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Israel army says struck Iran's presidential office, security council building


What Happened

  • The Israeli Defence Forces (IDF) announced strikes on Iran's Supreme National Security Council (SNSC) headquarters and the presidential office in Tehran on March 3, 2026, as part of an ongoing military campaign designated "Operation Epic Fury."
  • The strikes are a continuation of military operations that began on February 28, 2026, when coordinated US-Israeli air and missile strikes on Iran commenced at approximately 9:45 AM Iranian Standard Time.
  • Among the initial targets struck on February 28 was the Pasteur Street district in Tehran, where Iran's Supreme Leader and several senior military and intelligence officials were reportedly gathered in the SNSC offices.
  • On March 3, a separate Israeli strike targeted the building housing the Assembly of Experts — the constitutional body responsible for electing Iran's new Supreme Leader following the reported killing of Ali Khamenei on February 28.
  • Iran's Islamic Revolutionary Guard Corps (IRGC) threatened a response, warning of opening the "gates of hell."

Static Topic Bridges

The UN Charter's Prohibition on the Use of Force (Article 2(4)) and the Right of Self-Defence (Article 51)

The UN Charter's Article 2(4) is the foundational rule of the post-WWII international legal order: all member states must "refrain in their international relations from the threat or use of force against the territorial integrity or political independence of any state." Exceptions exist under Article 51 (individual or collective self-defence in response to an armed attack) and Chapter VII Security Council authorisation. Without one of these exceptions, military strikes on another sovereign state constitute a violation of international law.

  • Article 51 of the UN Charter preserves "the inherent right of individual or collective self-defence if an armed attack occurs against a Member of the United Nations."
  • Anticipatory self-defence (acting before an attack occurs) remains controversial under international law; the Caroline Test (1837) — necessity, immediacy, proportionality — is the classic standard for pre-emption.
  • The UN Security Council's ability to authorise or respond to the conflict is severely constrained by the veto powers of the five permanent members (P5): the US, Russia, China, the UK, and France.
  • Customary international law, reflected in the ICJ's Nicaragua v. United States (1986) judgment, affirms that arming or directing proxy forces also constitutes an unlawful use of force.

Connection to this news: Neither Israel nor the United States has presented a UN Security Council-authorised justification for strikes on Iran. Any legal justification would rest on expanded self-defence doctrines, which remain disputed under international law. The strikes set a significant precedent for the permissibility of pre-emptive attacks on state leadership.


Iran's Nuclear Programme and the JCPOA Framework

The Joint Comprehensive Plan of Action (JCPOA), concluded in 2015 between Iran and the P5+1 (US, UK, France, Russia, China, and Germany), placed verifiable limits on Iran's nuclear activities in exchange for sanctions relief. The US unilaterally withdrew from the JCPOA in 2018 under the Trump administration's "maximum pressure" policy. Subsequent diplomatic efforts (JCPOA renegotiations in Vienna, 2021-2023) failed to restore the agreement.

  • Under the JCPOA, Iran agreed to limit uranium enrichment to 3.67%, reduce its centrifuge count, accept intrusive IAEA inspections, and cap its enriched uranium stockpile at 300 kg.
  • After the 2018 US withdrawal, Iran progressively violated JCPOA limits, enriching uranium to up to 60% purity (weapons-grade is approximately 90%).
  • The IAEA's Board of Governors passed multiple resolutions finding Iran in non-compliance with its safeguards obligations.
  • Iran is not a Nuclear Weapons State under the NPT but is a signatory, and its nuclear programme has been the central issue in US-Israel-Iran relations for two decades.
  • The 2020 US assassination of IRGC Quds Force commander General Qasem Soleimani established a contested precedent for targeting state military officials outside a declared war.

Connection to this news: The escalation to direct military strikes on Tehran marks a qualitative departure from the decade-long pattern of covert operations, proxy conflicts, and diplomatic pressure over Iran's nuclear programme.


The Islamic Revolutionary Guard Corps (IRGC) and Iran's Regional Power Projection

The IRGC is a branch of the Iranian armed forces, distinct from the regular military (Artesh), established after the 1979 Islamic Revolution to protect the revolutionary system. The IRGC's Quds Force is its external operations wing, responsible for Iran's network of allied non-state actors across the Middle East — Hezbollah in Lebanon, Hamas in Gaza, Houthi forces in Yemen, and Shia militias in Iraq and Syria.

  • The IRGC was designated a Foreign Terrorist Organisation (FTO) by the United States in 2019 — the first time a state military entity was so designated.
  • The Quds Force has operated in Syria since 2012, supporting the Assad government; in Iraq following the 2003 US invasion; and in Yemen through arms supplies to the Houthis.
  • The concept of "strategic depth" — using allied non-state actors to deter adversaries and project power — has been central to Iranian security doctrine.
  • Iran's "Axis of Resistance" network includes Hezbollah (Lebanon), Hamas (Palestine), Islamic Jihad, Kataib Hezbollah (Iraq), and Ansarallah/Houthis (Yemen).

Connection to this news: The Israeli-US strikes targeting Iran's presidential and security architecture represent an attempt to dismantle the command structure that has directed the Axis of Resistance network — the strategic rationale goes beyond nuclear concerns.


India's Relations with Iran and West Asia Policy

India maintains a policy of strategic autonomy in West Asia, balancing relationships with Iran, Israel, Saudi Arabia, and the United Arab Emirates simultaneously. Iran is important to India for energy imports (historically 10-12% of oil imports before sanctions), the Chabahar Port project (a key connectivity link to Afghanistan and Central Asia), and India's access to the International North-South Transport Corridor (INSTC).

  • The Chabahar Port agreement between India and Iran was signed in 2016; India has invested in developing the Shahid Beheshti terminal.
  • The US granted India a sanctions waiver for Chabahar in 2018 and 2019, recognising its strategic connectivity value.
  • Iran is a member of the Shanghai Cooperation Organisation (SCO) since 2023.
  • India's diaspora in Iran numbers approximately 20,000-30,000, primarily students and workers; a much larger diaspora (over 10 million) lives across Gulf Cooperation Council (GCC) states.
  • India has historically voted against anti-Iran resolutions at the IAEA or abstained, reflecting its policy of avoiding direct confrontation with Iran.

Connection to this news: The conflict directly threatens India's Chabahar investment, Iran-linked energy access, and the safety of the Indian diaspora. India's calls for de-escalation must be balanced against its security partnership with Israel and strategic partnership with the US.

Key Facts & Data

  • Operation Epic Fury: US-Israeli strikes on Iran began February 28, 2026
  • Supreme National Security Council (SNSC): Iran's highest national security body, chaired by the President
  • Assembly of Experts: 88-member body elected by direct vote; elects, supervises, and can dismiss the Supreme Leader
  • UN Charter Article 2(4): prohibits threat or use of force against territorial integrity of any state
  • UN Charter Article 51: preserves the right of self-defence if an armed attack occurs
  • ICJ Nicaragua v. US (1986): landmark ruling on use of force and non-intervention
  • JCPOA signed July 2015; US withdrew May 2018; Iran began violating limits from 2019
  • Iran's uranium enrichment level post-2019: up to 60% (weapons-grade = ~90%)
  • IRGC designated FTO by US in April 2019
  • India-Iran Chabahar Port agreement: signed May 2016