What Happened
- Expert analysis argues that political Islamism — the ideology that seeks to organise state and society according to Islamic law — is politically "dead" in much of the Muslim-majority world, having failed to deliver governance outcomes after the Arab Spring.
- The Muslim Brotherhood-affiliated parties that came to power after 2011 in Tunisia, Egypt, and Libya lost credibility after demonstrating poor governance capacity; trust in Islamist parties fell from 47.5% to 19.8% across six Arab countries between 2011 and 2019.
- Religious vocabularies — specifically Islamic references — are increasingly being co-opted by nationalist movements in Turkey, Pakistan, Iran, and Central Asia as tools of cultural identity rather than theological governance.
- Post-Islamic trends are visible in Iran, where decades of enforced "Islamisation" have produced a fiercely secular younger generation; in Saudi Arabia and Pakistan, surveys show rising numbers of ex-Muslims, atheists, and those identifying as "spiritual but not religious."
- The global trend sees religion becoming an instrument of nationalism (the state using religion for identity consolidation) rather than a basis for theocratic governance.
Static Topic Bridges
Political Islam: Origins, Ideologies, and Key Movements
Political Islam, also called Islamism, is the set of ideologies holding that Islam should guide social and political as well as personal life. It emerged as a modern phenomenon in the late 19th and early 20th century as a response to Western colonialism and the perceived decline of Muslim civilisations.
- Key organisations: Muslim Brotherhood (Egypt, 1928, founded by Hassan al-Banna), Jamaat-e-Islami (British India, 1941, founded by Abul Ala Maududi), and Hezbollah, Hamas as militant variants.
- Spectrum: Ranges from moderate participatory Islamism (Turkey's AKP, Tunisia's Ennahda) to radical jihadist movements (Al-Qaeda, ISIS).
- Arab Spring (2011): Initially brought Islamist parties to power in Egypt (Muslim Brotherhood's Mohamed Morsi, 2012), Tunisia, and Libya, but most were removed from power within years — Egypt by military coup in 2013, Tunisia by President Kais Saied's constitutional coup in 2021.
- ISIS (Islamic State): Declared a "Caliphate" in 2014; territorially defeated by 2019 but remains an insurgent threat.
Connection to this news: The Arab Spring's failure is the pivotal empirical argument for Islamism's political death — it had an unprecedented opportunity to demonstrate governance capacity and failed. This has delegitimised the Islamist political project in the eyes of the very populations it sought to represent.
Secularism and Religion in the Indian Constitutional Framework
India's Constitution, while not using the word "secular" in the original 1950 text, was amended by the 42nd Constitutional Amendment (1976) to include "secular" in the Preamble. India follows a model of "positive secularism" — the state does not maintain strict separation from religion but treats all religions equally (sarva dharma sambhav) while also being able to reform religious practices.
- Article 25: Freedom of conscience and free profession, practice and propagation of religion (subject to public order, morality, health, and other Fundamental Rights).
- Article 26: Religious denominations have the right to manage their own affairs in matters of religion.
- Article 27: No person shall be compelled to pay taxes for promotion or maintenance of any particular religion.
- Article 28: No religious instruction shall be provided in wholly state-funded educational institutions.
- The Indian model contrasts with strict French laïcité (religion entirely private) and theocratic models (Pakistan, Iran) where state and religion are fused.
Connection to this news: India's constitutional secularism faces challenges from the intersection of religious identity and nationalism — a dynamic the article identifies globally. The Hindu nationalist dimension of Indian politics mirrors the "religious vocabulary as nationalism" phenomenon the expert describes, even if India's democratic-constitutional framework differs fundamentally from the theocratic Islamist model.
Religion and Nationalism: The Global Convergence
Historically, religion and nationalism were seen as competing loyalties — the secular nation-state was theorised as replacing religion as the primary source of collective identity. However, the 21st century has seen their convergence in diverse settings: Hindu nationalism in India, Buddhist nationalism in Myanmar and Sri Lanka, Christian nationalism in the United States, and Islamist nationalism in Turkey and Pakistan.
- Pew Research Center (2024, surveying 41,503 adults across 36 countries): Religion and nationalism have converged across a wide range of political contexts as "religious nationalism."
- Turkey: Erdogan's AKP uses Ottoman Islamic symbolism for Turkish nationalist consolidation — Hagia Sophia reconversion to mosque in 2020 is a key example.
- Iran: The Islamic Republic uses Shia identity as an instrument of Persian-Iranian nationalism, while younger Iranians increasingly reject both.
- India's RSS-BJP framework: Hindutva theorists like V.D. Savarkar and M.S. Golwalkar articulated Hindu identity as co-extensive with Indian national identity — a contested but politically dominant framework.
- Pakistan: The Two-Nation Theory (Islam as the basis of nationhood) has evolved into a situation where Islam is used rhetorically by the military-establishment to consolidate power, even as Pakistan's state repeatedly fails its Muslim citizens.
Connection to this news: The article's central thesis — that religious vocabularies have become vehicles for nationalism rather than instruments of theocratic governance — is directly borne out by these examples. For UPSC Mains, this is a critical analytical framework for questions on secularism, communalism, and India's neighbourhood relations.
India's Engagement with Muslim-Majority World
India has significant strategic interests in the Muslim-majority world — energy security (Gulf states supply ~60% of India's oil imports), diaspora remittances (Gulf diaspora of ~9 million, sending over $35 billion annually), and counter-terrorism cooperation (Pakistan, Afghanistan, Bangladesh corridors).
- India-OIC (Organisation of Islamic Cooperation): India is not a member; OIC has passed resolutions critical of India on Kashmir. India engages bilaterally with OIC member states instead.
- India-UAE Comprehensive Economic Partnership Agreement (CEPA): Signed February 2022, India's first CEPA with a Gulf country — strategic deepening with a moderate Muslim-majority state.
- India-Iran: Chabahar Port project (strategic for Afghanistan/Central Asia access); Iran's nuclear programme and US sanctions create complications.
- India-Saudi Arabia: Vision 2030 investments; Crown Prince MBS's modernisation agenda is itself a form of "nationalist Islam" — using Islamic legitimacy while suppressing political Islamism.
Connection to this news: India's foreign policy has successfully differentiated between state-Islam (Gulf monarchies, Erdogan's Turkey) and political Islamism (Muslim Brotherhood, Pakistan-sponsored groups). The expert's framework helps explain why India can partner with Muslim-majority states while opposing Islamist groups that threaten its territorial integrity.
Key Facts & Data
- Muslim Brotherhood founded: 1928, Egypt, by Hassan al-Banna.
- Jamaat-e-Islami founded: 1941, by Abul Ala Maududi in British India.
- Trust in Islamist parties: 47.5% (2011) → 19.8% (2019) across six Arab countries.
- ISIS Caliphate declared: June 2014; territorially defeated: March 2019.
- 42nd Constitutional Amendment (1976): Added "socialist" and "secular" to India's Preamble.
- Article 25: Right to freedom of religion (subject to public order, morality, health).
- Hagia Sophia reconverted to mosque by Erdogan: July 2020.
- Pew Research Center survey (2024): 36 countries, 41,503 adults; found convergence of religious identity and nationalism globally.
- India-UAE CEPA: Signed February 18, 2022.