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Should the Governor’s address be scrapped?

February 06, 2026 6 min read Polity & Governance GS Paper 2 (Polity & Governance Federalism Constitutional Bodies)
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What Happened

  • An opinion piece in The Hindu examines whether the Governor's address to state legislatures — mandated under Articles 175 and 176 of the Constitution — should be abolished, amid a series of high-profile controversies involving Governors in Opposition-ruled states refusing to deliver the customary address or walking out of legislative assemblies.
  • Recent flashpoints include Governors in Tamil Nadu, Kerala, Punjab, and West Bengal either refusing to read out the state Cabinet-approved address or departing from the approved text — actions that have triggered constitutional confrontations between Raj Bhavans and elected governments.
  • The article analyses whether these constitutional provisions are necessary in a parliamentary democracy where the Governor is a constitutional figurehead, and whether their abolition would simplify the Centre-State relationship or eliminate a useful constitutional accountability mechanism.
  • The debate reflects a broader, recurring tension in India's federal structure: the role of the Governor as an agent of the Centre in a state nominally governed by an elected legislature and council of ministers.

Static Topic Bridges

Articles 175 and 176 — The Governor's Address: Constitutional Provisions

The Indian Constitution contains two distinct provisions relating to the Governor's address to state legislatures, modelled on Articles 86 and 87 governing the President's address to Parliament.

  • Article 175(1): The Governor may address either House of the State Legislature, or both Houses assembled together, and for that purpose require the attendance of members.
  • Article 175(2): The Governor may send messages to either House of the Legislature on any matter — these messages must be considered by the House "with all convenient despatch."
  • Article 176(1) — the mandatory address: The Governor shall address the Legislature at the commencement of the first session after each general election to the Legislative Assembly, and at the commencement of the first session of each year. This address is the equivalent of the Union Budget session's Presidential Address in Parliament.
  • The word "shall" makes Article 176 a constitutional obligation — the Governor cannot refuse to deliver the address.
  • The address is prepared by the Council of Ministers (elected government) and approved by the Cabinet; the Governor is constitutionally bound to read it (similar to the President's address to Parliament under Article 87).
  • Article 174: Fixes the maximum interval between two sessions of the state legislature at six months — failure to call the legislature is another area of Governor-CM conflict.

Connection to this news: The constitutional obligation under Article 176 creates a structural paradox: Governors who belong to a party or political persuasion different from the ruling state government may resent reading out an address they disagree with — but they have no constitutional discretion to refuse, modify, or abandon it.

Governor's Discretionary and Non-Discretionary Functions — Constitutional Position

The Governor of a State is the constitutional head of the state executive under Article 153, appointed by the President under Article 155 for a term of five years (though removable at any time — no security of tenure). The Governor's powers are a mix of binding-advice functions and genuine discretionary functions, a distinction that is often blurred in practice.

  • Non-discretionary functions (bound by Council of Ministers' advice): Appointing the Chief Minister (convention-bound), summoning/proroguing/dissolving the Assembly (Article 174), assenting to Bills (Article 200), granting pardons (Article 161), delivering addresses (Articles 175, 176).
  • Discretionary functions (genuine discretion): Sending Bills to the President for consideration (Article 200 proviso), reporting to the President on state affairs (Article 356 trigger), appointment of CM when no clear majority exists.
  • Nabam Rebia v. Deputy Speaker (2016): The Supreme Court held that the Governor must act on the advice of the Council of Ministers in all non-discretionary matters; specifically, the Governor cannot summon a special session of the Assembly on his own initiative when a government is in office. Functions under Article 175/176 are non-discretionary.
  • Rameshwar Prasad v. Union of India (2006): SC held that Governor's report to the President recommending President's Rule must be based on objective material; partisan or motivated reports are unconstitutional.
  • Punjab Governor case (2023) / Tamil Nadu Governor (2023): Supreme Court ruled that indefinitely withholding assent to Bills is unconstitutional; directed Governors to act on Bills within a reasonable time.

Connection to this news: The Governor's address controversies arise specifically from Governors exercising perceived "discretion" in areas where they have none — such as refusing to read the Cabinet-approved text of the Article 176 address. The Supreme Court has repeatedly clarified this is unconstitutional.

Centre-State Relations and the Governor's Role — 7th Schedule and Sarkaria Commission

The Indian Constitution establishes a quasi-federal structure under which states have significant autonomous powers (7th Schedule, State List) but the Centre retains supremacy in several respects. The Governor functions as the constitutional link between the Centre and the State — and this dual role is the root cause of the address controversy.

  • 7th Schedule: Lists of subjects for Centre (Union List — 97 subjects), States (State List — 66 subjects), and Concurrent (Concurrent List — 47 subjects).
  • Article 200-201: Bills passed by state legislatures are sent to the Governor; the Governor can assent, withhold, return (for ordinary bills), or reserve for Presidential consideration. Reserving a bill effectively gives the Centre a veto over state legislation.
  • Sarkaria Commission (1983-87): Established to review Centre-State relations; recommended that Governors should be apolitical figures with no active connection to the ruling party at the Centre; recommended that Governors should not be removed prematurely for political reasons.
  • Punchhi Commission (2007-10): Further recommended that the practice of using Governors for partisan purposes must end; suggested a fixed term of five years for Governors to be constitutionally guaranteed.
  • Arguments for abolishing the address: It is a colonial relic (inherited from the Government of India Act, 1935); Governors are appointed by the Centre and have become political instruments; address controversies create constitutional crises; the elected government's policy statement can be delivered in other ways.
  • Arguments against abolishing the address: Article 176 serves as a formal constitutional accountability moment when the government articulates its annual agenda before the legislature; it provides a dignified opening to the legislative session; problems are not with the provision but with the conduct of Governors.

Connection to this news: The article's analysis reflects a consensus among constitutional scholars: the problem is not Article 176 per se but the politicisation of the Raj Bhavan. Abolishing the address provision would require a constitutional amendment (Article 368 — special majority in Parliament + ratification by half the state legislatures), which is politically difficult. The more viable reform is strengthening the norms and conventions around Governor appointments and conduct.

Key Facts & Data

  • Article 175: Governor may address either/both Houses; send messages requiring consideration.
  • Article 176: Governor shall address at first session after general election and at first session of every year — mandatory obligation.
  • Article 153: Every state shall have a Governor.
  • Article 155: Governor appointed by the President.
  • Article 156: Governor holds office during pleasure of the President — no security of tenure.
  • Article 161: Governor's pardon powers for state offences.
  • Article 174: Maximum 6-month gap between sessions.
  • Article 200: Governor's options on Bills — assent, withhold, return, or reserve for President.
  • Nabam Rebia (2016): Governor cannot exercise non-discretionary functions against Council of Ministers' advice.
  • Sarkaria Commission (1987): Recommended apolitical, non-partisan Governors with genuine independent standing.
  • Punchhi Commission (2010): Recommended fixed 5-year tenure for Governors.
  • Recent controversies: Tamil Nadu, Kerala, Punjab, West Bengal Governors vs. state governments (2022-26) — Bills withheld, address walkouts, SC interventions.
  • SC Punjab/Tamil Nadu Governor rulings (2023): Indefinite withholding of Bills unconstitutional; Governors must act within reasonable time.
  • Constitutional amendment requirement: Abolishing Articles 175-176 would require Article 368 special majority (2/3 of members present and voting + majority of total membership) + ratification by half the state legislatures.
  • Government of India Act, 1935: Origin of the Governor's address convention in India.