What Happened
- Prominent Chinese political scientist Yan Xuetong, speaking at the India International Centre in New Delhi on February 24, 2026, argued that a bilateral G2 power-sharing arrangement between the United States and China is "fundamentally impossible."
- Yan contended that the US-China rivalry centres on future technologies — artificial intelligence, cyberspace, and other emerging domains — making the kind of compartmentalised cooperation envisioned in a G2 framework unworkable.
- The remarks directly challenged attempts (including by former US President Trump) to frame US-China relations as a G2 bilateral management arrangement.
- Yan argued that the inherent structural competition over technological supremacy makes meaningful US-China co-governance of global affairs structurally incompatible.
Static Topic Bridges
The G2 Concept — Origin and Critique
The "Group of Two" or G2 is a hypothetical global governance framework proposing that the United States and China, as the world's two largest economies, jointly manage global affairs. The concept was popularised in the late 2000s by American economists and strategists, most prominently C. Fred Bergsten (Peterson Institute) and Zbigniew Brzezinski (former US National Security Advisor). Proponents argued that the two countries collectively accounted for approximately half of global economic growth and therefore needed a coordination mechanism. The concept was decisively rejected by China — which views it as imposing great-power hierarchy on the developing world — and remains a theoretical construct rather than an institutional reality.
- G2 concept origin: proposed by C. Fred Bergsten in 2009 (Peterson Institute for International Economics)
- Zbigniew Brzezinski also advocated for informal G2 as a mechanism for managing global challenges (2009 onwards)
- China's official rejection: based on China's Global South leadership positioning — G2 would signal China abandoning its claimed role as voice of developing nations
- G20 was explicitly designed as an alternative to G2 — bringing 20 major economies together rather than concentrating power in a bilateral directorate
- Trump-Xi framing: in Trump's second term (2025-), some bilateral summits were described by observers as "G2 meetings" — China objected to the framing
- G2 implications: if US and China managed global affairs bilaterally, it would marginalise India, EU, Russia, and the developing world from key decisions
Connection to this news: Yan Xuetong's rejection of the G2 framework from a Chinese intellectual perspective provides academic grounding for China's structural opposition to any US-China bilateral management of global governance — a position that aligns with India's advocacy for multipolarity.
US-China Technological Rivalry — AI, Cyberspace, and Strategic Competition
The US-China rivalry has shifted from primarily trade and territorial dimensions to a contest over technological supremacy in the 21st century. The two countries are competing across artificial intelligence, semiconductor manufacturing, quantum computing, 5G/6G telecommunications infrastructure, and space technology. This competition is existential in nature — the country that leads in AI and quantum computing will hold decisive advantages in economic productivity, military capability, and geopolitical influence. The structural nature of this competition makes the cooperation envisioned in a G2 framework increasingly implausible.
- US CHIPS and Science Act (2022): USD 52 billion for domestic semiconductor manufacturing; explicit aim to reduce dependence on Taiwan and limit China's chip access
- US export controls on advanced chips to China: escalated from 2022 (Biden) through 2025 (Trump) — targeting NVIDIA H100/H200 AI chips, EUV lithography machines
- China's "Made in China 2025" (2015): industrial policy targeting domestic leadership in 10 strategic sectors including AI, robotics, semiconductors
- AI governance: US and China both submitted positions to the UN on AI regulation; fundamental disagreements on AI governance frameworks
- Huawei's 5G: banned in US, UK, Australia, India and restricted across democratic alliances; China rejects exclusion as protectionism
- Beijing AI Governance Principles vs US AI Safety Framework: divergent regulatory philosophies on AI development and deployment
Connection to this news: Yan's argument that the technological rivalry makes G2 impossible resonates directly with the observable decoupling in chip supply chains, AI regulation, and cyber norms — domains where US-China cooperation has effectively collapsed.
Multipolarity and India's Strategic Position
The rejection of the G2 framework by China — and the US preference for maintaining primacy rather than sharing power — creates space for middle powers like India to shape a genuinely multipolar order. India has consistently advocated for multipolarity at the UN, in BRICS, in G20, and in its bilateral statements. The world order India envisions is one where decisions are made through multilateral institutions (reformed to reflect contemporary realities) rather than through great-power bilateral deals.
- India's UNSC reform position: permanent member seat for India; expansion of UNSC permanent membership to reflect contemporary geopolitics (G4 group: India, Brazil, Germany, Japan)
- India's G20 Presidency (2023): "One Earth, One Family, One Future" — explicitly inclusive, Global South-centric agenda
- India's BRICS Chairmanship (2026): "humanity first, people-centric" approach
- Panchsheel (Five Principles of Peaceful Coexistence): India's foundational foreign policy doctrine — respect for sovereignty, non-aggression, non-interference, equality, peaceful coexistence
- India as a "swing state": in US-China competition, India's alignment with one side would decisively tilt the strategic balance — hence both powers court New Delhi
- India's QUAD membership: strategic alignment with US, Japan, Australia on Indo-Pacific security; NOT a military alliance but a security coordination mechanism
Connection to this news: The Chinese scholar's rejection of G2 at the India International Centre in New Delhi is itself symbolically significant — the venue, in the world's most populous democracy that is also Asia's third-largest economy, underlines that China seeks Indian support for its multipolar world narrative, even as the two countries manage their own bilateral tensions.
Key Facts & Data
- G2 concept proposed: 2009 (C. Fred Bergsten, Peterson Institute for International Economics)
- Yan Xuetong: Director, Institute of International Relations, Tsinghua University; one of China's most prominent IR scholars
- Venue of remarks: India International Centre, New Delhi (February 24, 2026)
- US CHIPS and Science Act: signed August 2022; USD 52 billion in semiconductor subsidies
- US chip export controls: extended in 2022, 2023, 2024, and 2025; cover advanced AI chips and EUV lithography machines
- China's "Made in China 2025": launched 2015; targets 10 strategic technology sectors
- G20 founded: 1999 (finance ministers); Summit level from 2008
- India's UNSC reform demand: permanent membership (G4 group with Brazil, Germany, Japan)
- India's G20 Presidency: 2023 ("One Earth, One Family, One Future")
- India BRICS Chairmanship: 2026