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Iran says no country can deprive it of enrichment rights

February 19, 2026 5 min read International Relations Science & Technology GS2 (International Relations) GS3 (Science & Technology — Nuclear Technology)
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What Happened

  • Iran's atomic energy chief Mohammad Eslami stated that "no country can deprive Iran of the right to peacefully benefit from nuclear technology" and that Iran's nuclear programme is proceeding according to IAEA rules
  • Iran's Foreign Ministry spokesman Esmaeil Baghaei reinforced this, calling the right to peaceful nuclear use "inherent and inalienable" under Article IV of the NPT
  • Foreign Minister Abbas Araghchi separately stated that Iran's enrichment right is "non-negotiable" during an address at the UN Conference on Disarmament on February 17, 2026
  • The statements came after the second round of Oman-mediated indirect talks between Tehran and Washington in Geneva
  • Trump has hinted at military action and deployed significant naval forces to the region, including the USS Abraham Lincoln carrier group and the Gerald Ford carrier indicated for deployment

Static Topic Bridges

Nuclear Non-Proliferation Treaty (NPT) — Article IV and the Right to Peaceful Nuclear Energy

The NPT, opened for signature in 1968 and entering into force in 1970, is the cornerstone of the global nuclear non-proliferation regime. Article IV recognises the "inalienable right" of all state parties to develop, produce, and use nuclear energy for peaceful purposes, which Iran cites as the legal basis for its enrichment programme.

  • NPT entered into force: March 5, 1970; currently has 191 state parties — the most widely adhered-to arms control treaty
  • Three pillars: non-proliferation (Articles I-III), disarmament (Article VI), peaceful use of nuclear energy (Article IV)
  • Article IV(1): "Nothing in this Treaty shall be interpreted as affecting the inalienable right of all the Parties to the Treaty to develop research, production and use of nuclear energy for peaceful purposes"
  • Article IV(2): All parties have the right to participate in the fullest possible exchange of equipment, materials, and scientific/technological information for peaceful uses
  • Non-NPT nuclear states: India, Pakistan, Israel (never signed); North Korea (withdrew 2003)
  • India's position: India has not signed the NPT, viewing it as discriminatory for creating a two-tier system; India gained access to civilian nuclear trade through the NSG (Nuclear Suppliers Group) waiver in 2008
  • The tension in Article IV: the same enrichment technology used for civilian nuclear power (low-enriched uranium, 3-5%) can produce weapons-grade material (90%+ enrichment)

Connection to this news: Iran's repeated invocation of Article IV reflects the fundamental ambiguity in the NPT — the same treaty that grants the right to peaceful nuclear technology also creates the pathway to weapons capability through enrichment, making verification and safeguards critical.

JCPOA (Joint Comprehensive Plan of Action) — Status and Collapse

The JCPOA, agreed in 2015 between Iran and the P5+1 (US, UK, France, Russia, China, plus Germany), was designed to limit Iran's nuclear programme in exchange for sanctions relief. The agreement has effectively collapsed following the US withdrawal in 2018 and the subsequent European invocation of the snapback mechanism.

  • JCPOA signed: July 14, 2015, in Vienna; endorsed by UNSC Resolution 2231
  • Key limits: Iran restricted to enriching uranium to 3.67% (civilian use level); limited to 300 kg LEU stockpile; centrifuge numbers capped at 5,060 IR-1 units at Natanz; Fordow converted to a research facility (no enrichment); Arak heavy water reactor core to be redesigned
  • US withdrew: May 8, 2018, under Trump's first term; reimposed sanctions
  • Iran's response (from July 2019): progressively exceeded JCPOA limits — enriched to 20% (January 2021) and then to 60% (April 2021)
  • European snapback: France, UK, and Germany invoked the snapback mechanism on August 28, 2025, under UNSC Resolution 2231; all pre-JCPOA UN sanctions reimposed on September 27, 2025
  • Current status: JCPOA is effectively defunct; Iran enriches to 60% (near weapons-grade is 90%); stockpile exceeds 9,247.6 kg of enriched uranium (May 2025 IAEA report)

Connection to this news: Iran's assertion of enrichment rights comes as the JCPOA lies in ruins and indirect talks via Oman explore a potential new framework, making the question of how to reconcile Iran's Article IV rights with non-proliferation concerns the central diplomatic challenge.

IAEA Safeguards System and Iran's Compliance

The International Atomic Energy Agency (IAEA), established in 1957 and headquartered in Vienna, operates the safeguards system designed to verify that nuclear materials are not diverted from peaceful uses to weapons. Iran's relationship with the IAEA has been marked by periods of cooperation and confrontation.

  • IAEA Safeguards: based on Comprehensive Safeguards Agreements (CSAs) required under NPT Article III; enhanced by the Additional Protocol (1997, Model Protocol INFCIRC/540)
  • Iran signed the Additional Protocol in 2003 but never ratified it; provisionally applied it until February 2021 when it suspended implementation
  • IAEA has reported unresolved questions about possible military dimensions (PMD) of Iran's nuclear programme, particularly regarding uranium traces found at undeclared sites (Turquzabad and Varamin)
  • Iran's current enrichment capacity: operating advanced centrifuges (IR-6, IR-4) at Natanz and Fordow; producing 60% enriched uranium at rates exceeding 34 kg per week
  • Iran's stockpile of 60% enriched UF6: 432.3 kg as of recent IAEA verification — if further enriched to weapons-grade, sufficient for approximately 9-10 nuclear weapons
  • The IAEA Board of Governors passed a censure resolution against Iran in November 2025
  • India sits on the IAEA Board of Governors (35 members, elected by the General Conference)

Connection to this news: Eslami's claim that Iran's programme "proceeds according to IAEA rules" is contested by the IAEA's own reports, which have documented significant violations of JCPOA limits and unresolved safeguards questions, making verification the critical gap between Iran's stated position and international concerns.

Key Facts & Data

  • NPT: entered into force March 5, 1970; 191 state parties; Article IV guarantees peaceful nuclear energy rights
  • JCPOA signed: July 14, 2015; US withdrew: May 8, 2018; European snapback: September 27, 2025
  • Iran enriching uranium to 60% (weapons-grade is 90%); producing over 34 kg/week at Fordow
  • Iran's total enriched uranium stockpile: ~9,247.6 kg (IAEA, May 2025)
  • 60% enriched stockpile: 432.3 kg — sufficient for ~9-10 nuclear weapons if further enriched
  • IAEA established: 1957; headquartered in Vienna; 178 member states
  • Oman-mediated indirect talks between Iran and US held in Geneva (second round, February 2026)
  • US naval deployment: USS Abraham Lincoln carrier group in the Gulf; Gerald Ford carrier indicated for deployment