Social ill cannot be branded as ‘religious practice’, says Supreme Court on maiden day of Sabarimala reference hearing

What Happened

A nine-judge Constitution Bench of the Supreme Court began hearing the Sabarimala reference on April 7, 2026, revisiting the 2018 five-judge bench verdict that allowed women of all ages to enter the Sabarimala temple
Justice B.V. Nagarathna stated that courts are empowered to intervene when "social evils are branded as religious practice," signalling the bench's willingness to scrutinise the essential religious practices (ERP) doctrine
The Solicitor General, appearing for the Centre, argued that courts must be cautious in determining what constitutes an essential religious practice, contending that religion can only be restricted on grounds of public order, morality, health, or violation of fundamental rights
The Centre also argued that the legislature — not courts — is the appropriate body for enacting social reform
The All India Muslim Personal Law Board submitted that courts must not attempt to judicially determine the nature of religious practices
The nine-judge bench is examining seven questions referred by the Kantaru Rajeevaru review bench in November 2019, covering the scope of Articles 25 and 26, interaction between individual and denominational rights, and whether Article 26 rights are subject to broader Part III guarantees

Static Topic Bridges

Articles 25 and 26 — Freedom of Religion

Article 25 guarantees all persons the right to freely profess, practise, and propagate religion, subject to public order, morality, health, and other fundamental rights. Crucially, Article 25(2)(b) empowers the State to make laws providing for "social welfare and reform" or throwing open Hindu religious institutions to all classes of Hindus. Article 26 grants religious denominations the right to manage their own affairs in matters of religion, maintain religious institutions, and administer property — subject to public order, morality, and health.

Article 25 rights are available to all persons (citizens and non-citizens); Article 26 rights vest in religious denominations
The expression "morality" in Articles 25 and 26 has been interpreted by the Supreme Court in the Sabarimala 2018 verdict to include constitutional morality, not merely public/social morality
The interplay between Articles 25(1) (individual right) and 26(b) (denominational right to manage religious affairs) is the core constitutional question before the nine-judge bench

Connection to this news: The bench must decide whether the Sabarimala practice of excluding women of menstruating age is protected under Article 26 as a denominational right, or whether it must yield to the equality and anti-discrimination rights guaranteed under Articles 14, 15, and 25(1).

Essential Religious Practices (ERP) Doctrine

The ERP doctrine was developed by the Supreme Court to distinguish between practices integral to a religion (which receive constitutional protection) and those that are merely incidental or social in character (which can be regulated by the State). A practice is considered "essential" only if its non-performance would fundamentally alter the religion itself.

The doctrine was first articulated in the Shirur Mutt case (1954), which also defined a "religious denomination" as requiring a common faith, common organisation, and a distinctive name
The 2018 Sabarimala majority held that exclusion of women was NOT an essential religious practice, while the lone dissent (Justice Indu Malhotra) held courts should not interfere in matters of deep religious faith
Critics of the doctrine argue that courts — not religious communities — should not be the final arbiter of what is "essential" to a religion; this is the central challenge the nine-judge bench must resolve

Connection to this news: The reference specifically asks whether the ERP doctrine needs to be reconsidered or reformulated, and whether it can override denominational rights under Article 26.

The 2018 Sabarimala Judgment — Indian Young Lawyers Association v. State of Kerala

A five-judge bench of the Supreme Court, by a 4:1 majority on September 28, 2018, struck down Rule 3(b) of the Kerala Hindu Places of Public Worship (Authorisation of Entry) Rules, 1965, which prohibited women aged 10 to 50 from entering the Sabarimala temple. The majority held that devotees of Lord Ayyappa did not constitute a separate religious denomination and that the exclusion of women violated their fundamental rights under Articles 14, 15, and 25(1). Justice Indu Malhotra's dissent held that constitutional courts should not interfere in matters of deep religious faith and sentiment.

Petitioner: Indian Young Lawyers Association (filed in 2006)
Majority opinion authored by Chief Justice Dipak Misra, with concurrences by Justices Nariman and Chandrachud
Following the verdict, Kerala witnessed widespread protests by devotees opposing women's entry; the Kerala government initially complied but later aligned with review petitioners
In November 2019, a three-judge bench in Kantaru Rajeevaru referred seven broader constitutional questions to a nine-judge bench, effectively pausing implementation

Connection to this news: The nine-judge bench is not merely reviewing the 2018 Sabarimala verdict — it is deciding broader constitutional questions that will govern the relationship between religious freedom, social reform, and judicial review across all future cases involving religious practices.

The Indian Constitution explicitly empowers the State to legislate for social reform, particularly in relation to Hindu religious institutions. This reflects the framers' recognition of the need to combat caste discrimination and social exclusion entrenched in religious practice. Article 17 abolishes untouchability; Article 25(2)(b) opens Hindu religious institutions to all classes; and Article 44 (DPSP) envisages a uniform civil code.

The Centre's argument that "legislature, not courts, is entitled to enact social reform" echoes a long-standing tension in constitutional law between judicial activism and legislative primacy in social policy
However, the Supreme Court has consistently held that it can strike down legislation or practices that violate fundamental rights, including those cloaked in religious garb
The distinction between "social reform" (state's domain) and "essential religious practice" (protected domain) is precisely what the nine-judge bench must demarcate

Connection to this news: The Centre's position, if accepted, would significantly limit judicial power to strike down discriminatory religious practices, shifting the burden of reform to Parliament and State legislatures.

Key Facts & Data

The Sabarimala temple in Kerala's Pathanamthitta district is dedicated to Lord Ayyappa and attracts an estimated 50 million pilgrims annually during the Mandalam-Makaravilakku season
The nine-judge bench is the largest constitutional bench assembled for this reference; it will also settle questions arising from Mosque Entry (Sunni Shia women), Parsi women married to non-Parsis, and female genital mutilation cases
Article 26 uses the phrase "religious denomination" — the Supreme Court has defined it as requiring: (i) a collection of individuals having a system of beliefs; (ii) a common organisation; (iii) a distinctive name (Shirur Mutt, 1954)
Seven constitutional questions before the bench include: scope of Article 25(1), interplay between Articles 25 and 26, whether ERP doctrine is correctly evolved, and whether Part III rights apply inter se to individuals
The 2025 Pahalgam attack (carried out by LeT) and ongoing national security debates make the nine-judge bench hearing on the limits of religious autonomy a politically sensitive constitutional moment