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As oil flows through Strait of Hormuz come to a halt, India may look at increasing Russian oil imports


What Happened

  • Following joint US-Israel military strikes on Iran in late February 2026, tanker traffic through the Strait of Hormuz dropped by approximately 70%, with over 150 ships anchoring outside the strait to avoid attack risk.
  • Indian refiners have begun prioritizing alternative crude sourcing options that bypass the Strait of Hormuz — including West Africa, Oman, and the United States.
  • The US, which has its own surplus crude production capacity, has emerged as a viable alternative for Indian refiners seeking non-Hormuz supply.
  • If the disruption persists, Indian refiners may route cargoes via the Cape of Good Hope — but this extends transit time substantially and would reduce available Gulf supply to approximately one-fourth of normal volumes.
  • Saudi Arabia and UAE have some pipeline infrastructure that can bypass Hormuz, with an estimated 2.6 million barrels per day of combined bypass capacity available.

Static Topic Bridges

Strait of Hormuz: Geography and Strategic Significance

The Strait of Hormuz is a narrow waterway located between Iran to the north and Oman to the south, connecting the Persian Gulf with the Gulf of Oman and the Arabian Sea. At its narrowest, it is approximately 33 kilometres wide. In 2024, approximately 20 million barrels per day of oil — equivalent to roughly 20% of global petroleum liquids consumption — transited through the strait. Around one-fifth of global LNG trade (primarily Qatari) also passes through Hormuz. It is universally recognized as the world's most critical oil chokepoint.

  • Location: between Iran (north) and Oman (south)
  • Narrowest width: approximately 33 km
  • Daily oil flow: ~20 million barrels/day (about 20% of global petroleum consumption, 2024)
  • LNG flow: ~one-fifth of global LNG trade (Qatar primarily)
  • No adequate alternative route exists — Saudi and UAE pipelines combined can bypass only ~2.6 million bpd (a fraction of the 20 million bpd that transits the strait)

Connection to this news: The strait's extraordinary concentration of global energy flows — and the absence of viable alternatives at scale — explains why any disruption immediately forces importers like India to seek geographically distant substitutes such as US crude or West African barrels.


India-US Energy Trade

The United States has become a significant crude oil supplier to India following the shale revolution that turned the US into the world's largest crude oil producer. In 2024, the US supplied approximately 0.17 million barrels per day to India, accounting for 3.5% of India's crude imports. Under the backdrop of US-India trade negotiations in 2025-2026 and US pressure to reduce Russian oil purchases, Indian state refiners have been nudged toward increasing US crude purchases. A Hormuz disruption structurally accelerates this shift.

  • US crude supplied to India: ~0.17 mb/d in 2024 (3.5% of India's imports)
  • US is world's largest crude oil producer (post-shale revolution)
  • US crude is West Texas Intermediate (WTI) or Eagle Ford grade — lighter and sweeter than Gulf medium-sour crude
  • Indian refineries are predominantly configured for medium-sour crude; blending adjustments are required for light-sweet US crude
  • Increasing US crude aligns with India-US trade deal negotiations reducing tariff frictions

Connection to this news: Turning to US crude during a Hormuz crisis serves a dual purpose — replacing Gulf supply while also signalling goodwill in ongoing India-US trade negotiations. The practical constraint is that Indian refinery configurations require blending to accommodate lighter US grades.


Alternative Maritime Routes and Their Constraints

When the Strait of Hormuz is disrupted, oil cargoes from the Persian Gulf must reroute around the Arabian Peninsula via the Cape of Good Hope — adding thousands of nautical miles and weeks to transit time. Saudi Arabia's East-West Pipeline (Petroline) can carry approximately 5 million bpd from the Eastern Province to the Red Sea port of Yanbu. The UAE's Abu Dhabi Crude Oil Pipeline (ADCOP) can move approximately 1.5 million bpd to Fujairah on the Gulf of Oman, bypassing Hormuz entirely. Together, these provide about 2.6 million bpd of bypass capacity — far short of the 20 million bpd that normally transits the strait.

  • Saudi Petroline: ~5 million bpd capacity (Eastern Province to Yanbu, Red Sea)
  • UAE ADCOP: ~1.5 million bpd capacity (to Fujairah, Gulf of Oman)
  • Combined bypass capacity: ~2.6 million bpd vs. 20 million bpd normal Hormuz flow
  • Cape of Good Hope route: adds ~2-3 weeks transit time; oil available to India would be roughly one-fourth of normal Gulf supply
  • Insurance and freight costs on Hormuz-linked routes rising by as much as 50%

Connection to this news: The extreme mismatch between bypass capacity and normal Hormuz flows is why Indian refiners must seek geographically distant alternatives (US, West Africa) rather than simply relying on Saudi/UAE pipeline rerouting.


Key Facts & Data

  • Strait of Hormuz: ~33 km at narrowest; ~20 million bpd oil transit (2024)
  • India: 51% of crude oil and 83% of LPG imports pass through Hormuz-linked routes
  • Tanker traffic through Hormuz dropped ~70% in early March 2026
  • Saudi-UAE bypass pipeline capacity: ~2.6 million bpd combined
  • US crude share of India's imports: ~3.5% (2024); potential to increase during crisis
  • Cape of Good Hope rerouting would reduce available Gulf supply to ~one-fourth of normal volumes
  • Shipping cost premiums on Hormuz routes: rising up to 50%
  • India's crude import dependence: ~87% of national requirements (2024)