What Happened
- SIPRI (Stockholm International Peace Research Institute) released its annual arms transfer data on March 9, 2026, covering the 2021–2025 period
- India ranked as the world's second-largest arms importer by volume (8.3% of global arms imports), behind Ukraine — which topped the list due to emergency arms transfers during the Russia-Ukraine conflict
- Russia's share of India's arms imports declined from 70% (2011–2015) to 51% (2016–2020) and further to 40% (2021–2025), a dramatic reduction driven by India's supplier diversification and delays in Russian deliveries
- France emerged as India's second-largest arms supplier (29% share in 2021–2025), largely driven by the Rafale fighter jet deal, while Israel accounted for 15%
- India's total arms imports fell by 4% between 2016–2020 and 2021–2025, reflecting the early impact of the Atmanirbhar Bharat defence indigenisation push and growing domestic production capabilities
- Pakistan significantly increased its arms imports in the same period, primarily from China, heightening the regional arms competition that SIPRI identified as a driver of Indian procurement
Static Topic Bridges
SIPRI Methodology: Trend Indicator Values (TIV)
SIPRI's arms transfer rankings are based on its unique Trend Indicator Value (TIV) system, not the financial (monetary) value of arms deals. This distinction is critical for interpreting SIPRI data correctly — a country ranked second by TIV volume may not be the second-largest by dollar expenditure, because TIV measures military capability transferred rather than contract price.
- TIV is calculated based on the known unit production cost of a "core set" of weapons (typically US-manufactured equivalents); weapons are then assigned TIV values based on their performance characteristics relative to these core weapons
- SIPRI's Arms Transfers Database (updated March 9, 2026) covers transfers from 1950 to 2025 for major conventional weapons: aircraft, armoured vehicles, artillery, missiles, naval vessels, radar systems, and satellites
- TIV figures are useful for tracking volume trends and supplier market shares but should NOT be used to compare with financial data like defence budgets, contract values, or GDP
- India's decline in TIV-measured imports (4% drop 2016–20 to 2021–25) partly reflects substitution toward domestically manufactured systems (LCA Tejas, Arjun MBT, Dhanush howitzer, Advanced Light Helicopter) which are not captured in SIPRI's import data
Connection to this news: Understanding TIV methodology prevents misreading: India's continued ranking as second-largest importer does not mean it is a larger arms buyer than it was 10 years ago — TIV volumes have declined, signalling genuine (if partial) indigenisation progress.
India's Defence Indigenisation: Atmanirbhar Bharat
India's Atmanirbhar Bharat Abhiyan (Self-Reliant India Mission, 2020) set an ambitious target for the defence sector: increase the domestic share of capital procurement to 75% by 2025. This policy has resulted in Positive Indigenisation Lists (PIL) — items that can only be procured domestically — and dedicated budgetary allocations to domestic industry.
- India's domestic defence production reached a record ₹1.51 lakh crore (~$18 billion) in FY2024–25, an 18% increase year-on-year
- The Ministry of Defence has earmarked 75% of its capital procurement budget for domestic procurement (up from 58% in 2020–21)
- Three Positive Indigenisation Lists have been issued covering 5,500+ items; over 3,000 have been indigenised as of 2025
- iDEX (Innovations for Defence Excellence) has cleared procurement of 43 technology items worth over ₹2,400 crore from startups and MSMEs
- India's defence exports have also grown sharply — from ₹1,521 crore (2016–17) to over ₹21,000 crore (~$2.5 billion) in FY2024–25
Connection to this news: The SIPRI data's 4% decline in India's import volumes is a measurable early indicator of Atmanirbhar Bharat's success — but the continued 40% Russian share and 8.3% share of global imports show the indigenisation transition is far from complete.
India's Arms Supplier Diversification: Strategic Rationale
India's shift away from Russia as its primary arms supplier is driven by both strategic-political and operational considerations. Strategically, over-dependence on any single supplier creates leverage risk — a supplier can use the threat of spare parts denial or technology transfer refusal to constrain the recipient's foreign policy. The 2022 Ukraine war exposed India's Russian-origin spare parts vulnerability when Russian production was redirected to the war effort.
- India's "de-risking" from Russian arms began in earnest post-2014 (Crimea annexation and anticipation of US sanctions on Russia under CAATSA — Countering America's Adversaries Through Sanctions Act)
- France (Rafale fighters, submarines), the US (C-17 transport aircraft, P-8I maritime patrol aircraft, Apache helicopters), and Israel (drones, missiles, surveillance systems) have emerged as key alternative suppliers
- India-US defence trade: from near-zero in 2008 to over $20 billion in cumulative value by 2024 — driven by the Foundational Agreements (LEMOA, COMCASA, BECA) signed 2016–2020
- India-Russia defence ties: Russia remains the single-largest supplier at 40%; key ongoing systems include S-400 air defence (partially delivered), frigates (Gorshkov-class), and submarine leases
- CAATSA risk: India's S-400 purchase from Russia risks US sanctions under CAATSA; the US has granted India a continuing waiver given strategic partnership considerations
Connection to this news: Russia's declining share (70% → 40% over a decade) and France's and Israel's rising shares directly reflect this diversification strategy — the SIPRI data quantifies what has been a deliberate, multiyear policy shift.
Key Facts & Data
- India: 2nd largest arms importer globally in 2021–2025; 8.3% of global arms imports (SIPRI 2026)
- Ukraine ranked 1st (driven by emergency transfers during Russia-Ukraine war)
- Russia's share in India's imports: 70% (2011–15) → 51% (2016–20) → 40% (2021–25)
- France: 29% of India's imports in 2021–25 (largely Rafale jets); Israel: 15%
- India's arms import volume fell by 4% comparing 2016–20 to 2021–25
- Pakistan's arms imports increased; ~82% from China — a key regional security driver
- India's domestic defence production: record ₹1.51 lakh crore in FY2024–25 (+18% YoY)
- Defence exports: ₹21,000+ crore (~$2.5 billion) in FY2024–25, up from ₹1,521 crore in 2016–17
- iDEX: 43 procurement items worth ₹2,400 crore cleared from startups/MSMEs
- US-India cumulative defence trade: over $20 billion since 2008
- CAATSA risk: India's S-400 purchase from Russia potentially triggers US sanctions; waiver maintained