What Happened
- Expert analysis of the ongoing US-Israel war on Iran (Operation Epic Fury, begun February 28, 2026) suggests that the long-term implications for Iran-Arab relations hinge on a critical variable: whether Iran's state and governing capacity survive the strikes
- The initial wave of strikes killed Supreme Leader Ali Khamenei and dozens of senior officials; Iran's government has continued to function and prosecute the conflict through the IRGC and parallel state structures
- For the first time in history, Iran attacked all six Gulf Cooperation Council (GCC) member states simultaneously, causing Gulf states to condemn Iran sharply — temporarily overriding any Arab public sympathy for Iran as a victim of US-Israeli aggression
- Experts assess two long-term scenarios: if Iran survives and reconstitutes, Gulf states that were seen as facilitating the strikes could face Iranian hostility for years; if Iran collapses into post-conflict instability, a power vacuum could destabilise the entire region
- The US-Israel war has complicated the 2023 China-brokered Iran-Saudi normalisation and revived fears of full sectarian conflict across the Middle East
Static Topic Bridges
The Axis of Resistance — Iran's Regional Influence Architecture
Iran has built a regional influence architecture through a network of non-state armed groups and political parties, collectively described as the "Axis of Resistance." This network includes Hezbollah (Lebanon), Hamas and Palestinian Islamic Jihad (Gaza/Palestine), the Houthis (Yemen/Ansar Allah), Hashd al-Shaabi (Popular Mobilisation Forces, Iraq), and Kataib Hezbollah (Iraq). These groups receive Iranian funding, weapons, training, and strategic direction primarily through the IRGC's Quds Force. This proxy network allowed Iran to project power beyond its borders without direct military engagement — until the current conflict made Iran itself the direct theatre of war.
- Hezbollah (Lebanon): founded 1982 with IRGC support during Israeli occupation; estimated 100,000+ fighters; arms depot struck by Israel in October 2024, severely degraded
- Houthis (Yemen): Iran-backed; have fired ballistic missiles at Saudi Arabia and Israel since 2015 and 2023 respectively; disrupted Red Sea shipping in 2024-2025
- Hamas: Palestinian militant group designated FTO by US, EU, UK; October 7, 2023 attack triggered the Gaza war that preceded the current Iran conflict
- Hashd al-Shaabi: Iraqi paramilitary, formally integrated into Iraqi security forces since 2016; has attacked US bases in Iraq
- Quds Force: Killed when its commander Qasem Soleimani was assassinated by the US in January 2020; current command structure is decentralised
- The network's strategic value: creates multiple fronts, forces adversaries to spread resources, gives Iran deniability
Connection to this news: Iran's Axis of Resistance is the structural reason why, even with state leadership decapitated, Iran can continue prosecuting an asymmetric conflict — and why Arab states fear a surviving, reconstituted Iran that will remember which states facilitated the strikes against it.
Iran-Arab Relations — Historical Tensions and the Shia-Sunni Divide
The Arab-Persian divide precedes Islam: Persians and Arabs are distinct civilisational and linguistic groups with a history of political competition. The Islamic Revolution (1979) superimposed a Shia theocracy onto this pre-existing Arab-Persian competition, creating the contemporary Shia-Sunni geopolitical axis. Saudi Arabia (Sunni-majority, Wahhabi orientation) and Iran (Shia theocratic republic) have competed for influence across Iraq, Syria, Lebanon, Yemen, and Bahrain. However, this sectarian framing oversimplifies the relationship: Arab Shia communities (in Iraq, Lebanon, Bahrain) have complex and not always pro-Iran loyalties, and Arab states' relationships with Iran are primarily driven by security and economic interests rather than religion alone.
- Iran-Iraq War (1980-1988): Iraq (under Saddam Hussein) attacked Iran; majority Arab states backed Iraq; Iran emerged with deep mistrust of Arab Sunni states
- 1990 Gulf War: Iran's neutrality allowed it to begin repairing Arab relations
- 2003 US invasion of Iraq: empowered Iraq's Shia majority, expanding Iranian influence — viewed with alarm by Saudi Arabia
- Arab Spring (2011): Iran backed Syria's Assad regime; Saudi Arabia backed Sunni opposition — proxy war lines hardened
- Abraham Accords (2020): UAE, Bahrain, Morocco, Sudan normalised ties with Israel — a regional realignment Iran opposed
- 2023 Iran-Saudi normalisation (Beijing Agreement): temporary de-escalation, now reversed by the current conflict
- Bahrain: majority Shia population, Sunni Al-Khalifa monarchy — Iran's influence is a permanent concern for the government
Connection to this news: If Iran survives the current war with its state intact, its hostility toward Gulf states that tacitly supported (or failed to oppose) the US-Israeli strikes could define the next decade of Middle Eastern geopolitics — reversing the 2023 normalisation and potentially triggering a new phase of proxy conflict.
US Presence in the Gulf — Security Architecture and Indian Stakes
The US has maintained a substantial military presence in the Gulf since the 1991 Gulf War. Key facilities include: Al Udeid Air Base (Qatar, largest US base in the Middle East), Naval Support Activity Bahrain (home of US 5th Fleet), Ali Al Salem Air Base (Kuwait), Camp Arifjan (Kuwait), and Al Dhafra Air Base (UAE). This presence underpins the US security umbrella that Gulf monarchies depend on. India has significant stakes in Gulf stability: approximately 9 million Indian nationals live in GCC countries; remittances from GCC to India total approximately 38% of India's total personal remittances (~$52 billion in FY25).
- US 5th Fleet: headquartered at NSA Bahrain; responsible for the Persian Gulf, Red Sea, Arabian Sea, and parts of the Indian Ocean
- Al Udeid Air Base (Qatar): hosts US Air Forces Central Command; over 10,000 US personnel
- India-GCC relations: India is the GCC's second-largest trade partner; bilateral trade ~$161 billion (2023-24)
- Indian diaspora in Gulf: ~9 million in GCC; remittances from GCC = ~38% of India's total personal remittances
- India's stated position: India has emphasised diplomatic resolution, expressed concern about energy security and diaspora safety; abstained from taking sides in the conflict
- Chabahar Port (India-Iran): India's 10-year agreement (May 2024) to operate Shahid Beheshti terminal; a strategic investment now at risk from the conflict
- INSTC (International North-South Transport Corridor): multi-modal corridor linking India to Russia and Central Asia via Iran; conflict disrupts this corridor
Connection to this news: A collapsed or fundamentally weakened Iran would eliminate the Chabahar-INSTC corridor for India; a surviving but hostile Iran could complicate Indian investments in Iran's infrastructure, while a broader Gulf destabilisation directly threatens India's remittance flows and energy security.
Key Facts & Data
- Operation Epic Fury began: February 28, 2026; entered Day 11 on March 10
- First time Iran simultaneously attacked all 6 GCC member states
- 2023 Iran-Saudi normalisation: brokered by China (Beijing Agreement, March 2023)
- Indian nationals in GCC: approximately 9 million
- Indian remittances from GCC: approximately 38% of total personal remittances (~$52 billion from GCC in FY25)
- India-Iran Chabahar Port: 10-year operating agreement signed May 2024
- US 5th Fleet: headquartered in Bahrain; responsible for Persian Gulf and Arabian Sea
- Al Udeid Air Base (Qatar): US Air Forces Central Command; 10,000+ US personnel
- India-GCC bilateral trade: ~$161 billion (2023-24)