What Happened
- External Affairs Minister S. Jaishankar held telephonic conversations with the foreign ministers of Iran, Russia, France, and the European Union's High Representative for Foreign Affairs (Kaja Kallas) on March 11, 2026, amid the escalating West Asia conflict.
- The conflict began on February 28, 2026, following joint US–Israel strikes on Iran that resulted in the death of Iran's Supreme Leader, triggering Iranian retaliatory drone and missile attacks across the region.
- With Russia, Jaishankar reviewed diplomatic efforts on the conflict and took stock of bilateral India–Russia relations.
- With France and the EU, discussions centred on the conflict's broader geopolitical repercussions.
- With Iran, bilateral matters including BRICS were also discussed alongside the crisis.
- India's outreach spans both Western powers and Iran simultaneously, underscoring New Delhi's effort to remain a credible interlocutor across the conflict's fault lines.
Static Topic Bridges
India's Strategic Autonomy and Multi-Alignment Doctrine
India's post-Cold War foreign policy is characterised by strategic autonomy — the pursuit of national interests without being locked into an alliance bloc. This evolved from the Non-Aligned Movement (NAM) of the 1950s–70s, where India sought equidistance between the US and Soviet blocs. In the 21st century, strategic autonomy has taken the form of "multi-alignment": engaging simultaneously with competing powers — the US, Russia, China, EU, and Gulf states — to maximise strategic options. Jaishankar has articulated this as India refusing to be a "camp follower."
- NAM was founded in 1961 at the Belgrade Conference; India, under Nehru, was a founding architect.
- The 2021 S. Jaishankar book "The India Way" explicitly articulates the shift from non-alignment to strategic autonomy.
- India participates in both the Quad (with US, Australia, Japan) and maintains robust ties with Russia — a deliberate multi-alignment posture.
- India is simultaneously a member of BRICS (with Russia, China, Iran) and the I2U2 grouping (with Israel, UAE, US).
Connection to this news: Calling both Iran (the aggressor from the Western perspective) and France/EU (broadly pro-US) on the same day is a textbook exercise of multi-alignment — India seeks to preserve all channels, signal diplomatic relevance, and avoid alienating any party it has strategic or economic interests with.
India–Iran Relations and Strategic Interests
India and Iran share deep historical, cultural, and strategic ties. India has significant interests in Iran: the Chabahar Port project (on Iran's southeastern coast) provides India an alternative access route to Afghanistan and Central Asia, bypassing Pakistan. India was also a major buyer of Iranian crude before US sanctions (CAATSA framework) forced a halt in 2019.
- Chabahar Port: India has invested approximately $85 million in developing the Shahid Beheshti terminal; a 10-year contract was signed in May 2024.
- Chabahar is excluded from US sanctions and provides India land connectivity to Afghanistan via the International North–South Transport Corridor (INSTC).
- INSTC: A 7,200 km multi-modal corridor linking India to Russia via Iran — rail, road, and sea.
- India imported ~12 million tonnes of Iranian crude annually before 2019 sanctions.
Connection to this news: Jaishankar's call to Iran's FM is not merely humanitarian — it directly concerns safeguarding Chabahar operations, protecting Indian seafarers in the Gulf, and maintaining the INSTC corridor which passes through Iranian territory.
India's Diplomatic Engagement Architecture in West Asia
India's West Asia policy rests on several pillars: energy security (60%+ of crude from the Gulf), diaspora welfare (~9 million Indian workers in the Gulf), trade connectivity, and more recently infrastructure diplomacy through IMEC. India has historically maintained balanced ties with both Israel and Arab states, formalising relations with Israel in 1992 while never abandoning its historic support for Palestinian statehood.
- India–Israel ties were formalised in 1992; upgraded to Strategic Partnership in 2017.
- India's ties with Gulf states (Saudi Arabia, UAE, Qatar, Kuwait) are anchored in the OPEC energy relationship and diaspora.
- I2U2 (India, Israel, UAE, US) — formed 2022 — focuses on food security, clean energy, and infrastructure.
- India's vote record at the UN on West Asia conflicts reflects an attempt to balance: often abstaining on Israel-critical resolutions while supporting ceasefire language.
Connection to this news: The simultaneous outreach to Iran, Russia, France, and the EU reflects India's attempt to preserve credibility with all stakeholders — a necessary posture for a country that imports energy from the Gulf, has workers across the region, and aspires to be a leading mediating power.
Key Facts & Data
- West Asia conflict start date: February 28, 2026 (US–Israel strikes on Iran).
- Indian nationals in Gulf region: ~9 million (largest Indian diaspora concentration globally).
- Jaishankar's March 11 calls: Iran, Russia, France, EU.
- Chabahar Port: ~$85 million Indian investment; 10-year agreement signed May 2024.
- INSTC: 7,200 km multi-modal corridor (India–Iran–Russia).
- India–Israel relations formalised: 1992; upgraded to Strategic Partnership: 2017.
- India's crude imports from Gulf region: normally ~60% of total imports.