What Happened
- A nine-judge Constitution Bench of the Supreme Court began hearing the Sabarimala reference on April 7, 2026, examining broader questions of religious freedom, essential religious practices, and the scope of judicial review over religious customs
- Justice B.V. Nagarathna raised a pivotal preliminary question: whether a person who is not a devotee of Lord Ayyappa — specifically a non-member of the religious denomination — has the legal standing (locus standi) to challenge the temple's exclusionary practices through a Public Interest Litigation (PIL)
- Justice Nagarathna observed that the original petition was filed by the Indian Young Lawyers Association (IYLA), not by Ayyappa devotees, and suggested that the first issue to be decided by the bench should be whether such a challenge is maintainable
- The nine-judge bench (headed by CJI Surya Kant) has framed seven constitutional questions, including whether a non-member of a denomination can challenge that denomination's religious practices via PIL
- The review petitioners (who seek to reinstate the exclusion of women) are being heard from April 7-9; original petitioners (who support entry of all women) from April 14-16
Static Topic Bridges
Sabarimala Temple Case — Background and 2018 Judgment
The landmark case Indian Young Lawyers Association v. State of Kerala (2018) resulted in a five-judge Constitution Bench ruling (4:1 majority) on September 28, 2018, lifting the ban on entry of women between 10 and 50 years of age into the Sabarimala temple. The Court held that the exclusionary practice violated Articles 14 (equality), 15 (non-discrimination), 17 (untouchability), and 25 (freedom of religion) of the Constitution. The lone dissenter — Justice Indu Malhotra — held that the practice was an essential religious practice protected under Article 26 and that non-devotees (as petitioners in the PIL) lacked standing to challenge it. The 2018 judgment triggered a reference to a larger bench.
- Case: Indian Young Lawyers Association v. State of Kerala (2018)
- Decided: September 28, 2018; 4:1 majority
- Majority: DY Chandrachud, RF Nariman, AM Khanwilkar, CJI Dipak Misra (for majority); Justice Indu Malhotra (dissent)
- Constitutional provisions in question: Article 14 (equality), Article 15 (non-discrimination), Article 17 (untouchability), Article 25 (freedom of conscience and religion), Article 26 (right of religious denomination to manage its own affairs)
- Earlier restriction: Rule 3(b) of Kerala Hindu Places of Public Worship (Authorisation of Entry) Rules, 1965 — allowed exclusion of women of "such age as they may become impure" (i.e., menstruating age)
- Dissent (Justice Malhotra): non-devotees' PIL not maintainable; essential religious practices should not be interfered with by courts
Connection to this news: The 2018 majority ruling is now under review by the nine-judge bench, which was triggered partly by a reference ordered in November 2019 when a five-judge bench found the Sabarimala question raised broader constitutional issues interlinked with religious practices at mosques (Dargah entry), Parsi towers of silence, and similar cases.
Locus Standi and PIL — Constitutional Basis and Evolution
Locus standi refers to the legal right or standing to bring a case before a court. In traditional litigation, only persons directly aggrieved (suffering legal injury) have standing. Public Interest Litigation (PIL) was a judicial innovation of the Indian Supreme Court in the 1970s-80s that dramatically expanded standing — allowing any member of the public (including non-aggrieved third parties) to approach the court on behalf of marginalised or unable-to-litigate sections. PIL is grounded in Articles 32 (Supreme Court) and 226 (High Courts) of the Constitution. Justice Nagarathna's challenge is precisely to whether PIL jurisdiction, designed for socioeconomic rights violations, should extend to challenging religious denomination practices where the petitioner has no personal connection.
- Articles 32 and 226: constitutional basis for writ petitions (habeas corpus, mandamus, prohibition, certiorari, quo warranto)
- PIL origin: Hussainara Khatoon v. State of Bihar (1979) — prison conditions; SP Gupta v. Union of India (1982) — established PIL doctrine; Justice PN Bhagwati was key architect
- PIL standing test: locus standi relaxed — any person acting bona fide in public interest can petition
- Abuse concern: Courts have flagged "publicity interest litigation" and frivolous PILs
- Order VII Rule 11 CPC: plaint can be rejected at threshold if no cause of action (Justice Nagarathna invoked this by analogy)
- Key precedent on standing: Shayara Bano v. Union of India (2017, triple talaq) — Muslim women (directly affected) were petitioners, not non-members
Connection to this news: Justice Nagarathna's observation that no devotee of Ayyappa filed the original Sabarimala PIL directly raises the question of whether PIL jurisdiction is being misused to interfere in internal religious denomination practices — a question with implications for religious freedom jurisprudence broadly.
Essential Religious Practices (ERP) Doctrine
The Essential Religious Practices (ERP) doctrine was developed by the Supreme Court to determine which religious practices receive constitutional protection under Article 25 and 26. Only practices "essential" to the religion — without which the religion itself would be fundamentally altered — are constitutionally protected. Courts decide what is "essential" through judicial inquiry, often examining religious texts, traditions, and expert evidence. This doctrine has been controversial: critics argue courts are not equipped to adjudicate theological questions, while supporters argue it prevents superstitious or discriminatory practices from hiding behind religious freedom.
- Article 25: Freedom of conscience, profession, practice, and propagation of religion (subject to public order, morality, health, and other fundamental rights)
- Article 26: Freedom of religious denominations to manage their own affairs in matters of religion; administer property
- Essential Religious Practices test: originated in Shirur Math case (Commissioner of Hindu Religious Endowments, Madras v. Lakshmindra Thirtha Swamiar, 1954)
- ERP vs non-ERP: courts have held the following as non-ERP: animal sacrifice (Dargah Committees), begging by monks, loudspeakers for Azaan
- Criticism: Sabarimala dissent (Justice Malhotra) argued courts should not apply the ERP test to practices of a denomination; deference to denomination's own understanding preferred
- Seven questions framed by nine-judge bench include: scope of ERP doctrine, whether Article 17 (untouchability) can apply to menstruation-based exclusion, and PIL standing of non-denomination members
Connection to this news: Whether the exclusion of women of menstruating age from Sabarimala is an "essential" religious practice of the Ayyappan denomination is the core substantive question; but Justice Nagarathna's procedural question (PIL standing) would, if upheld, make the substantive question moot for this particular petition.
Religious Denomination — Article 26 and Ayyappa Devotees
Article 26 of the Constitution gives every religious denomination the right to: (a) establish and maintain institutions for religious and charitable purposes; (b) manage its own affairs in matters of religion; (c) own and acquire movable and immovable property; and (d) administer such property in accordance with law. The term "religious denomination" has been interpreted by the Supreme Court to require: a common faith, a common organisation, and a distinctive name. In the Sabarimala case, the key question was whether Ayyappa devotees constitute a distinct denomination separate from Hinduism, or a sub-sect within Hinduism.
- Article 26: protects rights of religious denominations (and sections thereof); distinct from Article 25 (individual right)
- Denomination test from Shirur Math: common faith + common organisation + distinctive name
- Sabarimala: majority held Ayyappans are not a separate denomination — they are Hindus; therefore, exclusion of women within the temple is not an internal denomination matter protected by Article 26
- Dissent: Ayyappans do constitute a denomination; their practice deserves Article 26 protection
- The nine-judge bench will re-examine whether Ayyappans constitute a denomination and, if so, the extent of Article 26 protection
Connection to this news: The nine-judge bench's answer on whether Ayyappans are a denomination will determine whether Article 26 applies — if it does, the exclusion practice is far better protected; if not, the Article 25 and 14 equality arguments of the 2018 majority will likely prevail again.
Key Facts & Data
- Original case: Indian Young Lawyers Association v. State of Kerala (2018); decided September 28, 2018
- 2018 verdict: 4:1 majority lifting ban on women aged 10-50 at Sabarimala
- Dissenter: Justice Indu Malhotra (lone dissent; questioned PIL standing and ERP)
- Reference to larger bench: November 2019 (by five-judge bench)
- Nine-judge bench (2026): CJI Surya Kant + Justices BV Nagarathna, MM Sundresh, Ahsanuddin Amanullah, Aravind Kumar, Augustine George Masih, Prasanna B Varale, R Mahadevan, Joymalya Bagchi
- Hearing schedule: April 7-9 (review petitioners); April 14-16 (original petitioners); April 21-22 (rejoinder + amicus)
- Seven constitutional questions framed by the bench include: scope of ERP doctrine, Article 26 denomination rights, PIL standing of non-denomination members
- Original petitioner: Indian Young Lawyers Association (IYLA) — not Ayyappa devotees
- Constitutional provisions: Articles 14, 15, 17, 25, 26, 32
- Earlier restriction: Kerala Hindu Places of Public Worship (Authorisation of Entry) Rules, 1965, Rule 3(b)
- PIL doctrine origin: SP Gupta v. Union of India (1982); Articles 32 and 226
- Essential Religious Practices doctrine origin: Shirur Math case (1954)