What Happened
- US Congressman Brad Sherman (Democrat, California), a senior member of the House Foreign Affairs Committee and House Financial Services Committee, accused President Trump of "grasping for excuses" to impose "outrageous" tariffs on India
- Sherman stated that India is being "singled out" — noting that India gets only 21% of its crude from Russia, while Hungary imports 90% of its crude from Russia with no tariffs imposed
- He also pointed out that China, Russia's biggest oil buyer, has not faced tariffs specifically tied to Russian oil purchases
- The criticism came weeks after India and the US announced an interim trade framework on February 2, reducing reciprocal tariffs from 25% to 18%
- Sherman urged the President to "reverse this policy immediately," describing the tariff rationale as discriminatory against an ally
Static Topic Bridges
US Trade Policy and Reciprocal Tariffs
The Trump administration has employed tariffs as a primary instrument of trade policy, using executive authority under various statutes. The concept of "reciprocal tariffs" — imposing tariffs equal to or proportional to what trading partners charge on US goods — has been a defining feature of Trump's trade doctrine, though critics argue it conflates trade deficits with unfairness.
- Legal basis for tariffs: International Emergency Economic Powers Act (IEEPA), Section 301 of the Trade Act of 1974, Section 232 (national security tariffs)
- India-US bilateral trade: approximately USD 190 billion (2024-25), with a US trade deficit with India of approximately USD 40-45 billion
- Pre-deal tariff: 25% reciprocal tariff on Indian goods under IEEPA; reduced to 18% under the February 2026 interim framework
- An additional 25% tariff was imposed specifically on India over Russian oil purchases and subsequently removed as part of the trade deal
- India's average applied MFN tariff (~13-15%) is higher than the US average (~3-5%), a gap frequently cited by US trade negotiators
- India's tariff structure: bound tariffs often significantly higher than applied rates, giving flexibility to raise tariffs within WTO commitments
Connection to this news: Sherman's criticism highlights the internal US debate over whether reciprocal tariffs on allies like India are economically justified or merely punitive instruments that damage strategic partnerships.
India-US Strategic Partnership and Trade Friction
Despite being designated a "Major Defence Partner" (2016) and member of the Quad (India, US, Japan, Australia), India and the US have had persistent trade friction. The US removed India from the Generalised System of Preferences (GSP) in 2019, and India has faced criticism over market access barriers, intellectual property enforcement, and data localisation rules.
- India designated "Major Defence Partner" of the US in 2016; elevated to "Comprehensive Global Strategic Partnership" under the Biden administration
- GSP removal (June 2019): India lost preferential duty-free access for approximately USD 6.3 billion in exports; the US cited India's failure to provide "equitable and reasonable access" to its market
- Key US grievances: high tariffs on agricultural products (e.g., 50% on motorcycles, 60-100% on dairy), price controls on medical devices, data localisation requirements
- Key Indian grievances: H-1B visa restrictions, steel and aluminium tariffs (Section 232), removal from GSP, and now the IEEPA-based reciprocal tariffs
- The Trade Policy Forum (TPF), the primary bilateral trade dialogue mechanism, met in January 2026 ahead of the interim deal
- India is not a member of any US-led trade agreement (e.g., not in RCEP, CPTPP, or Indo-Pacific Economic Framework for Prosperity trade pillar)
Connection to this news: Sherman's comments reflect a segment of the US Congress that views tariffs on India as counterproductive to the broader US strategic interest of deepening the India-US partnership, particularly as a counterbalance to China in the Indo-Pacific.
WTO Most Favoured Nation Principle and Tariff Disputes
The WTO's foundational principle of Most Favoured Nation (MFN) treatment requires that any trade advantage given to one WTO member must be extended to all members. Unilateral tariffs imposed outside the WTO framework — such as those under IEEPA — raise fundamental questions about the multilateral trading system's credibility.
- MFN principle enshrined in Article I of the GATT (1947/1994): no discrimination between "like" trading partners
- Exceptions: Regional Trade Agreements (Article XXIV), GSP for developing countries (Enabling Clause), national security (Article XXI)
- The US has increasingly used national security and emergency powers (Section 232, IEEPA) to impose tariffs unilaterally, bypassing WTO dispute settlement
- India has filed WTO disputes against US steel and aluminium tariffs; the US has filed disputes against India's tariff practices
- WTO Appellate Body has been non-functional since December 2019 due to US blocking of new judges, weakening the dispute resolution mechanism
- The IEEPA-based tariffs on India are not subject to WTO dispute settlement under the national security exception argument
Connection to this news: Sherman's characterisation of the tariffs as "grasping for excuses" implicitly questions the legal and economic rationale for using emergency powers to impose trade barriers on an ally, reflecting broader concerns about the erosion of rules-based multilateral trade.
Key Facts & Data
- US tariff on India: reduced from 25% to 18% under February 2026 interim framework
- India's crude oil imports from Russia: ~21% of total (January 2026); Hungary: ~90% from Russia (no tariffs)
- India-US bilateral trade: ~USD 190 billion (2024-25)
- US trade deficit with India: ~USD 40-45 billion
- India removed from US GSP in June 2019, affecting ~USD 6.3 billion in exports
- India's average applied MFN tariff: ~13-15%; US average: ~3-5%
- WTO Appellate Body non-functional since December 2019
- Brad Sherman serves on both the House Foreign Affairs Committee and House Financial Services Committee