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It’s time the old perception of the JVP’s India stance changed: Tilvin Silva

February 18, 2026 5 min read International Relations GS2 (International Relations India and its neighbourhood bilateral agreements)
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What Happened

  • Tilvin Silva, General Secretary of Sri Lanka's Janatha Vimukthi Peramuna (JVP) and the ideological compass of the ruling National People's Power (NPP) alliance, stated that it is time for the old perception of the JVP as an anti-India party to change.
  • Silva completed a landmark 8-day official visit to India (February 5–12, 2026) — the first time in his career that he had visited India — meeting External Affairs Minister S. Jaishankar and touring Gujarat and Andhra Pradesh.
  • His visit to the Vizhinjam Deep-Water Container Transshipment Port in Kerala — a project developed through a public-private partnership model — was seen as symbolic of the NPP government's willingness to engage with Indian development models and move away from rigid ideological opposition to foreign investment.
  • Silva stated: "We have changed a lot, and we are now a responsible government," acknowledging the JVP's transformation from a Marxist insurgent party that fought Indian forces (IPKF) in the 1980s to a governing party seeking regional economic integration.
  • The NPP, led by President Anura Kumara Dissanayake (who won the September 2024 presidential election), has moved toward developmental realism — welcoming Indian investment and infrastructure cooperation while managing Sri Lanka's ongoing IMF debt restructuring.

Static Topic Bridges

India-Sri Lanka Relations: Historical Context and Recent Reset

India and Sri Lanka share approximately 65 km of maritime proximity across the Palk Strait, making them among the closest neighbours in the world by sea. The relationship has oscillated between deep cooperation and periodic strain, shaped by the Tamil ethnic question, fishermen disputes, and great-power competition in the Indian Ocean.

  • The Indo-Sri Lanka Peace Accord (1987) — signed by Prime Ministers Rajiv Gandhi and J.R. Jayewardene — established a framework for Tamil political accommodation (13th Amendment to Sri Lanka's Constitution) and brought Indian Peace Keeping Force (IPKF) to Sri Lanka.
  • The IPKF (1987–1990) fought against the LTTE but also clashed with the JVP, which at the time opposed Indian intervention as neo-imperialist. The JVP waged its own insurgency (1987–89) partly in reaction to IPKF presence, resulting in thousands of deaths.
  • The 13th Amendment remains a live issue: it mandates the devolution of power to Provincial Councils, including to the Tamil-majority Northern Province. India has consistently urged Sri Lanka to fully implement the 13th Amendment.
  • India provided approximately $4 billion in support during Sri Lanka's 2022 economic crisis (currency swaps, credit lines, commodity supplies) — the largest bilateral support package from any single country.

Connection to this news: Silva's India visit represents a deliberate repudiation of the JVP's historical anti-India stance — rooted in IPKF-era conflicts — and signals that the NPP government recognises India's indispensable role in Sri Lanka's economic recovery and regional stability.

The Vizhinjam Port and India's Indian Ocean Strategy

The Vizhinjam International Seaport, developed near Thiruvananthapuram (Kerala) by the Adani Ports Group under a public-private partnership with the Kerala government, is India's first deep-water container transshipment port and a central node in India's maritime strategy.

  • Vizhinjam is located close to international east-west shipping lanes, positioning it as a potential rival to Colombo Port — which currently handles approximately 70% of India's transshipment cargo.
  • A deep-water transshipment hub allows large container vessels (ultra-large container carriers, ULCCs) to offload cargo for distribution to smaller regional ports — capturing significant port revenue currently leaving India.
  • The port's development is part of the Sagarmala Programme, India's flagship port-led development initiative launched in 2015, aimed at harnessing India's 7,516 km coastline for economic growth.
  • Sri Lanka's Colombo Port, by contrast, has been a target of Chinese investment (including the Hambantota Port debt-equity-swap model), making the competitive positioning of Indian-developed port infrastructure a strategic consideration.

Connection to this news: Tilvin Silva's visit to Vizhinjam signals Sri Lanka's openness to learning from — and potentially competing less with — India's port development model, reflecting a broader strategic reorientation away from purely Chinese-financed infrastructure.

China-India Competition in Sri Lanka and the Neighbourhood

Sri Lanka has been a focal point of India-China strategic competition in the Indian Ocean Region, encapsulated by the "String of Pearls" theory — China's alleged strategy of developing port infrastructure in the IOR to encircle India.

  • China financed the Hambantota Port (southern Sri Lanka) and subsequently acquired a 70-year lease on the port in 2017 when Sri Lanka's debt became unsustainable — a transaction widely cited as a case study in "debt-trap diplomacy" (though some scholars contest this characterisation).
  • China also invested in Colombo Port City (a land reclamation project), a planned financial hub adjacent to Colombo's central business district.
  • India has offered competing connectivity and infrastructure projects: the India-Sri Lanka economic partnership, the Trincomalee Oil Tank Farm rehabilitation (northern Sri Lanka), power grid interconnections, and the Jaffna Cultural Centre.
  • The JVP/NPP government's IMF-overseen fiscal consolidation has reduced Sri Lanka's appetite for new Chinese debt, creating an opening for Indian engagement.

Connection to this news: The NPP government's outreach to India — symbolised by Silva's visit — reflects the strategic opportunity India has gained from Sri Lanka's economic crisis: positioning Indian investment as preferable to opaque Chinese lending, while demonstrating that India can be a reliable development partner without political conditionality.

Key Facts & Data

  • Tilvin Silva India visit: February 5–12, 2026 — first visit to India by the JVP General Secretary.
  • Sri Lanka presidential election: September 2024 — Anura Kumara Dissanayake (AKD/NPP) elected.
  • NPP parliamentary majority: 159 seats (supermajority) in the 2024 parliamentary elections.
  • Indo-Sri Lanka Peace Accord: 1987 — established 13th Amendment (provincial devolution).
  • IPKF in Sri Lanka: 1987–1990.
  • India's 2022 crisis support: approximately $4 billion in currency swaps, credit lines, and commodity supplies.
  • Hambantota Port: China obtained 70-year lease in 2017 in exchange for debt relief.
  • Vizhinjam Port: India's first deep-water container transshipment port; Adani Ports operator; Kerala government PPP.
  • Sagarmala Programme: launched 2015, India's port-led coastal development initiative.