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UN to vote on using 'all defensive means' to secure navigation in Strait of Hormuz

April 02, 2026 5 min read International Relations Geography GS2 (International Relations International Organisations)
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What Happened

  • Bahrain, backed by the Gulf Cooperation Council and over 22 signatory nations, circulated a draft resolution at the UN Security Council that would authorise member states to use "all defensive means necessary" to secure navigation in the Strait of Hormuz and adjacent waters.
  • The draft replaces the earlier, more confrontational "all necessary measures" language with "all defensive means necessary," seeking to avoid giving Russia and China grounds for a veto while still authorising military protection of tanker convoys.
  • The resolution, if adopted, would allow states acting individually or through voluntary multinational naval partnerships to operate — including within the territorial waters of littoral states bordering the strait — to secure transit passage and deter attempts to close or obstruct navigation.
  • Russia and China, both opposed to the resolution, characterised the language as still amounting to authorisation for offensive military action; a vote was expected on April 3, 2026.
  • Earlier, on March 11, 2026, the UNSC had adopted Resolution 2817 (13 votes in favour, Russia and China abstaining) condemning Iran's attacks on Gulf states and declaring any impeding of Hormuz transit passage as a threat to international peace and security.

Static Topic Bridges

UN Security Council — Mandate, Voting, and Chapter VII Powers

The United Nations Security Council (UNSC) is the principal organ of the UN responsible for the maintenance of international peace and security under the UN Charter. It has 15 members: 5 permanent (P5: USA, UK, France, Russia, China) with veto power, and 10 non-permanent members elected for two-year terms by the General Assembly. Decisions on substantive (non-procedural) matters require 9 affirmative votes and no P5 veto. Under Chapter VII of the UN Charter, the Security Council can authorise measures ranging from sanctions (Article 41) to military force (Article 42) when it determines there is a threat to peace, breach of peace, or act of aggression.

  • "All necessary measures/means" is the standard Chapter VII formulation for authorising member states to use military force (e.g., Resolution 678 authorising force in Iraq in 1990; Resolution 1973 authorising the Libyan no-fly zone in 2011).
  • "Defensive means" is a narrower formulation intended to limit the scope to protection of vessels rather than offensive operations against Iran — designed to address Russian and Chinese concerns.
  • Russia and China exercised joint vetoes on Syria-related resolutions on multiple occasions; their alignment with Iran makes a veto of any Hormuz enforcement resolution highly probable.
  • UNSC Resolution 2817 (March 11, 2026) was adopted under Chapter VI (peaceful resolution of disputes) rather than Chapter VII, giving it moral weight but no enforcement mechanism.

Connection to this news: The shift from "all necessary measures" to "all defensive means necessary" in Bahrain's latest draft is a deliberate attempt to find language that might peel off Russian or Chinese opposition — but as of April 2026, both P5 members remain opposed, making a veto the likely outcome.

Freedom of Navigation and Transit Passage Under UNCLOS

The United Nations Convention on the Law of the Sea (UNCLOS, 1982) establishes the legal regime governing navigation rights in international straits like the Strait of Hormuz. Article 38 of UNCLOS establishes the right of "transit passage" through international straits, which cannot be suspended by any coastal state for any reason. Transit passage is broader than "innocent passage" (which can be temporarily suspended) — ships exercising transit passage have the right to proceed in normal mode without coastal state interference.

  • The Strait of Hormuz qualifies as an "international strait used for international navigation" under Part III of UNCLOS — making the transit passage regime applicable.
  • Iran is not a signatory to UNCLOS (it signed but never ratified); Iran's 1993 Maritime Law recognises innocent passage but not transit passage, creating a legal asymmetry.
  • The US is also not a party to UNCLOS but claims transit passage rights as customary international law.
  • UNCLOS Article 44 explicitly prohibits coastal states from hampering transit passage or the right of overflight of aircraft over international straits.
  • Iran has historically threatened to close the Strait — most recently during the 1980s "Tanker War" and during 2011-12 US sanctions tensions.

Connection to this news: The UNSC draft resolution's reference to "transit passage" is directly grounded in UNCLOS Article 38-44, seeking to convert the legal right of transit passage into an enforceable mandate — something UNCLOS itself lacks, since it has no enforcement mechanism for passage rights violations.

The 2026 Hormuz Crisis — Geopolitical Context

The current crisis stems from the US-Israel military operations against Iran's nuclear and missile programme, which began in early March 2026. Iran responded by partially closing the Strait of Hormuz to non-Iranian and non-friendly flagged vessels, triggering a global energy shock. The GCC states (Saudi Arabia, UAE, Bahrain, Kuwait, Qatar, Oman), whose oil export terminals are on the western shore of the Gulf, are the most directly affected — their entire hydrocarbon export capacity depends on Hormuz passage. The crisis has exposed the absence of an alternative pipeline route that can fully replace Hormuz transit: the Petroline (East-West Pipeline) in Saudi Arabia can carry approximately 5 million barrels/day, well below the ~20 million barrels/day that transit Hormuz.

  • Approximately 20% of global LNG and 25% of seaborne crude oil transits through Hormuz daily.
  • The Abu Dhabi Crude Oil Pipeline (ADCOP) bypasses Hormuz with a 1.5 million barrel/day capacity — significant but not sufficient for UAE's full export volume.
  • UNSC Resolution 2817 (March 11) condemned Iran's attacks but was adopted under Chapter VI — it demanded cessation of attacks but did not authorise enforcement action.
  • The GCC foreign ministers formally requested the UNSC to take measures to ensure freedom of navigation on April 2, 2026.

Connection to this news: Bahrain's sponsorship of the resolution — unusual for a small state — reflects the existential stakes for GCC nations: without Hormuz passage, their hydrocarbon export model collapses. The resolution is as much a statement of desperation as a legal instrument.

Key Facts & Data

  • UNSC draft resolution: authorises "all defensive means necessary" for Hormuz navigation security
  • Bahrain's draft vote: expected April 3, 2026
  • UNSC Resolution 2817 (March 11, 2026): condemned Iran's attacks, 13-0-2 (Russia and China abstaining)
  • 22+ nations signalled readiness to act in support of the draft resolution
  • Hormuz daily transit: ~20% of global LNG, ~25% of seaborne crude oil (~20 million barrels/day)
  • Saudi Arabia's Petroline bypass capacity: ~5 million barrels/day (insufficient to replace Hormuz)
  • UNCLOS Article 38: transit passage through international straits "shall not be impeded"
  • Iran has not ratified UNCLOS; does not recognise transit passage regime