Revisiting India’s entry onto the nuclear stage

May 18, 1974 marked the 52nd anniversary of India's first nuclear test — codenamed Operation Smiling Buddha — conducted at the Pokhran Test Range in Rajastha...

What Happened

May 18, 1974 marked the 52nd anniversary of India's first nuclear test — codenamed Operation Smiling Buddha — conducted at the Pokhran Test Range in Rajasthan's Thar Desert.
The test established India as the first nation outside the five permanent UN Security Council members to detonate a nuclear device.
The event is being revisited as a milestone that fundamentally reshaped India's strategic autonomy, non-proliferation diplomacy, and its relationship with international nuclear regimes.
India's nuclear journey — from the 1974 test through the 1998 Shakti tests to the 2008 NSG waiver — illustrates a sustained pursuit of independent deterrence capability outside the Non-Proliferation Treaty framework.
The anniversary has prompted renewed examination of India's nuclear doctrine, the credibility of its No First Use posture, and the operational status of its nuclear triad.

Static Topic Bridges

Operation Smiling Buddha (Pokhran-I) — India's First Nuclear Test

On 18 May 1974, India detonated a plutonium-based implosion device at Pokhran with a yield estimated between 6 and 15 kilotons. The official designation by the Ministry of External Affairs was a "peaceful nuclear explosion." The scientific team was led by Raja Ramanna under the aegis of the Department of Atomic Energy (DAE). In 1997, Ramanna confirmed it was in fact a weapons test.

Device type: Plutonium fission (implosion design), indigenously developed
Yield: Approximately 6–15 kilotons (estimates vary)
Location: Pokhran Test Range, Rajasthan, conducted by the Indian Army
Immediate consequence: Formation of the Nuclear Suppliers Group (NSG) to restrict nuclear technology transfer

Connection to this news: The 52nd anniversary has prompted reflection on how the 1974 test catalysed both international non-proliferation architecture and India's own path to overt nuclear power status.

Atomic Energy Act, 1962 — Legal Basis for India's Nuclear Programme

The Atomic Energy Act, 1962 is the foundational legislation governing all nuclear activities in India. It vests ownership of all atomic minerals and fissile materials in the central government, and empowers the Atomic Energy Commission (AEC) — established in 1948 under Homi J. Bhabha — to direct the Department of Atomic Energy (DAE). The Act restricts information about nuclear activities in the interest of national security and mandates parliamentary oversight only in limited form.

Establishes the three-stage nuclear power programme: natural uranium PHWRs → fast breeder reactors → thorium-based reactors
Gives DAE exclusive authority over uranium, plutonium, and thorium mining and processing
Amended in 2015 to allow private sector participation in nuclear liability frameworks

Connection to this news: All nuclear tests, including the 1974 and 1998 events, were conducted under DAE authority vested by this Act.

Pokhran-II (Operation Shakti) — 1998 Tests and Overt Nuclearization

Operation Shakti comprised five underground detonations: three on 11 May and two on 13 May 1998, at the Pokhran Test Range. The first device (Shakti-I) was a thermonuclear (hydrogen bomb) device with an officially claimed yield of 45 kilotons; Shakti-II was a fission device of approximately 15 kilotons; and Shakti-III was a sub-kiloton experimental device. The tests declared India an overt nuclear-weapon state.

India signed no de facto moratorium on further testing (unlike the US and Russia); it announced a voluntary moratorium
Pakistan responded with its own tests (Chagai-I and Chagai-II) within days
The tests prompted US-led sanctions under the Glenn Amendment
India subsequently articulated its official nuclear doctrine in 1999 (draft) and 2003 (official)

Connection to this news: The Shakti tests transformed the strategic landscape that had existed since 1974, making India's nuclear status internationally acknowledged and prompting negotiation of the 2008 NSG waiver.

India's Nuclear Doctrine — No First Use and Credible Minimum Deterrence

India's 2003 Nuclear Doctrine (summarised from the 1999 Draft Nuclear Doctrine) rests on two pillars: (1) No First Use (NFU) — India will not use nuclear weapons unless attacked with nuclear weapons first; and (2) Credible Minimum Deterrence — maintaining a sufficient but not excessive arsenal to deter adversaries. The doctrine mandates massive retaliation in response to a first nuclear strike and extends nuclear deterrence to cover retaliation against chemical or biological weapons attacks.

Authority for nuclear use vests in the Nuclear Command Authority (NCA), chaired by the Prime Minister
The doctrine envisages a triad: land-based ballistic missiles (Agni series), air-delivered bombs, and submarine-launched ballistic missiles (K-series, deployed on INS Arihant and INS Arighaat)
NFU commitment has faced periodic debates about whether it remains unconditional

Connection to this news: Discussion of India's nuclear history invariably leads to the doctrine question — whether the NFU posture remains credible and strategically sound in the current regional threat environment.

NPT Non-Membership and the NSG Waiver (2008)

India never signed the Treaty on the Non-Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons (NPT, 1968), arguing it created a discriminatory two-tier system (NWS vs. NNWS). As a result, India faced decades of technology denial. The 2008 India-US Civil Nuclear Agreement (123 Agreement) led the 48-member Nuclear Suppliers Group to grant India a country-specific exemption on 6 September 2008 at Vienna — allowing civilian nuclear trade without requiring India to join the NPT or sign the Comprehensive Nuclear-Test-Ban Treaty (CTBT).

India-US 123 Agreement signed July 2007; NSG waiver granted September 2008
India placed 14 thermal reactors under IAEA safeguards as part of the deal
India maintains a separation plan: civilian facilities (IAEA-safeguarded) vs. military (unsafeguarded)
India has observer status at NSG but full membership remains contested

Connection to this news: The 1974 test triggered the NSG's creation; the 2008 waiver brought India's nuclear programme into partial international legitimacy — a journey of 34 years from the first test.

Key Facts & Data

18 May 1974: Operation Smiling Buddha — India's first nuclear test, Pokhran
11–13 May 1998: Operation Shakti — five tests; India declares itself a nuclear-weapon state
Estimated yield, Pokhran-I: 6–15 kilotons (plutonium fission)
Estimated yield, Shakti-I: ~45 kilotons (thermonuclear)
NSG: formed in 1975 as a direct consequence of India's 1974 test; 48 member states
NSG India-specific waiver: 6 September 2008, Vienna
India's nuclear triad is operational with INS Arihant and INS Arighaat (SLBMs)
NCA: Nuclear Command Authority — the apex body for nuclear use decisions, chaired by the Prime Minister
India has not signed NPT (1968) or CTBT (1996)
Red Corridor reduction: India's No First Use doctrine adopted 2003; remains unchanged officially