How did India’s Maoist insurgency collapse, and can it rise again?

What Happened

• India's Left-Wing Extremism (LWE) threat has contracted to its lowest recorded level since the movement's resurgence in the 2000s, with the government targeting complete elimination of active Naxal presence by March 31, 2026.
• The number of LWE-affected districts has fallen from 126 in 2013 to 18 districts active in early 2025, with only 6 classified as "Most Affected" — four in Chhattisgarh (Bijapur, Kanker, Narayanpur, Sukma), one in Jharkhand (West Singhbhum), and one in Maharashtra (Gadchiroli).
• Violent incidents have declined by over 81% from a peak of 1,936 in 2010 to 374 in 2024; fatalities dropped from 908 in 2009 to 130 in 2024.
• Leadership attrition has been severe: the CPI (Maoist) Politburo, which once had nearly 50 Central Committee members, is now down to one active known member (Misir Besra).
• In 2024, security forces neutralized 290 Naxalites, arrested 1,090, and recorded 881 surrenders; by March 2025, 90 had been killed, 104 arrested, and 164 surrendered in that year alone.
• Over 1,500 cadres surrendered in 2025, the highest annual surrender figure on record.
• The analysis examines whether structural conditions — poverty, land rights disputes, tribal marginalization — that originally sustained the insurgency remain sufficiently unresolved to allow a resurgence.

Static Topic Bridges

Origins and Evolution of the Naxalite-Maoist Insurgency

The Naxalite movement originated in the Naxalbari village of West Bengal's Darjeeling district in May 1967, when a peasant uprising led by local Communist Party of India (Marxist) members — notably Kanu Sanyal and Jangal Santhal — demanded land redistribution from landlords. The 72-day uprising was suppressed, but it galvanized a revolutionary current across India that would splinter into dozens of factions over the following decades.

The modern phase of the insurgency is associated with the Communist Party of India (Maoist) [CPI (Maoist)], formed in 2004 through a merger of the People's War Group (operating primarily in Andhra Pradesh and Telangana) and the Maoist Communist Centre of India (operating in Bihar and Jharkhand). The merger created a unified command and a territorial corridor — the "Red Corridor" — stretching from Nepal's border through eastern India to northern Andhra Pradesh.

At its peak around 2010, the Red Corridor covered over 200 districts across 20 states, and LWE was described by Prime Minister Manmohan Singh as "the single biggest internal security challenge" facing India.

Government Counter-LWE Strategy: SAMADHAN and the Multi-Pronged Approach

India's counter-LWE approach evolved from pure security operations in the 1970s–2000s to a hybrid security-development framework from 2009 onward, and further to the SAMADHAN doctrine from 2017.

The National Policy and Action Plan against LWE was approved in 2015, emphasizing simultaneous security operations, development delivery, and rights protection. In 2017, the government formalized SAMADHAN as an acronym-based doctrine:

• S — Smart Leadership
• A — Aggressive Strategy
• M — Motivation and Training
• A — Actionable Intelligence
• D — Dashboard-Based KPIs and Key Performance Indicators
• H — Harnessing Technology
• A — Action Plan for Each Theatre
• N — No Access to Financing

Key security operations include Operation Green Hunt (launched 2009), and more recently Operation Kagaar (2024–25), which targeted the CPI (Maoist)'s central reserve formations in the Abujhmad forest (Chhattisgarh), the last major operational stronghold.

Development interventions under the LWE scheme include road connectivity, mobile towers, banking access, and Eklavya Model Residential Schools in affected districts. The Aspirational Districts Programme (since renamed Aspirational Districts and Blocks Programme) covers a significant number of former LWE strongholds.

Internal Security Architecture: LWE as a Case Study

LWE sits within India's broader internal security framework in a specific analytical category — it is neither a cross-border terrorism problem (like Pakistan-sponsored militancy in J&K) nor a pure ethnic/separatist insurgency (like in the northeast). It is classified as an ideologically-motivated armed uprising against the state with a domestic social base.

This classification has constitutional implications. Internal security is a state subject under the Seventh Schedule, but the central government provides support through CAPFs (Central Armed Police Forces), the SRE scheme, intelligence coordination, and financial/technical assistance. The Centre can deploy CAPFs to assist state police but cannot directly command them without state consent in most circumstances.

This structure creates coordination challenges — the three most affected states (Chhattisgarh, Jharkhand, Maharashtra) have different political configurations, capacity levels, and approaches to surrender/rehabilitation.

Can the Insurgency Rise Again? Structural Factors

The decline of CPI (Maoist) as an armed organization does not automatically dissolve the social conditions that sustained it. Analysts identify three categories of risk factors for resurgence:

Persistent Grievances: - Forest Rights Act (FRA) 2006 implementation remains incomplete in tribal districts; land alienation continues - Mining leases in Chhattisgarh, Jharkhand, and Odisha frequently create displacement without adequate rehabilitation - PESA (Panchayats Extension to Scheduled Areas) Act 1996 provisions on gram sabha consent for resource extraction are routinely bypassed

Organizational Resilience: - CPI (Maoist) has historically reconstituted after military setbacks (e.g., Andhra Pradesh defeat in 2004–05 led to eastward expansion into Odisha and Chhattisgarh) - Remaining cadres in Abujhmad have a history of operating without central coordination - Urban component ("Urban CASO" or urban Naxalism) provides above-ground ideological and financial support networks

External Enabling Factors: - Ideological sympathy networks in universities and civil society, though much reduced after NIA investigations - Diaspora funding channels, though disrupted after 2022–24 NIA operations

Key Facts & Data

• Peak LWE spread (2010): 1,936 violent incidents; 908 deaths; 200+ affected districts across 20 states
• Current LWE spread (2024–25): 374 incidents; 130 deaths; 18 affected districts; 6 "Most Affected"
• Decline in violent incidents: ~81% reduction from 2010 to 2024
• Most Affected districts (2025): Bijapur, Kanker, Narayanpur, Sukma (Chhattisgarh); West Singhbhum (Jharkhand); Gadchiroli (Maharashtra)
• 2024 security outcomes: 290 Naxalites neutralized, 1,090 arrested, 881 surrendered
• 2025 surrenders: Over 1,500 — highest annual figure on record
• CPI (Maoist) Politburo: Down to 1 active known member (Misir Besra) from ~50 peak Central Committee members
• Government target: Complete elimination of LWE by March 31, 2026
• CPI (Maoist) founded: 2004 (merger of PWG and MCC)
• SAMADHAN doctrine: Launched 2017 by Ministry of Home Affairs
• Key force: CRPF with COBRA (Commando Battalion for Resolute Action) units as primary counter-Naxal formation
• Operation Kagaar (2024–25): Targeted CPI (Maoist) central reserve formations in Abujhmad, Chhattisgarh
• Naxalbari uprising: 1967, Darjeeling district, West Bengal — ideological origin of the movement