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What international law says about the Israeli strikes on Iranian oil facilities


What Happened

  • Israel targeted Iranian oil refineries — specifically the Tondgouyan and Shahran refineries near Tehran — as part of the broader military campaign initiated on 28 February 2026
  • Following the strikes, Iranian authorities warned of toxic acid rain, and Tehran residents reported headaches and breathing difficulties due to air and water pollution
  • International legal experts have questioned whether the oil facilities qualify as legitimate military objectives under international humanitarian law (IHL), given their predominantly civilian function
  • There is no convincing evidence presented that the targeted refineries were significant fuel sources for the Iranian military, raising proportionality concerns
  • The strikes on energy infrastructure serving approximately 15 million Tehran residents highlight the legal complexity of targeting dual-use civilian infrastructure in modern warfare

Static Topic Bridges

Principles of International Humanitarian Law (IHL)

International humanitarian law, codified primarily in the Geneva Conventions and their Additional Protocols (1977), governs the conduct of armed conflict to limit suffering. It rests on three foundational principles: distinction, proportionality, and precaution. The principle of distinction (Article 52 of Additional Protocol I) requires parties to distinguish between civilian objects and military objectives at all times. A military objective is defined as an object which by its nature, location, purpose, or use makes an effective contribution to military action, and whose destruction offers a definite military advantage.

  • IHL is binding on all parties to armed conflict regardless of who initiated hostilities
  • The Geneva Conventions (1949) have near-universal ratification; Additional Protocol I covers international armed conflicts
  • Civilian objects lose protection only if and for as long as they are used for military purposes
  • Cultural property, places of worship, and objects indispensable to civilian survival enjoy special protection

Connection to this news: The Israeli strikes on Iranian oil refineries are being assessed under IHL's distinction framework — whether facilities supplying civilian transportation and heating qualify as military objectives given uncertain evidence of military use.

The Proportionality Rule in Armed Conflict

Proportionality in IHL (Article 51(5)(b) of Additional Protocol I) prohibits attacks expected to cause incidental civilian harm that is excessive in relation to the concrete and direct military advantage anticipated. Importantly, proportionality assessments must account not just for immediate casualties but also for reverberating effects — the cascading harm from disrupting essential civilian services such as fuel, water, and electricity. The International Committee of the Red Cross (ICRC) notes that attacking energy infrastructure is particularly difficult to justify proportionately because its disruption often has severe and long-lasting civilian impact.

  • Proportionality is assessed prospectively — based on what a commander reasonably knew at the time, not hindsight
  • "Military advantage" must be concrete, direct, and overall (not speculative or hypothetical)
  • Reverberating effects (secondary civilian harm from service disruption) must be included in the calculus
  • No objective standard exists in IHL for measuring "excessive" harm, creating a zone of commander discretion

Connection to this news: Critics argue the Israeli strikes on Tehran's refineries failed a proportionality test — the civilian disruption (fuel shortages, environmental contamination, public health impact on 15 million residents) appears disproportionate to any established military advantage from destroying civilian-use oil facilities.

Dual-Use Infrastructure in Warfare

Dual-use objects are civilian infrastructure that can also serve military purposes — power grids, fuel depots, communications networks, and transport hubs. Under IHL, dual-use objects occupy a grey zone: they are not automatically legitimate targets, but their military utility can, under certain conditions, render them targetable. The attacking party bears the burden of establishing that the military use is genuine, significant, and not separable from civilian use before proceeding with an attack.

  • Examples of dual-use targets: power stations, bridges, telecommunications networks, oil refineries, airports
  • Feasibility of partial attacks or attacks on military-use components must be considered before attacking the whole facility
  • Precautionary measures — warnings to civilians, choice of weapons, timing — must be taken when feasible
  • Environmental damage from attacks (oil spills, toxic releases) is an emerging concern under IHL and the Rome Statute

Connection to this news: The Tondgouyan and Shahran refineries exemplify dual-use dilemmas — they supply fuel for civilian transport and industry, but could theoretically supply military logistics. The absence of evidence of significant military fuel dependence on these specific refineries weakens the case for targeting them.

Key Facts & Data

  • Strikes on Iranian oil facilities took place as part of the US-Israel military campaign against Iran that began 28 February 2026
  • Targeted facilities: Tondgouyan and Shahran oil refineries, near Tehran
  • Tehran population affected: approximately 15 million residents dependent on these facilities for fuel
  • Iran warned of toxic acid rain after the strikes; residents reported acute health symptoms
  • Article 52, Additional Protocol I, Geneva Conventions (1977): defines legitimate military objectives
  • Article 51(5)(b), Additional Protocol I: codifies the proportionality prohibition
  • Legal analysis by Prof. Saeed Bagheri (University of Reading): states assessment of legality is difficult without definitive evidence of military advantage
  • Historical parallels: environmental damage from oil facility strikes documented in Kuwait (1991 Gulf War), Syria (2015), and Ukraine (2022–present)