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India considering naval escort for ships in Strait of Hormuz amid Iran war: Report


What Happened

  • India is actively considering deploying naval warships to escort its merchant vessels through the Strait of Hormuz amid the escalating Iran-US-Israel conflict.
  • Approximately 37 Indian oil and LPG tankers are currently stranded near the Strait of Hormuz, highlighting the acute threat to Indian maritime trade.
  • India has one of the world's largest seafaring communities, with thousands of Indian sailors aboard international cargo vessels that are now at risk.
  • The Indian Navy has existing institutional experience with maritime escort operations in the region, having conducted Operation Sankalp in 2019 in the Gulf of Oman.
  • Any decision on naval deployment would require careful calibration — Iran is not an adversary of India, and naval escort could be perceived as alignment with the US-Israeli military campaign.
  • The deliberation reflects the tension between India's need to secure energy and trade lifelines and its longstanding policy of strategic autonomy, including historically close ties with Iran.

Static Topic Bridges

Operation Sankalp — India's Precedent for Maritime Security in the Gulf

Operation Sankalp was launched by the Indian Navy on June 19, 2019, in the Gulf of Oman, in response to attacks on merchant ships near the Strait of Hormuz. It established a precedent for the Indian Navy deploying warships to protect Indian-flagged merchant vessels in the Gulf region.

  • Initial deployment: INS Chennai (guided missile destroyer) and INS Sunayna (offshore patrol vessel).
  • Role: Providing escort, reassurance, and aerial surveillance to Indian merchant vessels; 16 Indian-flagged vessels escorted per day on average during peak operations.
  • Coordination: Involved the Ministry of Defence, Ministry of External Affairs, Ministry of Shipping, Ministry of Petroleum and Natural Gas, and the Directorate General of Shipping — illustrating the whole-of-government approach.
  • The 2019 operation was triggered by a smaller, asymmetric threat (Iranian limpet mine attacks on tankers) — far less severe than the current IRGC-declared blockade with missile and drone attacks.
  • India's legal basis for such operations: The right of ships of all nations to transit international straits (UNCLOS transit passage, Article 38) provides the legal framework; naval escort of commercial vessels is a recognised state practice.

Connection to this news: Operation Sankalp provides the institutional template and legal precedent for the current consideration of naval escort. The scale and stakes are, however, categorically different — 2026 involves a declared blockade by Iranian naval forces, not isolated attacks, requiring a significantly larger and more sustained naval commitment.

Indian Navy's Maritime Doctrine and Blue-Water Capabilities

The Indian Navy's Maritime Doctrine (2015, updated 2022) identifies the Indian Ocean Region (IOR) — extending from the Gulf of Aden and the Persian Gulf to the Strait of Malacca — as India's primary area of maritime interest. The doctrine explicitly identifies sea lane protection, maritime trade security, and non-combatant evacuation operations (NEO) as core naval missions.

  • India's naval presence structure in the IOR is divided into: Primary Area of Interest (the Arabian Sea, Bay of Bengal, and Lakshadweep Sea), Secondary Area (extending to the Persian Gulf, Red Sea, and East African coast), and Tertiary Area (extending further).
  • The Persian Gulf falls within the Secondary Area — the Indian Navy can project force there but with greater logistical constraints than in the Primary Area.
  • Key platforms for Gulf operations: Guided missile destroyers (INS Visakhapatnam-class / Delhi-class), frigates (Talwar-class, Shivalik-class), and maritime patrol aircraft (P-8I Neptune — 12 inducted from the US, long-range maritime patrol capability).
  • India's IFR (Information Fusion Centre for the Indian Ocean Region), established at INS Baaz (Karwar) in 2018 and now at Gurugram, provides real-time maritime domain awareness — a critical enabler for escort operations.

Connection to this news: India has the naval capabilities to conduct escort operations in the Gulf, but doing so at the scale required by the current blockade would represent a significant commitment of surface combatants and would constitute a major escalation of India's military footprint in the Persian Gulf.

India's Strategic Autonomy and the Iran Relationship

India's foreign policy doctrine of Strategic Autonomy — maintaining independent positions rather than aligning with any bloc — faces a significant test in the current crisis. India has historically maintained functional relations with Iran: the Chabahar port agreement (2016, expanded 2024) gives India strategic access to Afghanistan and Central Asia bypassing Pakistan; Iran has been a key transit country for Indian trade with Central Asia.

  • Chabahar Port Agreement: India agreed to develop and operate the Shahid Beheshti terminal at Chabahar, Iran, under a 10-year agreement signed in May 2024. India has invested approximately $85 million in port development; the port provides access to the International North-South Transport Corridor (INSTC).
  • INSTC: A 7,200 km multimodal corridor connecting India to Russia and Europe via Iran — Iran is the central link. Disruption of India-Iran ties threatens this corridor.
  • India-Iran trade: Bilateral trade was constrained by US sanctions since 2019; Iran had been India's third-largest oil supplier before sanctions.
  • Iran's significance to India's neighbourhood policy: Iran shares a border with Afghanistan and Pakistan; India has used Iranian territory to project influence in Afghanistan independent of the Pakistan route.
  • Deploying naval escorts could be read by Tehran as India aligning with the US-Israeli military campaign, potentially jeopardising the Chabahar investment and INSTC connectivity.

Connection to this news: The naval escort debate encapsulates India's strategic dilemma — protecting energy security (requiring assertive naval action) risks damaging the Iran relationship that serves India's broader geopolitical interests in connectivity, Central Asia access, and strategic depth vis-à-vis Pakistan.

Key Facts & Data

  • Operation Sankalp launched: June 19, 2019 (Gulf of Oman).
  • Initial deployment: INS Chennai + INS Sunayna; average 16 Indian-flagged ships escorted per day.
  • Indian tankers currently stranded near Strait of Hormuz: ~37 vessels.
  • India's seafarers: one of the world's largest maritime communities; thousands aboard international vessels in the conflict zone.
  • India's LNG imports via Hormuz: ~69% (2025 data); LPG imports via Hormuz: ~85%.
  • Chabahar port agreement: 10-year deal signed May 2024; India's investment ~$85 million.
  • INSTC length: ~7,200 km (India to Russia/Europe via Iran).
  • Indian Navy P-8I Neptune aircraft: 12 inducted (long-range maritime patrol, Gulf operations capability).
  • IFR (Information Fusion Centre — IOR): established 2018; relocated to Gurugram.
  • India's foreign exchange reserves: ~$640-650 billion (~10-11 months import cover) — provides buffer for import disruption.