Connection to this news: The Centre's argument targets the very foundation on which courts claim power to evaluate religious practices — if judicial power is limited to reviewing State laws (not religious group practices directly), the entire ERP framework and the Sabarimala judgment's reasoning comes under question.

Public Morality vs. Constitutional Morality — A Key Distinction

A recurring debate in Indian constitutional law is whether the restriction on religious freedom under Article 25 ("subject to... morality") refers to "public morality" (what the majority of society considers moral at a given time) or "constitutional morality" (the values enshrined in the Constitution, including equality and non-discrimination).

The 2018 Sabarimala majority held that "morality" in Articles 25 and 26 refers to "constitutional morality" — i.e., the exclusion of women violated constitutional values of equality (Articles 14-15) and dignity (Article 21), overriding popular religious beliefs.
The Centre's current argument: treating "constitutional morality" as overriding popular morality in the religious domain is an illegitimate expansion of judicial power; the legislature, not the court, must balance these competing interests.
Navtej Singh Johar (2018): explicitly adopted "constitutional morality" over "popular morality" to decriminalise same-sex relations — the Centre now argues this was "not good law."
B.R. Ambedkar's use of "constitutional morality" in the Constituent Assembly (Nov 4, 1948) referred to adherence to constitutional processes by power-holders — not a substantive test for rights — a very different meaning from how the Supreme Court has used it.

Connection to this news: The debate in the Sabarimala reference on whether courts can call something "superstition" is inseparable from the larger debate about constitutional vs. public morality — because declaring a practice "superstition" and unworthy of constitutional protection is itself an exercise in applying "constitutional morality" against religious claims.

Key Facts & Data

Nine-judge Constitution Bench: CJI Surya Kant + 8 judges
Original Sabarimala judgment: Indian Young Lawyers Association v. State of Kerala (2018) — 4:1 majority
2018 judgment: allowed women of 10–50 years age group to enter Sabarimala temple
Petitioner in original case: Indian Young Lawyers Association (not devotees of Lord Ayyappa)
ERP doctrine origin: Shirur Mutt case (1954)
Article 25(2)(b): State can enact laws for social welfare and reform of Hindu religious institutions
Article 26: Denominational right to manage affairs in matters of religion (subject to public order, morality, health)
Travancore Devaswom Board: statutory body under Kerala law administering Sabarimala
Durgah Committee v. Syed Hussain Ali (1961): practices that are "accretions" or "superstitions" not protected under Articles 25-26
Centre's Solicitor General: Tushar Mehta