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India slams Pakistan’s air strikes inside Afghanistan

March 14, 2026 5 min read International Relations Internal Security GS2 (India and its Neighbourhood Bilateral and Multilateral Groupings) GS3 (Internal Security Linkages between Development and Spread of Extremism)
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What Happened

  • India's Ministry of External Affairs (MEA) strongly condemned Pakistan's air strikes inside Afghanistan, calling them "yet another act of aggression by a Pakistani establishment that remains hostile to the idea of a sovereign Afghanistan."
  • MEA Spokesperson Randhir Jaiswal delivered the statement on March 14, 2026, affirming India's position that Afghanistan's sovereignty and territorial integrity must be fully respected.
  • Pakistan's air force conducted the strikes in Kabul and eastern Afghan provinces (including Nangarhar), targeting positions Pakistan claims were used by Tehrik-i-Taliban Pakistan (TTP) militants.
  • The strikes killed at least 16 civilians and injured 15 others, according to Afghan authorities.
  • Afghan forces reportedly retaliated by targeting Pakistani military installations near Islamabad and northwestern Pakistan — marking a significant bilateral escalation.
  • Pakistan's Defence Minister Khawaja Asif declared the two countries are at "open war."

Static Topic Bridges

The Durand Line — Historical Dispute and Contemporary Flashpoint

The Durand Line is the 2,611 km border between Afghanistan and Pakistan, drawn in 1893 by British India's Foreign Secretary Sir Henry Mortimer Durand and Afghan Emir Abdur Rahman Khan. Afghanistan has never formally recognised the Durand Line as a legitimate international boundary, arguing it was a colonial imposition that arbitrarily divided the Pashtun ethnic community. The Taliban, which returned to power in Afghanistan in August 2021, has similarly refused to accept the Durand Line, viewing it as neither legally binding nor reflective of ethnic or cultural realities. This non-recognition of the border is the foundational source of Pakistani-Afghan tensions and creates a legal vacuum that Pakistan's military operations across the line inflame.

  • The Durand Line Agreement (1893) was a boundary delimitation, not a cession of territory — its legal status under modern international law is contested.
  • Pakistan's constitution designates all territory up to the Durand Line as Pakistani sovereign territory; Afghanistan's position is that the line expired at the end of the British Raj in 1947.
  • Post-2021: The Taliban's return intensified border tensions as Pakistan expected the Taliban to control TTP; instead, TTP attacks on Pakistan surged.
  • Pakistan completed a barbed-wire fence along the Durand Line (approximately 2,400 km) between 2017 and 2022; Afghanistan has repeatedly protested the fencing.

Connection to this news: Pakistan's justification for air strikes — targeting militant sanctuaries inside Afghan territory — is premised on its sovereign right to self-defence, but India's condemnation, along with the broader international community's concern, highlights that strikes inside another country's territory are an extreme measure that violates Afghan sovereignty regardless of the justification.

Tehrik-i-Taliban Pakistan (TTP) and the Af-Pak Security Nexus

Tehrik-i-Taliban Pakistan (TTP), also known as the Pakistani Taliban, was founded in 2007 as a coalition of militant factions operating primarily in Pakistan's former Federally Administered Tribal Areas (FATA). While ideologically aligned with the Afghan Taliban, the TTP's operational goal is the overthrow of the Pakistani state and imposition of its interpretation of sharia law within Pakistan. TTP conducted approximately 600 attacks on Pakistani security forces in 2025. Following the Afghan Taliban's return to power in 2021, Pakistan expected Taliban help in containing TTP; instead, Afghanistan became a refuge for TTP commanders and fighters, generating one of the most dangerous cycles in the Af-Pak security landscape.

  • TTP and Afghan Taliban share Pashtun ethnic identity, tribal networks, and ideological roots — but have distinct objectives (Afghan Taliban: governance of Afghanistan; TTP: revolution within Pakistan).
  • Pakistan has conducted multiple military operations targeting TTP in its own FATA/KPK regions: Operation Zarb-e-Azb (2014), Operation Radd-ul-Fasaad (2017), Operation Azm-e-Istehkam (2024).
  • The Islamic State – Khorasan Province (ISKP), operating in Afghanistan, is an enemy of both the Taliban and TTP, adding a third security actor to the conflict.
  • Cross-border airstrikes targeting TTP sanctuaries in Afghanistan began in 2024, marking a significant escalation from previous practices.

Connection to this news: Pakistan's justification for the March 2026 air strikes — TTP sanctuaries — has been a consistent policy rationale, but Afghanistan's civilian casualties and the Taliban's retaliatory response demonstrate that Pakistan's military strategy is generating sovereign conflicts rather than resolving the TTP problem.

India's Strategic Interests in Afghanistan's Stability

India has historically maintained significant stakes in a stable, sovereign Afghanistan, largely for three reasons: countering Pakistani influence in its neighbourhood, preventing Afghanistan from becoming a base for anti-India militant groups, and maintaining development investment credibility. India invested approximately $3 billion in Afghanistan between 2001 and 2021 in infrastructure projects including the Salma Dam (Herat), the Afghan Parliament building in Kabul, Zaranj-Delaram Highway, and hundreds of schools and hospitals. After the Taliban takeover in August 2021, India initially suspended its embassy operations but progressively re-engaged, reopening its embassy in Kabul in 2022 and hosting Afghan trade delegations.

  • India reopened its embassy in Kabul in June 2022, though without full diplomatic recognition of the Taliban government.
  • India and the Taliban have maintained functional engagement, particularly around trade and humanitarian assistance.
  • India's concern: Pakistan-backed militant groups using Afghan soil to plan attacks on Indian interests — a pattern seen before 2021 with groups like the Haqqani Network.
  • India's condemnation of Pakistan's air strikes aligns with India-Taliban bilateral convergence of interests on the question of Pakistani military intrusions.

Connection to this news: India's strong condemnation of Pakistan's air strikes serves dual purposes — it signals India's commitment to Afghan sovereignty (building goodwill with the Taliban government) and places India on record opposing Pakistani military unilateralism in the region.

Key Facts & Data

  • India's MEA statement: March 14, 2026 — MEA Spokesperson Randhir Jaiswal.
  • Quoted language: "yet another act of aggression by a Pakistani establishment that remains hostile to the idea of a sovereign Afghanistan."
  • Strikes location: Kabul and eastern Afghanistan (Nangarhar province among others).
  • Civilian casualties: at least 16 killed, 15 injured (Afghan authorities).
  • Pakistan's stated justification: targeting TTP and ISKP militant camps.
  • Pakistan Defence Minister Khawaja Asif: declared Pakistan and Afghanistan at "open war."
  • The Durand Line: 2,611 km, drawn in 1893.
  • TTP founded: 2007 in Pakistan's tribal belt (FATA).
  • India's investment in Afghanistan (2001–2021): approximately $3 billion.
  • India reopened Kabul embassy: June 2022.