What Happened
- On March 11, External Affairs Minister S. Jaishankar held separate high-level teleconferences with Russian Foreign Minister Sergey Lavrov, EU High Representative Kaja Kallas, and French Foreign Minister Jean-Noel Barrot to review the evolving West Asia situation.
- Jaishankar shared India's assessment of the conflict and coordinated diplomatic positioning with major global stakeholders, emphasizing the need to restore normalcy and prevent further escalation.
- The Russia-India readout highlighted the two ministers' emphasis on the role of multilateral platforms — specifically the SCO and BRICS — in supporting de-escalation and a sustainable settlement.
- India's diplomatic outreach reflects New Delhi's concern about the twin threats from the conflict: disruption to energy markets (India sources significant oil through the Persian Gulf) and the safety of Indian nationals in Gulf countries (approximately 9 million Indian diaspora in the region).
- The flurry of calls underscored India's effort to remain engaged with all major geopolitical blocs simultaneously — a posture aligned with its strategic autonomy doctrine.
Static Topic Bridges
India's Strategic Autonomy and Multi-Alignment Policy
India's foreign policy since independence has been anchored in the concept of strategic autonomy — the freedom to make independent foreign policy choices without being bound to any single power bloc. In the Nehruvian era, this was expressed as Non-Alignment — staying outside Cold War military alliances. Post-Cold War, this evolved into "multi-alignment" — India simultaneously cultivating deep partnerships with the US, Russia, EU, and Gulf states, without treaty-bound commitments that would constrain its choices. This doctrine has come under strain as great power competition intensifies, but India has largely maintained it — seen most clearly in its refusal to condemn Russia on Ukraine while deepening ties with the US and EU.
- Non-Alignment Movement (NAM): founded 1961 at Belgrade; India was a founding member under Nehru; 120 member states today
- Post-Cold War evolution: "strategic autonomy" replaced strict non-alignment; India joined QUAD, deepened US ties, while maintaining Special and Privileged Strategic Partnership with Russia
- India's simultaneous memberships: QUAD, SCO, BRICS, G20, Commonwealth — spanning competing geopolitical frameworks
- Multi-alignment allows India to buy Russian oil, engage Chinese investment selectively, and deepen defence ties with the US simultaneously
- PM Narendra Modi articulated this as "India first" foreign policy — national interest over ideological alignment
Connection to this news: Jaishankar's simultaneous engagement with Russia and the EU on the West Asia crisis is a textbook example of India's multi-alignment in action — seeking to be a relevant diplomatic actor across competing great power frameworks.
India and the West Asia Region — Strategic Significance
West Asia (Middle East) is of paramount strategic importance to India across four dimensions: (1) Energy: the Persian Gulf region supplies approximately 60% of India's crude oil imports; (2) Remittances: approximately 9 million Indians live and work in Gulf countries, remitting approximately $40 billion annually — making the Gulf India's largest remittance source; (3) Trade: the region is a major export market for Indian goods; (4) Security: conflicts in West Asia create refugee flows, terrorism risks, and disruptions to sea lanes (Suez Canal, Strait of Hormuz) critical to Indian trade.
- ~60% of India's crude oil imports come from the Persian Gulf (Saudi Arabia, Iraq, UAE are top suppliers)
- ~9 million Indian diaspora in Gulf countries — the largest Indian diaspora concentration globally
- Gulf remittances: ~$40 billion/year — largest single-region source of remittances to India
- Strait of Hormuz: ~20% of global oil trade transits this chokepoint, which is vital to India's energy supply
- India's "Look West" policy: engagements with Gulf Cooperation Council (GCC) states, deepening of India-Arab ties
Connection to this news: India's urgency in engaging Russia, EU, and France on West Asia reflects these deep stakes — any escalation threatens both India's energy security and the safety of millions of Indian workers in the region.
SCO and BRICS as Multilateral De-escalation Platforms
Both the SCO (Shanghai Cooperation Organisation) and BRICS have been cited by India and Russia as platforms for supporting West Asia stabilization. The SCO, founded in 2001, includes China, Russia, India, Pakistan, Iran (observer/dialogue partner), and several Central Asian states — making it a uniquely positioned forum that brings together key West Asian stakeholders. BRICS (originally Brazil, Russia, India, China, South Africa; expanded in 2024 to include Saudi Arabia, UAE, Iran, Egypt, Ethiopia, Argentina) now encompasses several Gulf states, giving it potential relevance to West Asia diplomacy.
- SCO founded: 2001 (Shanghai); India and Pakistan joined in 2017; Iran joined in 2023
- SCO members include Russia, China, India, Pakistan, Iran — all with stakes in West Asia stability
- BRICS expanded in 2024: added Saudi Arabia, UAE, Iran, Egypt, Ethiopia (Argentina declined)
- India holds SCO Presidency in 2023 and has been active in the BRICS framework
- These platforms are distinct from Western-led bodies (NATO, G7) — enabling Russia-inclusive diplomacy
Connection to this news: India and Russia specifically cited SCO and BRICS as frameworks for West Asia de-escalation, reflecting both countries' preference for multipolar diplomacy rather than US/Western-led conflict resolution frameworks.
Key Facts & Data
- Jaishankar spoke with Lavrov (Russia), Kallas (EU), and Barrot (France) on March 11, 2026
- India's Persian Gulf crude dependency: ~60% of total crude imports
- Indian diaspora in Gulf: ~9 million; Gulf remittances: ~$40 billion/year
- SCO members: China, Russia, India, Pakistan, Iran, Central Asian states; founded 2001
- BRICS (2024 expanded): Saudi Arabia, UAE, Iran, Egypt, Ethiopia added
- India's strategic autonomy doctrine: multi-alignment across competing great power frameworks