Mojtaba forbids export of enriched uranium: officials

Iran's Supreme Leader Mojtaba Khamenei (who assumed the position in March 2026 following the death of Ali Khamenei) issued a directive prohibiting the export...

What Happened

Iran's Supreme Leader Mojtaba Khamenei (who assumed the position in March 2026 following the death of Ali Khamenei) issued a directive prohibiting the export of Iran's enriched uranium stockpile out of the country.
The directive directly contradicts a key US demand in ongoing nuclear negotiations: that Iran must transfer its highly enriched uranium abroad (to a third country, with Russia having offered to receive it) as a precondition for any final agreement.
Iranian officials stated the rationale as strategic vulnerability — transferring uranium abroad would expose Iran to possible future military strikes by the United States and Israel, with no means of reconstituting the stockpile quickly.
The directive has the support of Iran's entire top leadership, including the Islamic Revolutionary Guard Corps (IRGC).
The US and Iran had been conducting multi-round indirect negotiations (mediated by Oman) aimed at ending the 2026 Iran war and resolving the nuclear standoff; as of late May 2026, a tentative memorandum of understanding was being drafted for a 30-day negotiating period.
The uranium export ban significantly complicates prospects for a deal, as the US and Israel regard Iran's enriched uranium stockpile as an existential proliferation risk.

Static Topic Bridges

Iran's Nuclear Program — Key Technical Facts

Iran's nuclear program has been at the centre of global non-proliferation concerns since the early 2000s. Iran operates uranium enrichment facilities at Natanz (main enrichment site) and Fordow (buried underground). The key proliferation concern is the enrichment level: civilian nuclear power requires approximately 3–5% enriched uranium (low-enriched uranium, LEU); weapons-grade uranium is enriched to 90% or above (highly enriched uranium, HEU).

Weapons-grade uranium (HEU): ≥90% enrichment of U-235
Civilian power reactor grade: 3.5–5% enrichment
Research reactor fuel: ~20% enrichment
Under JCPOA (2015): Iran agreed to limit enrichment to 3.67% and reduce stockpile to 300 kg of LEU
Iran's enrichment escalation post-JCPOA exit: to 5% (2019), 20% (January 2021), and 60% (April 2021) — all at Fordow
Current status (as of 2024–26): Iran can produce enough weapons-grade uranium for 5–6 bombs in under two weeks
Breakout time (time to produce enough HEU for one weapon): under 2 weeks, compared to 12 months under JCPOA constraints

Connection to this news: The enriched uranium export ban is significant because Iran's stockpile of 60%-enriched uranium is the central proliferation concern — the US demand for export is precisely aimed at eliminating this breakout capability. The directive preserves Iran's nuclear leverage but blocks the key US demand.

Joint Comprehensive Plan of Action (JCPOA) — Background and Collapse

The JCPOA (Joint Comprehensive Plan of Action), also known as the Iran nuclear deal, was finalised in Vienna on July 14, 2015, between Iran and the P5+1 (US, UK, France, Russia, China + Germany) plus the EU. It offered Iran sanctions relief in exchange for verified limits on its nuclear program, monitored by the International Atomic Energy Agency (IAEA).

JCPOA signed: July 14, 2015; entered into force: January 16, 2016
Key Iranian commitments: reduce LEU stockpile by 97% (from ~10,000 kg to 300 kg); limit enrichment to 3.67%; reduce centrifuges by two-thirds; convert Arak heavy-water reactor to light-water; accept IAEA Additional Protocol inspections
US withdrew from JCPOA: May 8, 2018 (Trump's first term); reimposed maximum pressure sanctions
Iran began systematic violations: from July 2019 — exceeded enrichment limits, stockpile limits, and centrifuge limits
JCPOA parties: P5+1 — China, France, Russia, UK, US (P5 of UN Security Council) + Germany; collectively the E3/EU+3
JCPOA is not a treaty — it is a political commitment; never ratified by US Senate

Connection to this news: The collapse of JCPOA constraints is the direct reason why Iran now possesses near-weapons-grade uranium at the 60% level. New negotiations are attempting to restore some version of these constraints, with the uranium export question at the centre.

Nuclear Non-Proliferation Treaty (NPT) — Framework

The Nuclear Non-Proliferation Treaty (NPT) is the foundational international legal instrument for preventing the spread of nuclear weapons, promoting disarmament, and enabling peaceful use of nuclear energy. It entered into force in 1970 and has 191 states parties (the most widely subscribed arms control treaty globally).

NPT adopted: 1968; entered into force: March 5, 1970; indefinitely extended: 1995
Three pillars: (1) Non-proliferation — Non-Nuclear Weapon States (NNWS) pledge not to acquire weapons; (2) Disarmament — Nuclear Weapon States (NWS) pledge to pursue disarmament; (3) Peaceful use of nuclear energy — right of all parties
Nuclear Weapon States (NWS) under NPT: US, Russia, UK, France, China (the five recognised in NPT as having tested before January 1, 1967)
Countries outside NPT: India, Pakistan, Israel (never joined); North Korea (announced withdrawal in 2003)
IAEA: The NPT's verification body; administers safeguards agreements; Additional Protocol (1997) enables enhanced inspections
Iran is an NPT signatory; its nuclear activities have been subject to IAEA safeguards and oversight

Connection to this news: Iran remains an NPT party and has consistently maintained it does not seek nuclear weapons. However, its enrichment to 60% (and the capacity to reach 90%) undermines this claim, and the standoff over the uranium stockpile is fundamentally about whether Iran will retain a nuclear breakout capacity.

Iran's Political Structure — Supreme Leader and IRGC

Iran's governance under the Islamic Republic is characterised by a dual structure: elected institutions (President, Majlis/Parliament) operating under the authority of a Supreme Leader (Vali-e Faqih) who holds ultimate authority over all state matters, including the military and nuclear policy. The Islamic Revolutionary Guard Corps (IRGC) is a separate armed force parallel to the regular military, with deep economic and political influence.

Supreme Leader (Vali-e Faqih): Ali Khamenei held this position from 1989 until his death in February 2026; succeeded by Mojtaba Khamenei (elected by the Assembly of Experts, March 2026)
Assembly of Experts: 88 elected clerics who appoint and theoretically supervise the Supreme Leader
IRGC: established after the 1979 Islamic Revolution; guards against internal and external threats; controls the Quds Force (extraterritorial operations) and the nuclear missile program
IRGC was designated a Foreign Terrorist Organisation (FTO) by the US in 2019 — a designation with significant implications for international financial transactions involving Iran
Nuclear decisions are ultimately made by the Supreme Leader, not the President

Connection to this news: The enriched uranium export ban — backed by both the new Supreme Leader and the IRGC — reflects the institutional consensus within Iran's security establishment that the uranium stockpile is a strategic deterrent, not merely a bargaining chip.

Key Facts & Data

JCPOA signed: July 14, 2015 (Vienna); US withdrawal: May 8, 2018
Iran's enrichment levels: 3.67% (JCPOA limit) → 5% (2019) → 20% (January 2021) → 60% (April 2021)
Weapons-grade uranium threshold: ≥90% enrichment
Current Iranian breakout time (to enough HEU for one bomb): under 2 weeks
JCPOA stockpile limit: 300 kg of LEU at 3.67%; Iran's pre-JCPOA stockpile: ~10,000 kg
NPT entered into force: March 5, 1970; states parties: 191
Nuclear Weapon States (NPT): US, Russia, UK, France, China
Non-NPT states with nuclear weapons: India, Pakistan, Israel, North Korea
Mojtaba Khamenei became Supreme Leader: March 9, 2026
US negotiating demand: zero enrichment and/or transfer of enriched uranium to third country
Iran's position: enriched uranium will not be transferred abroad under any circumstances
Oman: primary mediation channel for US-Iran nuclear negotiations