What Happened
- Ahead of his February 25-26 Israel visit, Prime Minister Modi publicly characterised India-Israel friendship as one "built on trust" — underscoring the transformation of bilateral ties from arms-length coexistence to active strategic partnership.
- Modi's framing emphasised the depth and reliability of the relationship, contrasting with India's historically cautious, hedging approach to Israel for fear of antagonising Arab states and the Palestinian solidarity bloc.
- The visit agenda includes counter-terrorism cooperation, defence co-development, AI and cybersecurity collaboration, revival of IMEC, and Modi's address to the Knesset.
- Netanyahu described the visit as "historic" and framed it as part of a broader effort to build coalitions of moderate nations against radical forces in the region.
Static Topic Bridges
India's "De-hyphenation" Doctrine in West Asia Policy
For decades, India's West Asia policy was constrained by "hyphenation" — treating relations with Israel as inseparable from relations with Arab states and the Palestinian cause. Improving ties with Israel was seen as risking Arab goodwill, oil supplies, remittances from the Indian diaspora in the Gulf, and Muslim domestic sentiment. India's post-1992 "de-hyphenation" strategy disaggregated these linkages — allowing independent track management of Israel ties, Arab state ties, and the Palestinian question simultaneously, without treating improvement in one as a setback in another.
- Pre-1992 rationale for limiting Israel ties: Arab oil dependency; 3+ million Indian workers in Gulf states (remittances); Muslim vote bloc; Palestinian solidarity in NAM framework
- De-hyphenation: Formalised after 1991 — India opened embassy in Tel Aviv January 1992, while maintaining Arab ties and formal support for Palestinian statehood
- India's Gulf ties: Indian diaspora in Gulf: ~9 million (UAE, Saudi Arabia, Kuwait, Oman, Qatar, Bahrain); remittances ~$30-35 billion annually from the region
- India's formal Palestine position unchanged: Supports independent Palestinian state, two-state solution, East Jerusalem as capital
Connection to this news: Modi's "friendship built on trust" language — and the depth of agenda being pursued in the 2026 visit — is the clearest expression of de-hyphenation in practice: India can pursue a deep strategic relationship with Israel without it being read as abandoning its Palestinian or Arab positions.
Strategic Partnership — Definition and India's Use of the Term
A "Strategic Partnership" in diplomatic terminology denotes a relationship elevated above normal bilateral ties — typically involving defence cooperation, intelligence sharing, institutionalised dialogue mechanisms, and alignment on regional and global issues. India has designated multiple countries as Strategic Partners, but the content varies significantly. The India-Israel Strategic Partnership (declared 2017) was significant because it was the first time an Indian Prime Minister visited Israel and formally used the term, marking a departure from decades of cautious engagement.
- India's Strategic Partners include: USA (Global Strategic Partnership), Russia (Special and Privileged Strategic Partnership), France, Japan (Special Strategic and Global Partnership), Australia (Comprehensive Strategic Partnership), UAE, Saudi Arabia, and Israel (Strategic Partnership since 2017)
- India-Israel Strategic Partnership: July 2017, Modi's first visit to Israel
- Pillars of India-Israel Strategic Partnership: Defence and security; Agriculture and water technology; Innovation and S&T; Cultural and people-to-people ties
- India-Israel Innovation Fund (BIRD Foundation): $40 million bilateral R&D fund
Connection to this news: The 2026 visit deepens the 2017 Strategic Partnership framework — the Knesset address, defence MoU, IMEC discussions, and AI collaboration all represent operationalisation of the partnership across multiple pillars simultaneously.
Counter-terrorism as a Bilateral Pillar
India and Israel share a defining experience of sustained terrorism and have developed a functional basis for counter-terrorism cooperation since the 1990s. Israel's intelligence agencies (Mossad, Shin Bet) and defence R&D (particularly in surveillance technologies) have been a key source of capability transfer to India. Post-9/11 and following the 26/11 Mumbai attacks (2008), counter-terrorism cooperation deepened. India-Israel cooperation covers: surveillance technology, UAV/drone intelligence platforms, cyber intelligence tools, border protection systems, and explosives detection.
- Mumbai 26/11 (November 2008): Exposed India's counter-terrorism gaps; Israel one of the first partners to offer assistance
- Key Israel-origin counter-terrorism platforms used by India: Heron UAVs (border surveillance), EL/M ground surveillance radars, Spike missiles (anti-terrorist operations in counter-insurgency)
- NSG (National Security Guard) — India's counter-terrorism force: Has trained with Israeli special forces units
- India's designation of terrorist organisations: National Investigation Agency (NIA) Act, 2008; UAPA (Unlawful Activities Prevention Act) — India uses a domestic legal framework for designation (not international)
- Joint terror designation: India and Israel have jointly called for UNSC listing of Pakistan-based terrorist entities
Connection to this news: Counter-terrorism remains a foundational pillar of the bilateral relationship and is explicitly on the agenda for the Modi-Netanyahu talks — the "trust" characterisation partly refers to this operational, intelligence-sharing dimension of the relationship.
India's West Asia Strategy — Energy, Diaspora, and Connectivity
West Asia (the Middle East) is India's most consequential neighbourhood by several metrics: it supplies ~60% of India's crude oil and LNG imports; hosts over 9 million Indian workers whose remittances underpin India's current account; and is the gateway for IMEC connectivity to Europe. India's West Asia policy since 2014 has been characterised by simultaneous upgrading of ties across the entire region — Israel, UAE, Saudi Arabia, Oman, Qatar, Iran — avoiding the exclusive alignments of earlier eras.
- India's crude oil imports from West Asia: ~60% of total (Iraq, Saudi Arabia, UAE are top 3 suppliers)
- Indian diaspora in Gulf: ~9 million (UAE: ~3.5 million; Saudi Arabia: ~2.5 million)
- Remittances from Gulf: India is the world's largest recipient of remittances (~$125 billion annually total; Gulf contributes ~$30-35 billion)
- IMEC: India-UAE-Saudi Arabia-Jordan-Israel-Europe corridor — integrates energy, trade, digital connectivity
- India-UAE CEPA: Comprehensive Economic Partnership Agreement signed February 2022 — first India FTA with a Gulf country
- India-Iran Chabahar port: Separate connectivity strategy — India operates the port to access Central Asia independently of Pakistan
Connection to this news: Modi's Israel visit is not an isolated bilateral event — it is one node in a comprehensive West Asia engagement strategy. The IMEC agenda during the visit directly links the Israel relationship to India's broader connectivity, energy, and economic strategy across the region.
Key Facts & Data
- India-Israel full diplomatic relations: January 1992
- Strategic Partnership declared: July 2017 (Modi's first Israel visit — first ever by an Indian PM)
- Modi's 2026 visit: February 25-26 — second visit; Knesset address
- India-Israel trade: $200 million (1992) → $6.5 billion (2024)
- India-Israel defence partnership: Projected ~$10 billion; Israel = India's 2nd-largest defence supplier
- BIRD Foundation: $40 million India-Israel Industrial R&D and Technological Innovation Fund (est. 2017)
- India-Israel Bilateral Investment Agreement: Signed September 2025
- FTA terms of reference: Signed November 2025
- IMEC announced: September 9, 2023, G20 New Delhi Summit
- India's crude oil from West Asia: ~60% of total imports
- Indian diaspora in Gulf: ~9 million; remittances from Gulf: ~$30-35 billion annually
- India-UAE CEPA: February 2022 (first Gulf FTA for India)
- India's formal Palestine position: Two-state solution, East Jerusalem as Palestinian capital