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West Asia conflict: Why has Iran called for ‘human chains’ to counter U.S.?

April 07, 2026 4 min read International Relations Economics GS Paper 2 (International Relations) GS Paper 1 (Society)
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What Happened

  • Iranian authorities called on citizens — youth, athletes, artists, students — to form human chains around power plants and bridges ahead of a Trump-set deadline to reopen the Strait of Hormuz or face strikes.
  • Alireza Rahimi, Secretary of Iran's Supreme Council of Youth and Adolescents, issued the call via state television; approximately 2,000 youth gathered at power plants nationwide.
  • Protesters gathered at the Ahvaz and Dezful bridges and the Rajaee, Bisotun, and Tabriz power plants, with state media broadcasting footage of large crowds.
  • Trump had explicitly warned that US strikes would target Iranian "bridges and power plants" if the Strait of Hormuz was not reopened — the most direct reference to civilian infrastructure as a military target in the conflict.
  • Iranians have formed human chains previously around nuclear sites during heightened Western tensions, giving the tactic a precedent in Iran's civil mobilization history.

Static Topic Bridges

International Humanitarian Law (IHL) and Protection of Civilian Infrastructure

International Humanitarian Law (IHL) — also called the laws of war or laws of armed conflict — governs the conduct of armed conflict and seeks to limit its effects on people and objects not directly participating in hostilities. The cornerstone instruments are the four Geneva Conventions of 1949 and their Additional Protocols of 1977.

  • Additional Protocol I (1977), Article 54: Prohibits attacks on objects indispensable to the survival of the civilian population (food, water, agriculture) — bridges used for civilian food/water transport can fall under this
  • Additional Protocol I, Article 56: Prohibits attacks on works and installations containing dangerous forces (dams, dykes, nuclear power stations) even if military objectives, if such attacks may cause severe losses among the civilian population
  • The principle of distinction: Parties must always distinguish between combatants/military objects and civilians/civilian objects; attacks may only be directed at military objectives
  • The principle of proportionality: Incidental civilian harm must not be excessive in relation to anticipated concrete and direct military advantage
  • The principle of precaution: Parties must take all feasible precautions to avoid or minimize civilian harm
  • Power plants and bridges can be classified as military objectives if they make an effective contribution to military action — but this dual-use determination is contested under IHL

Connection to this news: Trump's explicit targeting of civilian infrastructure (bridges, power plants) and Iran's civilian mobilization around those objects — human shields debate — placed this conflict directly into IHL's most contested terrain: dual-use infrastructure and the civilian human chain as a form of passive defense.

The practice of using civilian presence to protect military objectives — or civilians voluntarily gathering near potential targets — creates complex legal questions under IHL.

  • Article 51(7) of Additional Protocol I prohibits parties from using the presence of civilians to render military objectives immune from attack ("voluntary human shields" by state direction is a violation)
  • Distinction is crucial: A state directing civilians to physically surround a military target is different from civilians voluntarily gathering around civilian infrastructure they believe will be targeted unlawfully
  • When civilians voluntarily protect what they and the attacking force disagree about (is a power plant a civilian or military object?), the proportionality calculation becomes the operative test
  • The ICRC (International Committee of the Red Cross) is the primary guardian of IHL, based in Geneva, Switzerland; established 1863
  • Iran historically used this tactic around nuclear sites in 2012 and 2015 during periods of Israeli strike threats

Connection to this news: The Iranian human chain mobilization was organized by state agencies around civilian infrastructure (power plants, bridges), raising the question of whether this is state-directed civilian use or genuine civilian protection response — a distinction that determines legality under IHL.

Civil Mobilization and State-Society Relations in Authoritarian Contexts

The Iranian state's ability to mobilize civilian action — whether genuine popular sentiment or state-managed performance — reflects the complex dynamics between regime legitimacy and national solidarity in authoritarian systems.

  • Iran's political system combines theocratic elements (Supreme Leader, Guardian Council) with republican structures (elected President, Parliament/Majlis)
  • The Supreme Council of Youth and Adolescents, whose secretary issued the human chain call, is a state body under the government structure
  • Iranian civil society has a layered character: genuine nationalist sentiment coexists with state-controlled organizations; external threat often triggers cross-factional solidarity
  • The human chain tactic has visual and symbolic power for international audiences even beyond its physical deterrent value
  • Social media amplification of human chain videos formed part of Iran's information strategy during the conflict

Connection to this news: The human chain mobilization illustrates how states under external military threat use civil society organizations — including state-affiliated youth bodies — to project national solidarity, complicate targeting optics for adversaries, and generate international sympathy simultaneously.

Key Facts & Data

  • Human chain locations: Ahvaz and Dezful bridges; Rajaee, Bisotun, and Tabriz power plants
  • Mobilized by: Alireza Rahimi, Secretary, Supreme Council of Youth and Adolescents
  • Estimated participants: ~2,000 youth at power plants nationwide (state media)
  • Additional Protocol I (1977): Article 54 (indispensable civilian objects), Article 56 (dangerous forces installations)
  • ICRC established: 1863, Geneva; administers IHL
  • Prior Iranian human chain instances: around nuclear sites in 2012 and 2015
  • Trump's stated targets: bridges and power plants (tied to Strait of Hormuz non-reopening)