What Happened
- External Affairs Minister S. Jaishankar held his fourth phone call with Iranian Foreign Minister Abbas Araghchi since the Iran-US-Israel war began, this time expanding the conversation beyond Hormuz to include broader bilateral ties and BRICS-related issues
- The conversation confirmed that India's diplomatic engagement with Iran has moved from purely crisis management (Hormuz passage) to a more comprehensive reassessment of the bilateral relationship
- Iran's FM blamed US actions for the regional instability, while India maintained its diplomatic position of not attributing blame publicly
- The call followed Iran's confirmation of safe passage for Indian-flagged vessels through the Strait of Hormuz
- Discussing BRICS in this context is significant — India, Iran, and Russia are all BRICS members, providing an existing multilateral framework for economic engagement outside Western financial systems
Static Topic Bridges
BRICS: Expansion and Iran's Membership
BRICS (originally Brazil, Russia, India, China, South Africa) underwent a historic expansion at the Johannesburg Summit in August 2023, with six new members invited to join from January 1, 2024: Iran, Saudi Arabia, UAE, Ethiopia, Egypt, and Argentina (Argentina later declined under new President Milei). Iran's BRICS membership — despite being under US sanctions — creates a framework for India-Iran economic engagement that is more insulated from Western financial system pressure. BRICS countries collectively represent approximately 37% of global GDP (PPP) and over 42% of world population.
- BRICS original members: Brazil, Russia, India, China, South Africa
- BRICS 2024 expansion: Iran, Saudi Arabia, UAE, Ethiopia, Egypt (Argentina declined)
- Iran's BRICS membership: From January 1, 2024
- BRICS GDP share: approximately 37% of global GDP (PPP basis, 2024)
- BRICS population: approximately 42% of world population
- BRICS New Development Bank (NDB): Established 2014; HQ Shanghai; alternative to World Bank/IMF
- BRICS currency discussion: Ongoing debate about creating a BRICS payment unit or common currency
Connection to this news: Jaishankar discussing BRICS issues with Araghchi signals that India sees Iran as a relevant partner in the expanding BRICS framework — potentially for energy trade, digital payments, or other economic cooperation that bypasses Western sanctions architecture.
India-Iran BRICS Potential: Energy and Finance
Iran's entry into BRICS and India's existing bilateral ties create potential for expanded energy trade using mechanisms outside the US dollar and SWIFT system. During US sanctions, India partially experimented with rupee-based payments for Iranian oil. BRICS nations have been developing the mBridge project (a CBDC-based cross-border payment platform, developed by BIS Innovation Hub with China, UAE, Hong Kong, and Thailand), which could theoretically be extended to Iran-India energy transactions.
- India-Iran rupee trade: Attempted during 2012-2019 sanctions period; complicated by limited rupee usefulness to Iran
- mBridge: Multi-CBDC platform developed by Bank for International Settlements (BIS) Innovation Hub; for cross-border CBDC transactions
- SWIFT alternatives: Russia (SPFS), China (CIPS), India (UPI International) — all partial alternatives
- BRICS NDB: India has received project loans from NDB for urban infrastructure; potential to expand to energy sector
- India's energy import bill (FY2024-25): approximately $150 billion — reducing this through discounted Iranian crude would significantly improve India's current account
Connection to this news: The BRICS discussion signals India may be exploring longer-term frameworks for legal, sanctions-resilient energy trade with Iran — particularly relevant if the current war ends with Iran under modified or lifted sanctions.
India's Diplomatic Communication: Bilateral vs. Multilateral Channels
India's foreign policy uses multiple parallel communication channels to advance its interests. In the Hormuz crisis, India activated: (1) the bilateral India-Iran diplomatic channel (Jaishankar-Araghchi calls); (2) UN Security Council engagement (co-sponsoring the anti-Iran resolution on GCC attacks); (3) public statements through MEA; (4) high-level leader-to-leader contact (PM Modi-President Pezeshkian call); and (5) the resident ambassador channel (Iran's Ambassador Fathali's "India is our friend" statement). This multi-track diplomacy demonstrates India's sophisticated use of graduated diplomatic tools.
- EAM (External Affairs Minister) call frequency: 4 calls in 2 weeks — unusually high; signals crisis urgency
- MEA official language: Careful, graduated statements avoiding direct attribution
- PM-level call: Reserved for most significant issues; signals India elevated Hormuz to strategic priority
- BRICS foreign ministers: Meet annually on sidelines of UNGA; provides multilateral channel
- India's EAM S. Jaishankar: Former Foreign Secretary, longtime diplomat; known for direct engagement style
Connection to this news: The shift in the fourth call from purely Hormuz-focused to bilateral ties and BRICS suggests India and Iran are looking beyond the immediate crisis to a potential post-conflict normalisation — or at minimum, laying groundwork for expanded economic ties if and when sanctions are lifted.
Key Facts & Data
- Jaishankar-Araghchi calls: 4 total since war began (calls 1-3: Feb 28, Mar 5, Mar 10; call 4: Mar 13)
- Topics of 4th call: Bilateral ties, BRICS issues, Hormuz update
- Iran's position: Blames US actions for regional instability
- Iran's BRICS membership: Effective January 1, 2024
- BRICS GDP share (PPP): approximately 37% of global GDP
- BRICS 2024 new members: Iran, Saudi Arabia, UAE, Ethiopia, Egypt
- PM Modi-President Pezeshkian call: March 12-13, 2026
- Safe passage confirmation (Iran ambassador): March 13, 2026
- India's Iranian crude imports: Near-zero since 2019 US sanctions; potential resumption being discussed