What Happened
- Prime Minister Narendra Modi held his second telephonic conversation with Iranian President Masoud Pezeshkian since the start of the US-Israel war on Iran (which began on February 28, 2026).
- Modi condemned attacks on critical infrastructure in the Gulf region, stating they threaten regional stability and disrupt global supply chains.
- He reiterated India's position that shipping lanes must remain open and secure, stressing the importance of freedom of navigation for all nations.
- The call came on the occasion of Eid al-Fitr and Nowruz, with Modi extending greetings — framing the outreach as both humanitarian and strategic.
- The first Modi-Pezeshkian call (March 12) had focused on Indian nationals' safety and uninterrupted energy transit; this second call escalated India's public condemnation of infrastructure attacks as the war entered its third week.
Static Topic Bridges
Freedom of Navigation and the Strait of Hormuz
The Strait of Hormuz is the world's most critical maritime chokepoint, connecting the Persian Gulf to the Arabian Sea and the Indian Ocean. Approximately 20–21 million barrels of oil pass through it daily, representing roughly 20% of global seaborne oil trade. The strait lies between Iran's coast and Oman, and its navigational regime is governed by Part III of the United Nations Convention on the Law of the Sea (UNCLOS), specifically Articles 37–44 on Transit Passage. Under Article 38, all ships enjoy the right of "transit passage" — continuous and expeditious navigation through international straits — and under Article 44, coastal states cannot hamper or suspend this right. Iran is not a ratifying party to UNCLOS and maintains its own 1993 maritime law, which recognises only "innocent passage" through Hormuz, a more restrictive concept.
- UNCLOS Article 38: Right of transit passage through straits used for international navigation — cannot be suspended even by the coastal state.
- UNCLOS Article 44: Coastal states bordering straits shall not hamper transit passage; they must publicise known navigation hazards.
- Iran has not ratified UNCLOS; its national law does not recognise Hormuz as a "transit passage" strait.
- In 2026, shipping traffic through Hormuz fell by up to 90% as Iran warned vessels and tankers diverted or anchored in the Gulf.
Connection to this news: India's call for open shipping lanes is a direct invocation of the freedom of navigation principle — a key plank of India's Indo-Pacific maritime doctrine and its economic interest in securing oil imports and trade routes through the Gulf.
India's Maritime Foreign Policy and Freedom of Navigation Doctrine
India's foreign policy framework, especially since the articulation of SAGAR (Security and Growth for All in the Region) by PM Modi in 2015, explicitly upholds freedom of navigation and overflight as a cornerstone of regional security. India has consistently opposed the militarisation of sea lanes and advocates for a rules-based maritime order. This is reflected in India's participation in multilateral naval exercises (e.g., Malabar), joint patrols in the Indian Ocean Region (IOR), and diplomatic statements in fora such as the Indian Ocean Rim Association (IORA). The Strait of Hormuz is particularly vital to India: approximately 40–45% of India's crude oil imports transit this chokepoint, and India's oil import dependence stood at 88.5% in FY2025–26.
- SAGAR (2015): India's maritime vision — collective maritime security, shared prosperity, and open seas in the IOR.
- India's crude oil import dependence: ~88.5% of total consumption as of FY2026.
- Middle East's share in India's crude basket: ~46% (down from 63% in 2017–18 as India diversified toward Russian Urals).
- India has a diaspora of over 8 million in Gulf countries and remittances exceeding $35 billion annually from the region.
Connection to this news: Modi's insistence on secure shipping lanes directly serves India's energy security and diaspora interests. It also signals India's intent to position itself as a responsible stakeholder in global maritime order rather than a passive observer in the West Asia crisis.
India's Strategic Autonomy in Conflict Diplomacy
India's tradition of strategic autonomy — maintaining independent foreign policy positions distinct from both Western and non-Western blocs — is evident in how New Delhi has managed the West Asia war. India did not join Western condemnations of Iran, yet simultaneously condemned attacks on infrastructure (which implicitly includes Iranian strikes on UAE/Qatar energy facilities). This "principled equidistance" balances India's relationships with Iran (a key oil supplier and partner in Chabahar port access), the Gulf Arab states (home to India's diaspora), and the United States (a Quad partner and defence technology source). India's abstentions at the UN Security Council and General Assembly on the conflict reflect this balancing act.
- India has historically maintained relations with both Iran and Israel (arms supplier, technology partner).
- Chabahar Port Agreement (2024): India signed a 10-year agreement with Iran for operating the port — gives India access to Afghanistan and Central Asia bypassing Pakistan.
- India abstained on multiple UN votes regarding the 2026 Iran-US-Israel conflict.
- Modi's calls with Pezeshkian (March 12 and March 21) preceded or coincided with calls to UAE and other Gulf interlocutors — India engaging all sides.
Connection to this news: The carefully worded condemnation of "attacks on critical infrastructure" — without naming the perpetrators (US, Israel, or Iran) — exemplifies India's strategic ambiguity, a hallmark of its non-aligned diplomatic tradition adapted for the multipolar world.
Key Facts & Data
- The West Asia war (US-Israel vs. Iran) began on February 28, 2026, following coordinated airstrikes under Operation Epic Fury.
- Modi's second call with Pezeshkian took place on March 21, 2026 (Eid al-Fitr/Nowruz).
- The Strait of Hormuz: ~20 million barrels of oil per day, ~20% of global seaborne oil, ~25% of global LNG transit.
- India's oil import dependence: ~88.5% (FY2026); Middle East share: ~46% of crude imports.
- India has over 8 million nationals working in Gulf countries.
- Shipping through Hormuz fell by up to 90% in the first three weeks of the war (per Kpler shipping analytics).
- Brent crude surged from ~$70/barrel (pre-war) to as high as $119.50 during the conflict.
- UNCLOS Articles 37–44 govern transit passage through international straits; Iran has not ratified UNCLOS.