What Happened
- Opposition members in the Rajya Sabha raised concerns over the India-US interim trade framework, with the INDIA bloc demanding a full debate on the deal's terms and implications for Indian agriculture and industry.
- Leader of Opposition Mallikarjun Kharge argued the deal was asymmetric, with Indian exports facing 18% US tariffs while multiple US product categories would enter India at zero or reduced duties, and warned of potential agitation similar to the 2020-21 farm laws protests.
- Opposition members flagged concerns about the agricultural provisions -- particularly that DDGs (Dried Distillers' Grains) and red sorghum imports for animal feed could involve genetically modified products, potentially affecting India's dairy sector and cattle breeds.
- The government defended the deal, with the ruling coalition accusing the opposition of politicising a diplomatic achievement and being "wilfully ignorant" of the deal's benefits. Commerce Minister Piyush Goyal had earlier stated that sensitive agricultural and dairy products were protected.
- Opposition parties staged a walkout from the Rajya Sabha demanding a full discussion on the trade deal.
Static Topic Bridges
Parliamentary Debate on International Trade Agreements in India
India's constitutional framework does not require parliamentary ratification of international treaties and trade agreements. Under Article 246 read with Entry 14 of the Union List (Seventh Schedule), the power to enter into treaties and agreements with foreign countries is vested exclusively in the Central Government. Unlike the US system (where the Senate ratifies treaties under Article II of the US Constitution), or the EU system (where the European Parliament must approve trade agreements), the Indian executive can conclude trade agreements without parliamentary approval.
- Article 73 of the Indian Constitution vests executive power of the Union in the President (exercised on the advice of the Council of Ministers under Article 74)
- Entry 14 of the Union List (Seventh Schedule): "Entering into treaties and agreements with foreign countries and implementing of treaties, agreements and conventions with foreign countries"
- The Supreme Court in Maganbhai Ishwarbhai Patel v. Union of India (1969) held that treaty-making is an executive act and does not require parliamentary approval unless it involves legislation to modify domestic law
- However, if a trade agreement requires changes to tariffs, customs duties, or domestic legislation, parliamentary sanction is needed through the Finance Act or relevant amendments
- The Customs Tariff Act, 1975 (Section 25) empowers the Central Government to grant tariff concessions through notifications, providing executive flexibility for trade agreement implementation
Connection to this news: The opposition's demand for a parliamentary debate on the India-US trade deal highlights a recurring institutional question: whether significant trade agreements that affect sectors employing millions should require parliamentary scrutiny even when not constitutionally mandated. The walkout underscores the tension between executive prerogative in foreign affairs and parliamentary accountability.
Tariff Asymmetry and Reciprocal Trade
The concept of "reciprocal tariffs" as implemented by the Trump administration departs from the traditional WTO understanding of reciprocity. Under WTO rules, reciprocity operates through negotiated rounds of mutual tariff reductions (as in the Uruguay Round or Doha Development Agenda). The US "reciprocal tariff" framework, by contrast, seeks to equalise tariff rates bilaterally, arguing that countries with higher average tariffs than the US should face equivalent tariffs on their exports to the US.
- India's simple average MFN applied tariff: 16.2% (overall), 36.7% (agricultural), 13.0% (non-agricultural) -- WTO, 2024
- US simple average MFN applied tariff: approximately 3.3% -- WTO, 2024
- Under the interim deal: US reciprocal tariff on India reduced from 25% to 18%; India reduces tariffs on a range of US industrial and agricultural goods
- India's bound tariff rates (maximum permissible under WTO): 50.8% overall, 113.1% for agricultural products
- WTO's Special and Differential Treatment (S&DT) provisions allow developing countries to maintain higher tariffs and make lesser reduction commitments
- The Enabling Clause (1979 GATT Decision) permits non-reciprocal preferential treatment for developing countries
Connection to this news: The opposition's argument centres on the structural tariff asymmetry: even at 18%, US tariffs on Indian goods remain well above the US average MFN rate, while India is being asked to make significant cuts. India's higher tariffs reflect its development status and WTO-sanctioned policy space for developing countries, which the reciprocal tariff framework disregards.
India's Russian Oil Imports and Energy Security
India's energy security is heavily dependent on oil imports, with approximately 85% of crude oil consumed being imported. Russia became India's largest crude oil supplier after the Russia-Ukraine conflict (beginning February 2022), when heavily discounted Russian crude offered significant savings to India's import bill. The India-US trade deal's conditionality linking tariff relief to cessation of Russian oil purchases introduces a trade-energy-foreign policy nexus.
- India imported approximately 1.06 million barrels per day (bpd) of Russian crude in January 2026 (Rystad Energy data)
- Russia's share of India's crude imports rose from under 2% (pre-2022) to approximately 35-40% by 2024-25
- India's total crude oil imports: approximately 4.5-4.7 million bpd
- India's crude import bill: approximately $130-140 billion annually
- Under the interim deal, the US rescinded the 25% IEEPA tariff on India conditioned on India halting Russian oil imports
- If India resumes Russian oil purchases, the 25% penalty tariff is reimposable
- India has maintained its position that it will source energy from wherever it can get the best terms, citing national interest and energy security
Connection to this news: The opposition raised the Russian oil conditionality as a sovereignty concern, arguing the deal constrains India's independent foreign policy on energy sourcing. The requirement to halt Russian oil purchases -- which has saved India billions on its import bill -- in exchange for tariff relief represents a trade-off between trade access and energy security that the opposition characterised as disadvantageous.
Key Facts & Data
- US reciprocal tariff on India under the deal: 18% (down from 25% + 25% IEEPA penalty = 50%)
- India's crude oil import dependence: approximately 85%
- Russia's share of India's crude imports: approximately 35-40% (2024-25), up from under 2% pre-2022
- Russian crude oil supplied to India: approximately 1.06 million bpd (January 2026)
- India's total bilateral goods trade with US: $131.84 billion (FY 2024-25)
- India's trade surplus with US: approximately $41 billion (FY 2024-25)
- India's bound tariff for agriculture: 113.1% average (WTO); applied tariff: 36.7% average MFN
- Constitutional basis for treaty-making: Article 73 (executive power) + Entry 14, Union List
- The deal is India's first-ever trade agreement with the United States