What Happened
- India is seeking safe passage for six vessels carrying 270,000 tonnes of cooking gas (LPG) through the Strait of Hormuz, identified as the government's top diplomatic priority in the ongoing Hormuz crisis.
- The six LPG tankers are part of a larger group of 22+ Indian ships stranded in the Persian Gulf since Iran effectively blocked the strait following US-Israeli military strikes on February 28, 2026.
- New Delhi has explicitly prioritised cooking gas over crude oil and LNG shipments, reflecting the acute impact of the LPG shortage on ordinary households — particularly those dependent on PMUY cylinders.
- Iran has shown willingness to grant selective passage: two Indian LPG tankers (Shivalik and Nanda Devi) carrying ~92,700 MT already crossed the strait after diplomatic intervention, providing a proof-of-concept for the ongoing talks.
- External Affairs Minister Jaishankar, speaking to the Financial Times, confirmed there is no blanket arrangement — each crossing requires separate clearance, and India is working through direct diplomatic channels with Tehran.
Static Topic Bridges
Pradhan Mantri Ujjwala Yojana (PMUY) and LPG Penetration in India
The Pradhan Mantri Ujjwala Yojana (PMUY) is a flagship scheme launched by the Ministry of Petroleum and Natural Gas on May 1, 2016. It aimed to provide free LPG connections to women from Below Poverty Line (BPL) households, replacing traditional biomass-based cooking with clean fuel. PMUY has fundamentally altered India's LPG demand profile, significantly increasing the number of households dependent on imported LPG for daily cooking. A Phase 2 (Ujjwala 2.0) was launched in August 2021 to extend coverage to migrants and other marginalised groups.
- PMUY Phase 1 (2016): target of 50 million BPL connections, initially funded at ₹8,000 crore
- Ujjwala 2.0 (August 2021): additional 10 million connections, removed requirement for permanent address documents
- As of 2025: over 100 million PMUY connections active
- Refill subsidy: government provides Direct Benefit Transfer (DBT) subsidy to eligible PMUY beneficiaries
- Impact: India's LPG penetration rose from ~55% of households (2016) to ~99% (2025) in urban/semi-urban areas
Connection to this news: The scale of PMUY has created a large, price-sensitive population dependent on uninterrupted LPG supply. A Hormuz-driven shortage hits this segment hardest, making LPG tankers the government's political and humanitarian priority over crude oil, which has larger strategic reserves and more diversified suppliers.
India's Crude Oil Import Diversification Post-Ukraine War
India's crude import strategy has undergone a significant shift since 2022. Following Russia's invasion of Ukraine and subsequent Western sanctions, Russia began offering discounted crude to Asian buyers. India rapidly scaled up Russian crude imports — which now constitute 35-40% of India's crude basket — creating a partial cushion against Gulf disruptions. However, this diversification is crude-specific: Russia does not supply LPG in significant volumes, and the INSTC (India's overland corridor to Russia via Iran) is not yet fully operational for hydrocarbon shipments.
- Russia: emerged as India's top crude supplier by 2023, supplying ~35-40% of crude imports at a steep discount
- Iraq: ~20% of crude imports
- Saudi Arabia: ~15% of crude imports
- Russian crude mostly arrives via tankers circumventing western sanctions (shadow fleet)
- LPG imports: Russia is NOT a significant LPG supplier to India; West Asia remains dominant (~91%)
- India resumed Iranian crude imports in 2025 for the first time since 2018 (post-JCPOA withdrawal)
Connection to this news: Russia's supply has reduced India's crude vulnerability to Gulf disruptions — providing strategic breathing space for the government. This partly explains why crude tankers are not the emergency priority: India has alternative suppliers. For LPG, however, there is no comparable Russia buffer, making the six tankers stranded in the Gulf an acute crisis requiring immediate diplomatic resolution.
Maritime Insurance, Freedom of Navigation, and UNCLOS
When a shipping lane is disrupted by conflict, two legal and commercial frameworks come into tension: maritime insurance law (war risk premiums make passage commercially prohibitive) and UNCLOS's "transit passage" rights through international straits. Under UNCLOS Articles 37–44, all ships have a right of transit passage through straits used for international navigation — this right cannot be suspended by the bordering state even in peacetime. India, as a signatory to UNCLOS (ratified 1995), can invoke these provisions, but practical enforcement in a conflict zone requires either military escort or diplomatic arrangement.
- UNCLOS: opened for signature 1982, entered into force 1994; India ratified 1995
- Transit passage (Article 38): continuous and expeditious passage; cannot be denied by coastal state
- War risk surcharges: when shipping lanes face conflict risk, marine war risk premiums can increase 10–20× normal rates
- IFC-IOR (India): monitors maritime domain in the Indian Ocean; established December 2018
- Indian Navy Arabian Sea deployments: India has previously deployed warships to escort vessels during Houthi crisis (2024)
Connection to this news: The commercial unviability of passage (due to war risk insurance) combines with the legal complexity (Iran's de facto blockade vs. UNCLOS transit rights) to create a situation where diplomatic negotiation — rather than unilateral maritime assertion — becomes the most practical solution for India.
India's Engagement with Iran: Historical Context
India-Iran relations span centuries of cultural and trade links. In the post-independence period, the two countries signed a Treaty of Friendship in 1950. Energy cooperation deepened through the 1990s and 2000s before being disrupted by US sanctions following Iran's nuclear programme escalation. Key milestones include: the Trilateral Agreement on Chabahar Port (India, Iran, Afghanistan, 2016); the 10-year operational lease for Shahid Beheshti terminal at Chabahar (May 2024); and India's resumption of crude oil imports from Iran in 2025. India also declined to join Western sanctions against Iran, consistent with its strategic autonomy principle.
- India-Iran Treaty of Friendship: 1950
- Chabahar Trilateral Agreement: May 2016 (India, Iran, Afghanistan)
- Chabahar 10-year operational contract: May 13, 2024; India investing $370 million
- India's oil imports from Iran: halted 2018 (US JCPOA withdrawal pressure), resumed 2025
- India-Iran trade: ~$1.68 billion (2025); India exports more than it imports
- Jaishankar spoke separately with Iranian FM Seyed Abbas Araghchi in Brussels, March 2026
Connection to this news: India's ability to negotiate selective passage for LPG tankers stems directly from this historical relationship. Iran's willingness to accommodate Indian vessels — while blocking general commercial traffic — reflects the strategic value Tehran places on ties with New Delhi, including Chabahar port investment and INSTC connectivity.
Key Facts & Data
- Six priority LPG tankers: 270,000 tonnes of cooking gas, sought for urgent Hormuz passage
- 22+ total Indian vessels stranded in Persian Gulf (crude, LNG, LPG carriers)
- Two LPG tankers (Shivalik and Nanda Devi, ~92,700 MT) crossed after diplomatic intervention
- India's LPG import dependency: ~60% of consumption is imported; 91% from West Asia
- PMUY: over 100 million active connections (as of 2025); launched May 1, 2016
- LPG cylinder price increase: ₹60/cylinder post-Hormuz closure
- Brent crude surged above $120/barrel following the disruption
- Chabahar 10-year operational agreement: signed May 13, 2024; $370 million Indian investment
- India-Iran Treaty of Friendship: 1950
- UNCLOS ratified by India: 1995 (Article 38 enshrines transit passage rights)