What Happened
- Russia's Foreign Ministry spokesperson Maria Zakharova stated on February 18 that Moscow sees "no reason to believe" India has changed its stance on purchasing Russian crude oil
- Russia called the bilateral energy trade "mutually beneficial" and contributing to global market stability
- The statement came after the US claimed, during the India-US trade deal announcement on February 2, that India had agreed to stop importing Russian crude and would instead buy from the US and potentially Venezuela
- India has not confirmed or denied the US claim; MEA spokesperson Randhir Jaiswal reiterated that India's energy security needs take precedence
- Russian crude's share in India's total oil imports dropped sharply from a peak of 44.4% in June 2025 to 21.2% in January 2026 — the lowest since late 2022
Static Topic Bridges
India's Energy Security and Crude Oil Import Dependence
India is the world's third-largest crude oil consumer and importer, with import dependence exceeding 85% of total crude requirements. India's energy security policy is guided by the principle of diversification of sources and market-driven procurement, maintaining that energy purchases are sovereign commercial decisions.
- India imports over 85% of its crude oil requirements (~4.5-5.0 million barrels per day)
- Major traditional suppliers: Saudi Arabia, Iraq, UAE, Kuwait, Nigeria
- Russia's share surged from ~2.5% in 2021 (pre-Ukraine conflict) to a peak of ~44% in mid-2025, before declining to ~21% in January 2026
- India's stated policy: buy oil from wherever it is cheapest and most reliable, consistent with national interest
- The International Energy Agency (IEA) Strategic Petroleum Reserve concept: India maintains strategic reserves at Visakhapatnam, Mangalore, and Padur (total capacity ~5.33 million tonnes under Phase I)
- India Strategic Petroleum Reserves Limited (ISPRL), a subsidiary of OIDB (Oil Industry Development Board), manages these reserves
Connection to this news: The Russia-India oil dynamic illustrates the core tension between India's energy security imperatives (buying discounted Russian crude) and geopolitical pressures (US demands to reduce Russian imports as part of the trade deal).
Western Sanctions on Russian Oil and the G7 Price Cap
Following Russia's invasion of Ukraine in February 2022, Western nations imposed unprecedented sanctions on Russian energy exports. The G7 and EU introduced a price cap mechanism on Russian seaborne crude oil at USD 60 per barrel in December 2022, enforced through restrictions on Western shipping, insurance, and financial services.
- G7 price cap on Russian seaborne crude: USD 60/barrel (effective December 5, 2022)
- Enforcement mechanism: Western shipping companies, insurers, and financial institutions prohibited from facilitating trade in Russian oil priced above the cap
- India and China, as major purchasers of Russian crude, did not join the price cap regime
- India purchased Russian crude at significant discounts (USD 10-20 below Brent benchmark) during 2022-2025
- US imposed additional sanctions on Russian oil tankers, insurers, and intermediaries in January 2025, which contributed to the decline in Indian imports of Russian crude
- The "shadow fleet" of tankers used to circumvent Western sanctions became a key concern for G7 enforcement efforts
Connection to this news: Russia's insistence that the India-Russia oil trade has not fundamentally changed reflects Moscow's concern about losing its second-largest crude buyer, while India navigates between discounted Russian energy and the price cap/sanctions architecture designed by Western nations.
India's Multi-Alignment Foreign Policy Doctrine
India's approach to the Russia-Ukraine conflict exemplifies its broader foreign policy doctrine of multi-alignment (also termed strategic autonomy). India has maintained diplomatic engagement with both Russia and the West, avoiding formal alignment with either bloc while prioritising its own national interests.
- India abstained on all key UN General Assembly and Security Council resolutions condemning Russia's invasion of Ukraine (2022-2024)
- PM Modi's statement at the 2022 SCO Summit — "Today's era is not an era of war" — was directed at Russia and became a defining articulation of India's position
- India continued purchasing Russian crude, military hardware (S-400 system, spare parts), and fertilisers despite Western pressure
- The US invoked but did not apply CAATSA (Countering America's Adversaries Through Sanctions Act, 2017) sanctions on India for the S-400 purchase, granting a de facto waiver
- India's multi-alignment approach draws from the Non-Aligned Movement legacy but is distinct: it involves active engagement with all major powers rather than non-engagement
Connection to this news: Russia's public statement and India's studied silence on whether it agreed to halt Russian crude purchases reflect the delicate balancing act of India's multi-alignment policy, where it seeks maximum room for manoeuvre between competing great-power demands.
Key Facts & Data
- India's crude oil import dependence: over 85% of total requirements
- Russia's share of India's oil imports: peaked at ~44.4% (June 2025), declined to ~21.2% (January 2026)
- Pre-Ukraine conflict (2021): Russia supplied ~2.5% of India's crude imports
- G7 price cap on Russian seaborne crude: USD 60/barrel (since December 2022)
- India-US interim trade deal announced February 2, 2026, reduced tariffs from 25% to 18%
- India's strategic petroleum reserve capacity: ~5.33 million tonnes (Phase I) at three locations
- India imported approximately 1.1 million barrels per day of Russian crude in January 2026, down 23.5% from December 2025