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Turkish firms continue to work on metro rail contracts despite Ministry’s security directive

March 12, 2026 7 min read Internal Security Polity & Governance GS2 GS3
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What Happened

  • Turkish construction and technology companies continue to execute metro rail contracts worth thousands of crores in India despite formal objections raised by the Ministry of Defence (MoD) over national security concerns.
  • The tensions stem from Turkey's active support to Pakistan — including supply of drones and military cooperation — during the India-Pakistan conflict following the Pahalgam terror attack of April 2026 and the subsequent Operation Sindoor (May 2025).
  • Key Turkish firms with ongoing Indian metro contracts include Gülermak (involved in Kanpur Metro's underground section via a joint venture with Indian firm Sam India; earlier involved in Lucknow Metro's underground section) and Asis Guard (digital/surveillance systems for Bhopal and Indore Metro in Madhya Pradesh).
  • Despite the MoD raising security objections about Turkish firms with access to critical urban infrastructure — including tunnels, signalling systems, and digital control systems — contract cancellation involves complex legal, financial, and procedural hurdles that have prevented immediate action.
  • The government has placed all projects involving Turkish firms "under scrutiny," compiling data on public and private sector agreements; some state governments (notably Madhya Pradesh) have moved to cancel specific contracts.
  • The Celebi Airport Services contract was cancelled and IndiGo was directed to terminate its lease with Turkish Airlines — showing selective but escalating action against Turkish entities in India.

Static Topic Bridges

Critical Infrastructure Protection and National Security — The Regulatory Framework

India does not have a single omnibus "Critical Infrastructure Protection" law, but national security considerations in procurement and contracts are addressed through multiple frameworks including the General Financial Rules (GFR), Defence Procurement Procedure, and sector-specific security clearance regimes.

  • Security clearance requirements for foreign contractors working on sensitive projects (metro tunnels, airports, defence installations) are typically issued by the Ministry of Home Affairs (MHA) and Ministry of Defence — foreign firms require clearance before accessing sensitive information or physically working on designated secure areas.
  • The GFR 2017 (Rule 144) requires government procurement to be guided by public interest, and security concerns can override purely economic criteria.
  • The National Security Council Secretariat (NSCS) and the Cabinet Committee on Security (CCS) are the apex bodies for security-related decisions on strategic infrastructure.
  • Metro rail systems are classified as Critical Information Infrastructure (CII) under the Information Technology (Amendment) Act, 2008, and notified by the National Critical Information Infrastructure Protection Centre (NCIIPC) under Section 70A of the IT Act — meaning their digital systems cannot be accessed by unauthorised or security-flagged entities.
  • The Ministry of Defence's objections are routed through the inter-ministerial coordination mechanism; in cases of live contracts, termination requires invocation of Force Majeure, national security clauses, or public interest provisions in the contract itself.

Connection to this news: The MoD's objections are legally sound — Turkish firms with access to underground metro tunnels, digital ticketing, and surveillance infrastructure represent a potential security vulnerability given Turkey's demonstrated military cooperation with Pakistan. However, the absence of a specific legal framework for mid-contract termination on security grounds means execution is delayed by legal and contractual constraints.

Press Note 3 of 2020 — FDI Screening for Land-Border Countries

Press Note 3 (2020 Series), issued by the Department for Promotion of Industry and Internal Trade (DPIIT) on April 17, 2020, mandated prior government approval for all Foreign Direct Investment from entities of countries sharing land borders with India or where the beneficial owner is a citizen/entity of such countries. While Turkey does not share a land border with India, Press Note 3 illustrates India's evolving national security approach to foreign investment in sensitive sectors.

  • Countries covered by Press Note 3: Pakistan, Bangladesh, China, Nepal, Myanmar, Bhutan, and Afghanistan — all land-bordering nations.
  • The measure was introduced in the context of COVID-19-era economic vulnerabilities and concerns about opportunistic Chinese investment takeovers of stressed Indian companies.
  • As of April 2024: Out of 526 FDI proposals submitted under Press Note 3, 124 were accepted and 201 were rejected — indicating active security screening.
  • Turkey, while not covered by Press Note 3 (no land border), is now being subjected to informal equivalent scrutiny — the security clearance regime for government contracts and procurement is being applied more stringently to Turkish entities following Operation Sindoor.
  • The broader lesson: India's national security apparatus distinguishes between FDI (where Press Note 3 applies) and government procurement/contracts (where MoD/MHA security clearance frameworks apply separately).

Connection to this news: The Turkish metro contract controversy reveals a gap in India's critical infrastructure security framework — existing security screening for government contracts was not systematically applied to third-country (non-land-border) firms whose home countries subsequently become security concerns. Press Note 3's logic is now being informally extended to Turkey on a case-by-case basis.

India-Turkey Relations — Diplomatic and Security Dimensions

India and Turkey have historically maintained cordial, if distant, relations. Turkey has been a vocal supporter of Pakistan's position on Kashmir at international forums, including the United Nations General Assembly. The relationship deteriorated sharply following Turkey's supply of over 350 drones and military personnel to Pakistan during the 2025 India-Pakistan conflict triggered by Operation Sindoor.

  • Turkey's support for Pakistan at UNGA on the Kashmir issue dates back to the 1960s — the two countries share an Islamic solidarity framework.
  • Post-Operation Sindoor (May 2025): Turkey supplied Bayraktar TB2 and other drones to Pakistan; Turkish military advisors reportedly assisted Pakistan's air defence systems during the conflict.
  • India's retaliatory steps included: revocation of Çelebi Airport Services' security clearance; direction to IndiGo to terminate its Turkey-based aircraft lease; review of metro and tunnel contracts involving Turkish firms; and scrutiny of bilateral trade relations.
  • India-Turkey bilateral trade in FY 2022-23 was approximately $10 billion; India maintains a trade surplus. Indian exports to Turkey declined by over 17% in FY 2024-25 as diplomatic tensions reduced commercial engagement.
  • Indian tourist arrivals in Turkey fell by approximately 70% following Operation Sindoor fallout, affecting Turkey's tourism revenue from Indian visitors.

Connection to this news: The continuity of Turkish metro contracts despite MoD objections reflects the institutional challenge of rapidly reconfiguring existing infrastructure contracts — Turkey's support for Pakistan in a kinetic conflict has created a security externality that existing contract frameworks did not anticipate.

Strategic Procurement Policy — "Make in India" and Security-Linked Vendor Management

India's procurement policy has increasingly incorporated national security and self-reliance criteria, particularly for defence and critical infrastructure. The "Make in India" initiative and the Atmanirbhar Bharat framework provide the policy context for reassessing contracts with entities from strategically adversarial countries.

  • Defence Procurement Procedure (DPP) and Defence Acquisition Procedure (DAP 2020): Prioritise domestic procurement ("Make" categories) and impose security clearance requirements on all foreign vendors.
  • For non-defence infrastructure like metro rail, contracts are governed by state/central procurement rules; national security override mechanisms are less explicit but exist through the "public interest" and "security clearance" provisions in GFR 2017.
  • The Negative List (Positive Indigenisation List) under MoD: Lists items that can only be procured domestically — this concept of security-driven exclusion is now being informally extended to civil infrastructure.
  • Public-Private Partnership agreements for metro rail include force majeure clauses; however, "political" risk (diplomatic tensions, bilateral disputes) often falls in a grey zone between insurable and uninsurable events in these contracts.
  • NCIIPC (National Critical Information Infrastructure Protection Centre), established under Section 70A of the IT Act 2008, has the authority to direct changes to CII security measures — this includes metro rail digital systems operated by foreign entities.

Connection to this news: The MoD's objections represent an attempt to use security clearance review as an instrument for reassessing existing contracts — but without a clear legal pathway to terminate ongoing contracts for security reasons in the civil infrastructure domain, the process is slow and uncertain.

Key Facts & Data

  • Turkish firms in Indian metro projects: Gülermak (Kanpur Metro underground section, earlier Lucknow Metro), Asis Guard (Bhopal and Indore Metro digital systems, Madhya Pradesh)
  • Operation Sindoor (May 2025): Turkey supplied 350+ drones and military cooperation to Pakistan during India-Pakistan conflict
  • Çelebi Airport Services: Security clearance revoked by India post-Operation Sindoor
  • IndiGo: Directed to terminate aircraft lease with Turkish Airlines
  • India-Turkey bilateral trade (FY 2022-23): ~$10 billion; Indian exports to Turkey fell 17% in FY 2024-25
  • Indian tourism to Turkey: down approximately 70% post-Operation Sindoor
  • Press Note 3 (2020): Mandates prior government approval for FDI from land-border countries — Turkey not covered but security scrutiny informally extended
  • NCIIPC (established under Section 70A, IT Act 2008): Has authority over Critical Information Infrastructure including metro digital systems
  • GFR 2017 (Rule 144): Government procurement must be guided by public interest — basis for security overrides
  • Madhya Pradesh: Moving to cancel Asis Guard metro contract; central government compiling full review data