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Little accountability put on heads & members of tribunals, says SC


What Happened

  • The Supreme Court of India expressed sharp concern over the lack of accountability of tribunal heads and members, describing tribunals as functioning in a "no-man's land" with no clear authority responsible for their oversight — a situation the Court termed contrary to the national interest.
  • The remarks came in the context of the Court's November 2025 judgment in Madras Bar Association v. Union of India (2025), where key provisions of the Tribunals Reforms Act, 2021 were struck down as unconstitutional.
  • The November 2025 ruling directed the Central Government to establish a National Tribunals Commission (NTC) within four months — a deadline that falls in March 2026 — to independently oversee the appointment, administration, and accountability of all central tribunals.
  • The Court noted that in the absence of an NTC, no single body is responsible for monitoring tribunal vacancies, ensuring timely appointments, or taking action against non-performing members, creating systemic inefficiency.
  • The Attorney General was directed to update the Court on compliance with the NTC establishment deadline, with the Court signalling it would enforce the order.

Static Topic Bridges

Tribunals in India — Constitutional Basis and Article 323A/323B

Tribunals in India are quasi-judicial bodies that adjudicate disputes in specific subject areas. The 42nd Constitutional Amendment (1976) inserted Articles 323A and 323B, providing express constitutional authority for Parliament and State Legislatures to establish administrative tribunals. Article 323A specifically authorises tribunals for service matters (Central Administrative Tribunal, State Administrative Tribunals), while Article 323B allows tribunals for a broader range of matters including taxation, foreign exchange, land reforms, and election disputes.

  • Article 323A: Parliament may establish Administrative Tribunals for disputes relating to recruitment and service conditions of persons in public service.
  • Article 323B: Both Parliament and State Legislatures may establish tribunals for specified subject matters including taxation, industrial disputes, land reforms, and elections.
  • The Central Administrative Tribunal (CAT) was established under the Administrative Tribunals Act, 1985 — the first major tribunal under Article 323A.
  • Tribunals are meant to reduce the burden on regular courts and provide subject-matter expertise; however, vacancies and delays have undermined this objective.
  • The 42nd Amendment also tried to exclude tribunal orders from High Court judicial review — but this exclusion was struck down in L. Chandra Kumar v. Union of India (1997).

Connection to this news: The Supreme Court's concern about accountability directly relates to the structural gap in Articles 323A/323B: they authorise tribunals but do not specify any oversight mechanism — creating the "no-man's land" the Court described.


L. Chandra Kumar v. Union of India (1997) — Landmark Ruling on Tribunal Jurisdiction

In L. Chandra Kumar v. Union of India (1997), a seven-judge Constitution Bench of the Supreme Court addressed the constitutional validity of tribunal clauses that excluded High Court jurisdiction. The Court held that the power of High Courts to exercise judicial review over tribunal orders is part of the basic structure of the Constitution and cannot be excluded even by constitutional amendment. This ruling established that all tribunal decisions remain subject to High Court review (under Articles 226 and 227), and subsequently under the Supreme Court's appellate jurisdiction.

  • The Court held that while tribunals can supplement the role of High Courts, they cannot substitute for them — tribunals exercise "supplementary, not substitutive" jurisdiction.
  • Following L. Chandra Kumar, all tribunal orders are first appealable to the High Court (Division Bench), and then to the Supreme Court under Articles 136 or 32.
  • The ruling is a foundational precedent for the basic structure doctrine's application to judicial review and separation of powers.
  • Later, in Madras Bar Association v. Union of India (2010, 2014, 2021), the Supreme Court repeatedly struck down provisions that gave the executive excessive control over tribunal appointments and tenure — each time reaffirming L. Chandra Kumar's principle.

Connection to this news: The Supreme Court's current concern about accountability of tribunal members is a continuation of the L. Chandra Kumar principle — judicial independence requires not just protection from executive control but also an independent oversight body (the proposed NTC) to ensure tribunals function as genuine adjudicatory bodies.


Separation of Powers and Judicial Independence in Tribunal Design

The separation of powers — while not expressly mentioned in the Indian Constitution — is considered part of its basic structure (Kesavananda Bharati v. State of Kerala, 1973). For tribunals, the critical design question is: how do you ensure independence when members are appointed by, paid by, and housed within the executive? The Tribunals Reforms Act, 2021 (struck down in November 2025) had reduced the minimum tenure of tribunal members to 4 years and raised the minimum appointment age to 50 — both of which the Court held eroded judicial independence.

  • The Supreme Court in Madras Bar Association (2021) held that tribunal members must have security of tenure (minimum 5 years or until age 70 for heads, 67 for members) and that the executive cannot unilaterally remove members.
  • The National Tribunals Commission, as conceptualised, would: administer appointments, ensure adequate infrastructure, monitor performance, and provide a neutral forum for grievances against tribunal members.
  • Currently, India has over 35 central-level tribunals covering areas from income tax (Income Tax Appellate Tribunal), company law (National Company Law Tribunal), environment (National Green Tribunal), armed forces service (Armed Forces Tribunal), to competition (Competition Commission of India/NCLAT).
  • The multiplicity of tribunals with different service conditions, varying judicial oversight, and different parent ministries creates structural inconsistency in the justice delivery system.

Connection to this news: The Supreme Court's criticism that "little accountability is placed on heads and members of tribunals" is fundamentally a separation of powers argument — without an NTC, tribunal members answer to no one, undermining the constitutional expectation of impartial adjudication.


National Green Tribunal and Specialised Adjudication — A Model

The National Green Tribunal (NGT), established under the National Green Tribunal Act, 2010, is frequently cited as one of India's more successful specialised tribunals. It has original jurisdiction over environmental disputes, can award compensation, and has suo motu powers. The NGT's performance — including landmark orders on the Yamuna cleanup and pollution in river cities — illustrates both the potential and limitations of tribunal-based adjudication.

  • NGT Act, 2010: Established under the Stockholm Declaration principles and India's constitutional obligation under Article 21 (clean environment as part of right to life) and Article 48A (DPSP on environment protection).
  • NGT has benches in New Delhi, Bhopal, Pune, Kolkata, and Chennai with a Principal Bench in Delhi.
  • NGT members must have expertise in environment and forest management alongside judicial experience.
  • Despite its successes, NGT has faced criticism for: inadequate expert members, delayed appointments, and failure to implement its own orders due to lack of enforcement mechanisms.
  • The NGT experience illustrates the accountability gap: even a high-profile tribunal faces the same structural problems of vacancies and accountability that the SC highlighted.

Connection to this news: The NGT model, while successful in some areas, suffers from the same structural accountability gap as other tribunals — vindicating the Supreme Court's argument that a National Tribunals Commission is necessary to provide systemic oversight rather than piecemeal interventions.

Key Facts & Data

  • Tribunals Reforms Act, 2021: Key provisions struck down as unconstitutional by Supreme Court in November 2025 (Madras Bar Association v. Union of India, 2025).
  • Deadline for National Tribunals Commission establishment: March 2026 (4 months from November 2025 judgment).
  • Article 323A: Parliamentary authority for administrative tribunals (service matters).
  • Article 323B: Parliamentary and state legislative authority for subject-specific tribunals.
  • L. Chandra Kumar v. Union of India (1997): 7-judge bench; High Court judicial review of tribunal orders is part of basic structure; cannot be excluded even by constitutional amendment.
  • Kesavananda Bharati v. State of Kerala (1973): Established basic structure doctrine.
  • India currently has over 35 central-level tribunals.
  • Central Administrative Tribunal (CAT) was established under Administrative Tribunals Act, 1985 — the first tribunal under Article 323A.
  • National Green Tribunal established under NGT Act, 2010.