GS Papers: GS2
What Happened
A second round of direct diplomatic talks between Iran and the United States, held in Oman and subsequently in Geneva, concluded with Iranian Foreign Minister Abbas Araghchi describing the outcome as showing "very good progress" in both the nuclear and sanctions fields. Araghchi stated that the two sides had identified the main elements of a potential agreement and agreed to move discussions to the technical level, with American and Iranian technical teams set to meet at the International Atomic Energy Agency (IAEA) headquarters in Vienna within a week.
The talks were brokered and hosted by Oman, which serves as a long-standing backchannel between Washington and Tehran. The American delegation was led by Special Envoy Steve Witkoff and Jared Kushner, son-in-law of US President Donald Trump. Oman's Foreign Minister Badr Al Busaidi, the principal mediator, described the talks as yielding "significant progress," lending credibility to both sides' characterisation of the round as substantive.
The immediate context is the Trump administration's stated policy of "maximum pressure" — a resurrection of its earlier approach combining sanctions and military posturing — coupled with a stated preference for a new deal that would prevent Iran from acquiring nuclear weapons. Trump deployed additional US naval and air assets to the Persian Gulf region during this period, signalling coercive intent alongside the diplomatic track. The concurrent mobilisation rhetoric from Iran-backed armed groups in Iraq (including Kataeb Hezbollah) underlines the volatility surrounding these negotiations.
Despite claimed progress, no agreement was announced, and both sides remained far apart on the core issues: the extent of Iranian uranium enrichment permitted, the pace and breadth of sanctions relief, and verification mechanisms. Iran's enrichment programme currently stands far beyond JCPOA limits — the country has enriched uranium to 60% purity, just below the 90% weapons-grade threshold.
Static Topic Bridges
1. The JCPOA and Its Collapse
The Joint Comprehensive Plan of Action (JCPOA), signed in 2015 between Iran and the P5+1 (the five UN Security Council permanent members plus Germany), was the landmark agreement that constrained Iran's nuclear programme in exchange for sanctions relief. Under the JCPOA, Iran agreed to reduce its enriched uranium stockpile by 97% (from ~10,000 kg to 300 kg), limit enrichment to 3.67%, and allow intrusive IAEA inspections. In return, multilateral and US economic sanctions were lifted. The US unilaterally withdrew from the JCPOA in 2018 under Trump's first term, reimposing sweeping sanctions. Iran responded by progressively exceeding JCPOA limits on enrichment, centrifuge numbers, and stockpile size from 2019 onwards. By 2026, Iran's enrichment programme is substantially more advanced than it was in 2015, making a new agreement structurally more complex.
2. Iran's Nuclear Programme and the NPT Framework
Iran is a signatory to the Nuclear Non-Proliferation Treaty (NPT), which obligates it not to develop nuclear weapons. The IAEA is the principal verification body under the NPT. Iran's nuclear activities are concentrated at Natanz (primary enrichment site), Fordow (underground enrichment facility), and Isfahan (uranium conversion). Iran has maintained that its programme is for civilian purposes — power generation and medical isotopes — while Western nations have expressed proliferation concerns. Iran currently enriches uranium to 60%, and the IAEA has flagged concerns about undeclared nuclear material and restricted access. A resumed deal would require Iran to roll back enrichment and permit IAEA access, while the US would need to lift sanctions that have crippled Iran's oil exports and banking access.
3. Oman's Role as Diplomatic Intermediary
Oman occupies a unique position in Gulf diplomacy as a country that maintains working relations with both the United States and Iran, unlike most Arab Gulf states aligned against Tehran. Oman historically hosted secret US-Iran negotiations — including the back-channel talks in 2013 that led to the initial interim nuclear agreement (Joint Plan of Action). Its geographic position at the mouth of the Strait of Hormuz — through which roughly 20% of global oil trade passes — also gives Oman a direct economic and security stake in Gulf stability. Oman's consistent neutrality allows it to serve as a conduit for adversarial states to test positions and communicate without the political cost of direct engagement.
4. Iran's Regional Proxy Architecture and Internal Security Implications
Iran's nuclear negotiations cannot be separated from its "Axis of Resistance" strategy — a network of aligned non-state armed groups across the Middle East including Hezbollah (Lebanon), Hamas (Gaza), Houthi forces (Yemen), and various armed factions in Iraq and Syria. Kataeb Hezbollah, an Iraqi group receiving Iranian support, has openly declared readiness for "a long war of attrition" against the US should military strikes on Iran occur. This proxy dimension complicates any nuclear deal, as the US seeks to address Iran's regional behaviour alongside its nuclear programme, while Tehran insists these are separate issues. For India, which sources oil from the Gulf and has large diaspora communities in the region, Gulf stability is a key economic interest.
Key Facts & Data
- Iran currently enriches uranium to 60% purity — just below the 90% weapons-grade threshold; under JCPOA the limit was 3.67%
- The JCPOA was signed in July 2015; the US withdrew in May 2018; Iran began exceeding JCPOA limits in 2019
- Oman hosted the current round of talks; Iran's FM Araghchi and US Envoy Steve Witkoff led respective delegations
- Next round planned to be held in Vienna, at IAEA headquarters, within a week of the February 26-27 talks
- The Strait of Hormuz, off Oman's coast, handles approximately 20% of global seaborne oil trade
- IAEA is the UN body tasked with verifying nuclear compliance under the NPT; headquartered in Vienna, Austria
- Iran's enriched uranium stockpile is now many times larger than the 300 kg limit set under JCPOA
- Snapback mechanism under JCPOA allows signatories to reimpose UN sanctions if Iran violates terms — Europe triggered it in 2025