Jaishankar, Iran’s Araghchi hold third call as war rages

What Happened

External Affairs Minister S. Jaishankar and Iran's Foreign Minister Seyed Abbas Araghchi spoke for the third time since the outbreak of the Iran-Israel-U.S. conflict, with the conversation occurring on or around March 10, 2026.
The first call took place on February 28, 2026 (the day the U.S.-Israel strikes on Iran began); the second on March 5; the third on March 10 — a frequency that signals India's active diplomatic engagement and acute concern about the conflict's trajectory.
Key topics included: the Strait of Hormuz blockade's impact on global energy supply, India's interests in maritime shipping security, the welfare of Indian nationals in Iran, and Iran's request that the international community condemn what it described as U.S.-Israel aggression.
Araghchi told Jaishankar that maritime instability was entirely the result of U.S.-Israeli actions and urged India and other non-aligned nations to speak out against the strikes as violations of the UN Charter.
India has not issued any condemnation of either side; its position has been consistent calls for "dialogue and diplomacy" and concern for civilian casualties.

Static Topic Bridges

India's Engagement with West Asia: Historical and Contemporary Context

India's engagement with West Asia (the Middle East) is driven by four structural interests: energy imports, diaspora welfare, trade connectivity, and strategic balance. These interests predate independence and have deepened with globalisation.

Energy: India imports approximately 85–90% of its crude oil requirements. West Asia accounts for approximately 55–60% of total crude imports; Gulf states routing through the Strait of Hormuz account for approximately 40–45%.
Diaspora: The Gulf Cooperation Council (GCC) region hosts approximately 9 million Indian nationals — the largest concentration of the Indian diaspora anywhere. Remittances from the Gulf constitute the largest single regional contribution to India's ~$125 billion annual remittance receipts.
Trade: GCC countries account for approximately 13% of India's exports and 16% of imports. Key commodities: crude oil, LPG, fertilisers, gold/precious metals (imports); engineering goods, pharmaceuticals, textiles (exports).
Strategic connectivity: Chabahar port (Iran), INSTC, and the India-Middle East-Europe Economic Corridor (IMEC, announced at G20 2023) all run through or around the West Asia region.
The I2U2 grouping (India, Israel, UAE, U.S.), launched in July 2022, added a new minilateral format specifically linking India's West Asia interests to the Abraham Accords architecture.

Connection to this news: Three calls in under two weeks to Iran's foreign minister — the highest diplomatic frequency India has maintained with any conflict party in recent years — reflects the depth of India's structural exposure to the 2026 Iran war. Each call is partly diplomatic signalling (India as an engaged neutral) and partly direct interest protection.

The UN Charter and the Prohibition on the Use of Force

Iran's Foreign Minister Araghchi described the U.S.-Israel strikes as a "blatant violation of the fundamental principles of the United Nations Charter and international law" — invoking the Charter's core prohibition on the use of force against another state.

Article 2(4) of the UN Charter: "All Members shall refrain in their international relations from the threat or use of force against the territorial integrity or political independence of any state." This is the foundational norm of the post-1945 international order.
Exceptions to Article 2(4): Article 51 (inherent right of self-defence if an armed attack occurs against a member state) and Chapter VII (UN Security Council authorisation for collective security action).
The U.S. and Israel would justify the strikes as pre-emptive or preventive self-defence, or as enforcement of non-proliferation norms (Iran's nuclear programme). Neither justification is uncontested under international law.
The UN Security Council (UNSC) is the body with primary authority to determine breaches of peace under Chapter VII and to authorise enforcement action. The U.S. as a P5 member holds veto power, making any binding UNSC resolution against U.S. action impossible.
The UN General Assembly has no binding authority, but passed non-binding resolutions on Russia-Ukraine through the "Uniting for Peace" procedure (Resolution 377A); similar procedures could be invoked for the Iran conflict.

Connection to this news: Araghchi's invocation of the UN Charter in his call with Jaishankar is a deliberate diplomatic strategy — seeking to frame the conflict as an international law violation that obligates neutral states like India to take a public position. India's refusal to do so (consistent with its Ukraine stance) is itself a significant diplomatic choice.

India-Iran Relations: The Sanctions Constraint and Strategic Balance

India's relationship with Iran has been constrained since 2018 by U.S. secondary sanctions under the Countering America's Adversaries Through Sanctions Act (CAATSA) and Iran-specific sanctions, which deter Indian companies from transacting with Iranian entities. Yet India's strategic interests in Iran have not disappeared.

CAATSA (Countering America's Adversaries Through Sanctions Act, 2017): U.S. law that enables secondary sanctions against any entity in any country that conducts "significant transactions" with designated adversaries (Iran, Russia, North Korea). India received a waiver for its S-400 procurement from Russia; its Chabahar investment received a limited U.S. carve-out from Iran sanctions in 2018.
The Chabahar carve-out: The U.S. granted India a specific exemption from Iran sanctions for the Chabahar port project, recognising its role in stabilising Afghanistan. The carve-out's status became uncertain after the 2024 India-Iran 10-year port agreement, but India maintained the project.
India's oil imports from Iran: Peaked at approximately 25 million tonnes/year (about 500,000 barrels/day) in 2017–18 — making Iran India's third-largest supplier. Post-2018 sanctions, imports dropped to near zero. India has not publicly recommenced large-scale Iranian oil imports, though informal arrangements persist.
India's balancing act: Maintaining the Chabahar investment, supporting the INSTC through Iran, holding three phone calls with Araghchi — while simultaneously deepening defense cooperation with the U.S. and Israel. This multi-vector engagement is the operational definition of India's strategic autonomy.

Connection to this news: Each of Jaishankar's three calls with Araghchi carries implicit messaging: India's equidistance is not disinterest — India has concrete stakes (Chabahar, INSTC, 85,000 nationals, oil routes) that require active diplomatic management, regardless of which side "wins."

Key Facts & Data

Three Jaishankar-Araghchi calls: February 28, March 5, and March 10, 2026.
U.S.-Israel joint strikes on Iran began February 28, 2026; Iran's Supreme Leader Khamenei killed.
India imports ~85–90% of its crude oil; West Asia accounts for ~55–60% of total crude imports.
Gulf diaspora: ~9 million Indians, ~$125 billion total annual remittances (largest global recipient).
UN Charter Article 2(4): Prohibits use of force against territorial integrity/political independence.
CAATSA (2017): U.S. secondary sanctions law; India received S-400 waiver; Chabahar received Iran-sanctions carve-out.
India-Iran Chabahar 10-year agreement: signed May 2024; Shahid Beheshti terminal.
INSTC: 7,200 km multimodal corridor from Mumbai to St. Petersburg via Iran; Chabahar is India's entry point.
I2U2 (India, Israel, UAE, U.S.): Launched July 2022 — minilateral linking India to Abraham Accords architecture.
India's Ukraine precedent: Abstained at UNSC and UNGA on resolutions condemning Russia — consistent non-condemnation posture maintained in 2026 Iran conflict.