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Tamil Nadu FM presents interim budget, attacks Centre for ‘artificially inflating’ state’s debt


What Happened

  • Tamil Nadu Finance Minister Thangam Thennarasu presented the state's interim budget on February 17, 2026, using it as a platform to challenge Centre-state fiscal arrangements.
  • The state government accused the Centre of "artificially inflating" Tamil Nadu's debt figures by including borrowings of state-owned enterprises (whose debt is serviced through the state budget) in the Net Borrowing Ceiling calculation.
  • Three specific grievances were raised: (1) funds withheld by the Centre from Tamil Nadu's share; (2) unilateral deductions from state accounts; (3) tightened borrowing limits that constrain the state's infrastructure and welfare expenditure.
  • Tamil Nadu's total outstanding debt is projected to reach Rs 10.62 lakh crore by March 2027, with borrowings for FY2026-27 pegged at Rs 1,79,810 crore and repayments at Rs 60,413 crore.
  • The state maintains that its debt-to-GSDP ratio of 26.12% for FY2026-27 (excluding Chennai Metro Phase-II book adjustments) remains within the 15th Finance Commission's recommended thresholds.

Static Topic Bridges

Net Borrowing Ceiling (NBC) and Centre-State Fiscal Tensions

The Net Borrowing Ceiling is an administrative limit set annually by the Union Finance Ministry on the total borrowings a state can undertake from all sources — open market bonds, loans from financial institutions, and (since FY2021-22) borrowings by state-owned enterprises whose debt service flows through the state budget. The constitutional basis invoked is Article 293(3), which requires states to obtain the Centre's consent for open market borrowings if they have outstanding loans from the Union. States, particularly those with active public sector enterprises (state distribution companies, metro rail corporations, infrastructure financing bodies), argue that the NBC's expansion beyond direct state borrowing to state enterprise borrowing goes beyond the Constitution's intent. Tamil Nadu has been impacted by the inclusion of Tamil Nadu Generation and Distribution Corporation (TANGEDCO) and Chennai Metro Rail Limited borrowings in its NBC.

  • Article 293(3): Consent required for OMBs when Centre loans outstanding — basis for NBC
  • NBC level: 3% of GSDP (additional 0.5% conditional on power sector reforms, in some years)
  • NBC expansion (FY2021-22): State PSU borrowings included if debt service is from state budget
  • Tamil Nadu affected entities: TANGEDCO (power utility), Chennai Metro Rail, TIDCO
  • TN borrowings FY2026-27: Rs 1,79,810 crore (gross); repayments: Rs 60,413 crore
  • Debt-to-GSDP FY2026-27: 26.12% (FC-XV recommended threshold: ~35%)

Connection to this news: Tamil Nadu's accusation of "artificial inflation" of its debt refers specifically to this NBC methodology — by counting state enterprise borrowings that the state regards as commercially backed (not budget-dependent), the Centre effectively reduces the state's fiscal headroom beyond what constitutional provisions warrant.

Fiscal Responsibility and Budget Management (FRBM) Act and State Finance Discipline

The Fiscal Responsibility and Budget Management Act, 2003 (FRBM Act) established a fiscal consolidation framework for the Union government and, through state FRBM Acts, for state governments. Key FRBM targets for states: fiscal deficit ≤ 3% of GSDP; revenue deficit elimination; debt-to-GSDP ratio on a declining path. The 15th Finance Commission recommended that states with fiscal deficit below 3% could borrow an additional 0.5% of GSDP subject to power sector performance benchmarks. States often point out that the Centre itself has consistently run deficits above its own FRBM targets (3% for Union + 41% devolution to states), creating an asymmetric accountability framework where state borrowings are tightly monitored while Union off-budget spending (via extra-budgetary resources) went largely unreported until recent reforms.

  • FRBM Act 2003: Central government fiscal consolidation law; state FRBMs are separate state laws
  • State fiscal deficit ceiling: 3% of GSDP (under FC-XV recommendations)
  • Additional 0.5% (power sector window): Conditional on distribution company reforms (reduction in AT&C losses, etc.)
  • Tamil Nadu GSDP: ~Rs 27 lakh crore (FY2025-26 estimate); one of India's largest state economies
  • Centre off-budget borrowing: Extra-budgetary resources (EBR) through public enterprises; now being brought on-budget
  • Tamil Nadu debt-to-GSDP: 26.12% FY2026-27 (within FC-XV threshold of ~35%)

Connection to this news: Tamil Nadu's budget speech attacks the asymmetry: states face hard NBC limits enforced by constitutional consent requirements, while the Centre has historically used off-budget financing to soften its own fiscal constraints — a charge that resonates with several opposition-governed states.

Centre-State Revenue Sharing: GST Compensation and Devolution

Post the 2017 GST constitutional amendment (101st Constitutional Amendment Act), states surrendered their most productive taxes (VAT on goods, octroi, entry tax) in exchange for a 5-year guaranteed compensation for revenue shortfall below a 14% annual growth rate. The GST Compensation Cess (levied on sin goods — tobacco, aerated drinks, automobiles) was the funding mechanism. When the COVID-19 pandemic caused a major GST revenue shortfall in FY2020-21 and FY2021-22, the Centre offered states a borrowing option rather than direct compensation — a decision Tamil Nadu and several other states contested. The GST compensation period ended in June 2022, but many states (including Tamil Nadu) continue to report shortfalls in actual devolution relative to expectations based on their revenue growth and population.

  • 101st Constitutional Amendment: Inserted Article 246A (concurrent power to levy GST), Article 269A (IGST), Article 279A (GST Council)
  • GST compensation guarantee: 14% annual revenue growth for 5 years (ended June 2022)
  • Compensation Cess: On tobacco, aerated drinks, motor vehicles; cess collection short during COVID
  • COVID solution: Centre offered back-to-back loans to states instead of cash compensation
  • Post-June 2022: States bear full GST revenue risk; compensation cess continues to repay COVID-era borrowings
  • Tamil Nadu: Significant IGST devolution disputes over inter-state transaction settlement

Connection to this news: Tamil Nadu's budget grievances about "withheld funds" likely include disputed GST compensation arrears and under-settlement of IGST proceeds — layering a revenue sharing dispute on top of the NBC borrowing limit controversy to build a comprehensive case for Centre's fiscal unfairness to states.

Key Facts & Data

  • Tamil Nadu interim budget: FY2026-27 presented February 17, 2026
  • FM: Thangam Thennarasu; CM: M.K. Stalin
  • Debt-to-GSDP: 26.12% (excluding Chennai Metro Phase-II adjustment)
  • Total outstanding debt by March 2027: Rs 10.62 lakh crore
  • FY2026-27 gross borrowings: Rs 1,79,810 crore; repayments: Rs 60,413 crore
  • NBC: 3% of GSDP; PSU borrowings included from FY2021-22
  • Article 293(3): Constitutional basis for Centre's borrowing consent requirement
  • FRBM: State FRBM limits fiscal deficit to 3% GSDP
  • GST compensation ended: June 2022 (5-year guarantee period)